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This thesis explores the impact of local government reform in Qingdao, Jinan and 
Linyi municipalities of Shandong province in the People’s Republic of China. It aims 
to answer two main questions: (1) How effective is local government reform in the 
three municipalities? and (2) How can their different levels of effectiveness be 
explained? 
This thesis argues that the three municipalities have not effectively downsized 
their governments. However, they have improved public service delivery through 
rationalizing the administrative approval system and increasing government 
transparency and public participation. They have also improved the personnel 
management system in recruitment, promotion, appraisal and training. Nevertheless, 
the bureaucratic accountability and integrity of officials have not been improved since 
the anti-corruption measures have not been effective. Among the three municipalities, 
the Qingdao government is the most effective in carrying out administrative reform. 
The Jinan government is less effective than the Qingdao government but more 
effective than the Linyi government. This study further argues that three important 
factors, that is, the local context, the relationship between the central and local 
governments and the political leadership facilitate or hinder the effectiveness of local 
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Why Study Local Government Reform in China? 
 
Rapid economic, political and technological changes and the poor performance of 
many central governments have forced leaders to think beyond conventional 
top-down approaches to development and to rely more heavily on the lower levels of 
government, especially in larger countries such as China, India and Russia.1 The 
growing significance of local governments has stimulated interest among scholars 
who argue that the central government “does not have an unlimited ability to collect 
information and monitor agents,” whereas the local authorities “are generally better 
informed—for instance on the revenue-generating capacity of local enterprises, or on 
the needs of local populations.”2 Local government plays a pivotal role in providing 
and financing public services in many countries. It “could respond to local variation 
and experiment with innovative public policies which were often transferred to higher 
levels of government.”3 In terms of participation, local citizens also relate most 
directly to their local governments.4 Furthermore, better access to information and 
more effective policy-making are believed to enable local governments to play more 
important roles in managing population, economic, social and political affairs, 
                                                        
1 Jean-Jacques Dethier, “Governance, Decentralization, and Reform: An Introduction,” in Jean-Jacques Dethier 
(ed.), Governance, Decentralization, and Reform in China, India, and Russia (Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2000), pp. 5-6. 
2 Ibid. , p. 5. 
3 Peter John, Local Governance in Western Europe (London: Sage Publications, 2001), p. 8. 
4 C. Ronald Fisher, “Economic Influences on the Structure of Local Government in U.S. Metropolitan Areas,” 
Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 43 (1998), pp. 444-471. 
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especially in larger countries. 
Putting emphasis on the role of local government, the term “decentralization” is 
becoming increasingly popular worldwide. One of the reasons for the emphasis on 
decentralization is that many governments believe that decentralization can “promote 
local democracy and make for more efficient local government.”5 Decentralization is 
seen as a process to reduce overload and congestion in the channels of administration 
and communications, and it reacts swiftly to unanticipated problems that inevitably 
arise during implementation, and improves administrative and managerial capacity.6 
Another benefit of decentralization is that it has the potential to “improve the 
efficiency of local government by subjecting its actions to the scrutiny of the local 
electorate by both the articulation of demands and responses for public services.”7  
Recognizing the potential of local government and responding to the global call 
for decentralization, many central governments have empowered their local 
governments.8 However, the kinds of problems that exist within local government 
such as inefficiency and overlapping government functions have prevented a smooth 
power transition between the central and the local governments. Therefore, local 
government reform has become increasingly popular in developing countries since the 
mid-1980s, especially in China.  
Administrative reform in China was urgently propelled by economic reform. As 
                                                        
5 Dora Orlansky, “Decentralization Politics and Policies,” in Stuart S. Nagel (ed.), Critical Issues in 
Cross-National Public Administration: Privatization, Democratization, Decentralization (Westport: Quorum, 
2000), p. 184. 
6 Ibid. , p. 184. 
7 Ibid. , p. 184. 
8 Mark Turner, “Local Government Reform and Community-Driven Development: Asia-Pacific Experiences,” in 
Paul Collins (ed.), Applying Public Administration in Development: Guideposts to the Future (Chichester: Wiley, 
2000), p. 115. 
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China was transformed from a planned economy towards a market economy, the 
original role of government could not meet the demands of economic reform. The 
separation of functions between the government and enterprises became necessary.9 
Moreover, China has empowered its local governments to enhance their efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
However, during the last two decades, local government in China has encountered 
such serious problems as low trust of the public in government, serious fiscal deficits, 
inefficiency and the lack of accountability. These problems “ubiquitously exist in 
government to different degrees at every level,” which, not only “jeopardized the 
capacity and effectiveness of governance, but also challenged the legitimacy of the 
government for its existence.”10 Therefore, the Chinese government believes that 
administrative reform at the local level and the redefinition of local government 
functions are urgently required for the development of China.  
Local government reform in China is determined by the central government since 
its administrative reform provides the local governments with the standards and 
policies for carrying out reform.11 To meet the external challenges and to solve 
internal problems faced by the government, China has initiated four large-scale 
administrative reforms in 1982, 1988, 1993 and 1998. All these reforms have 
penetrated down to the level of local government.12 In general, these government 
                                                        
9 Chengfu Zhang and Mengzhong Zhang, “Public Administration and Administrative Reform in China for the 21st 
Century-from State-Centre Governance to the Citizen-Centre Governance,” (Paper presented at the American 
Society for Public Administration 62nd Annual Conference, in Newark, USA, March 10-13, 2001), p. 4.   
10 Ibid. , p. 6. 
11 Qingyun Chen, Ji Chen and Qingdong Zhang, “On the Reform of Local Government Organizations in China,” 
Chinese Public Administration Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2002), p. 92. 
12 Zhiyong Lan, “Local Government Reform in the People’s Republic of China: Stipulations, Impact, Cases and 
Assessment,” Chinese Public Administration, Vol. 1, No.1 (2002), p. 209. 
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reforms in China have not only boosted economic development but also have major 
implications for the change of government functions. Among these four reforms, the 
one starting from 1998 to 2003 is the most comprehensive reform to date.13  
In response to the 1998 central government reform, a document named “Opinions 
of the State Council on Reforming Organizations of Local Government” came into 
force in 1999. This document marks the beginning of comprehensive local 
government reform in China.14 Since 1999, local governments at the provincial, 
municipal, county and township levels of China have carried out administrative 
reform in succession. Administrative reforms at the provincial level were completed 
in early 2001,15 and were carried out initially in such developed areas as Guangdong 
province, Zhejiang province and Shandong province, as the undeveloped provinces 
were not urged to participate. 
The National Work Meeting on Organization Reform of Municipality, County and 
Township was held by the State Council in February 2001 as a prelude to the most 
comprehensive administrative reform at the municipal, county and township levels in 
China. 16  At that meeting, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji 17  emphasized that the 
municipal, county and township governments were the basic levels in the organization 
structure and administrative management system of the Chinese government because 
                                                        
13 Liu Zhifeng, Diqici geming: 1998-2003 zhongguo zhengfu jigougaige wenti baogao [The Seventh Revolution: 
1998-2003 Report on the Problems of Chinese Government Organizational Reform] (Beijing: China Social 
Sciences Press, 2003), p. 1. 
14  Zhang Zhijian, “Jianchi lilun yu shijian xiang jiehe tuijin difang zhengfu jigougaige” [Pushing Local 
Government Reform by Combining the Theory and Practice], in Zhang Zhijian and Tang Tiehan (eds.), Zhongguo 
difang zhengfu gaige yanjiu [The Study of Local Government Organization Reform in China] (Beijing: Guojia 
xingzheng xueyuan chubanshe, 1999), p. 3. 
15  Liu, Diqici geming: 1998-2003 zhongguo zhengfu jigougaige wenti baogao [The Seventh Revolution: 
1998-2003 Report on the Problems of Chinese Government Organizational Reform], p. 251. 
16 Ibid. , p. 253. 
17 Zhu Rongji was appointed premier in 1998. He left the Politburo Standing Committee in November 2002 and 
stepped from his premiership since the first session of the 10th National People’s Congress on March 5, 2003. 
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they were close to the grassroots.18 Therefore, the reforms at the municipal, county 
and township governments are more important than the central and provincial 
administrative reforms.  
At the same meeting, Hu Jintao, the then Vice-President of the People’s Republic 
of China,19 identified these goals of administrative reform at the municipal, county 
and township governments: to meet the needs of the socialist market economic 
development and facilitate the change of government functions; to serve and enhance 
the construction of grass-root units; to reduce the number of civil servants, cut 
administrative cost, alleviate financial burden and enhance government efficiency.20  
An in-depth study focusing on the experience of local government reform in 
China will broaden the theoretical scope in studying local government reform in 
developing countries. In addition, the experience of administrative reform in the three 
municipalities of Shandong province can provide policy implications for other cities 
in China.  
Although the issue of local government is important in studying administrative 
reform and many scholars have discussed this topic, few scholars have analyzed it 
from the perspective of the factors affecting local government reform. Even if some 
scholars have utilized some factors such as local context and leadership to analyze 
administrative reform, these factors are only applied in the analysis of administrative 
reform at the national level instead of the local level. In this case, this study tries to 
                                                        
18  Liu, Diqici geming: 1998-2003 zhongguo zhengfu jigougaige wenti baogao [The Seventh Revolution: 
1998-2003 Report on the Problems of Chinese Government Organizational Reform], p. 253. 
19 At that time, Hu Jintao was the Vice-President of the Peoples’ Republic of China, later he was elected as the 
General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee at the 16th National Congress of the CCP on November 14, 2002. 
20  Liu, Diqici geming: 1998-2003 zhongguo zhengfu jigougaige wenti baogao [The Seventh Revolution: 
1998-2003 Report on the Problems of Chinese Government Organizational Reform], p. 253. 
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employ these three key factors—local context, the relationship between the central 
and local governments, and leadership—to analyze local government reform in China. 
In addition, few scholars have evaluated the effectiveness of local government reform 
in China. Accordingly, this study tries to incorporate and use the indicators provided 
by some scholars, organizations and governments to evaluate the effectiveness of 
local government reform. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
 
This thesis aims to answer two main questions: (1) How effective is local government 
reform in the three municipalities? and (2) How can their different levels of 
effectiveness be explained? 
   With regard to the first question, this study argues that the Qingdao government is 
the most effective government in carrying out administrative reform. The Jinan 
government is less effective than the Qingdao government but more effective than the 
Linyi government. For instance, the Qingdao government has performed the best in 
providing public services to the citizens and enhancing the level of government 
transparency among the three municipalities. The Jinan government performs better 
than the Linyi government in simplifying the procedure of administrative approval 
and curbing corruption.  
Regarding the second question, this study argues that three important factors, that 
is, the local context, the relationship between the central and local governments and 
the political leadership have facilitated or hindered the effectiveness of local 
 7
government reform in the three municipalities. For instance, its coastal location and 
strong economic power have facilitated the implementation of economic and 
administrative reform in Qingdao city. However, the lack of preferential policies and 
special authority made prefecture-level cities such as Linyi city lack the incentives to 
carry out administrative reform. 
 
Research Methodology and Limitation of the Study  
 
In this thesis, qualitative analysis will be employed. A comparative study will be 
conducted to compare the changes before and after administrative reform in the three 
municipalities. Since the study focuses on local government reform after 1999, the 
comparison will explore the changes in the aspects of restructuring government, 
improving public service delivery and deepening civil service reform. The thesis also 
compares the effectiveness of local government reform among the three 
municipalities of Shandong province. 
According to Manning and Stage, a case study “is a highly effective perspective 
on which to rest research when individual, idiosyncratic meaning and depth are the 
goals of the effort.”21 Thus, this thesis examines three cases to explore multiple 
perspectives within local government reform and to interpret the findings generated 
from the field data in depth. 
The three cases are Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi municipalities in Shandong province. 
They typify three kinds of municipalities at the prefectural level in China. In 
Shandong province, there is only one centrally-planned city (jihua danlie shi): 
                                                        
21 Kathleen Manning and Frances K. Stage, “What is Your Research Approach?” in Frances K. Stage and 
Kathleen Manning (eds.), Research in the College Context (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2003), pp. 20-21. 
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Qingdao city; two sub-provincial cities (fushengji chengshi) Qingdao and Jinan cities; 
and 15 prefecture-level cities (diji shi) including Yantai, Weihai, Zibo, Weifang, 
Tai’an, Dongying, Jining, Rizhao, Liaocheng, Linyi, Laiwu, Heze, Zaozhuang, 
Dezhou and Binzhou. 
These three cities also typify three levels of 17 cities in Shandong province in 
terms of their urbanization level and the ranking of their competitiveness. According 
to “The Report of Survey of Competitiveness of 17 Cities in Shandong Province” 
initiated by Shandong statistical bureau, the ranking of competitiveness of 17 Cities 
was categorized into three levels in accordance with the 29 indicators in seven fields 
of city size, the economic development level, residents’ quality of life, infrastructure 
level, environment protection level, social management and public service level and 
radiation effect of a city.22 Qingdao city typifies the top level city. Jinan city typifies 
the five cities at the medium level. Linyi city typifies the 11 cities at the low level 














                                                        
22 Shandong Statistical Bureau, “17 chengshi jingzhengli diaocha yu paihang” [The Report of Survey of 
Competitiveness of 17 Cities in Shandong Province], Dazhong ribao [Dazhong Daily], 4 September 2002, p. A1. 
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Table 1: The Ranking of Competitiveness of 17 Cities in Shandong Province 
Ranking Level Cities 
Top Level Qingdao city 



















In this case, this thesis selects these three cities as cases to analyze local 
government reform. More specifically, in China’s context, the centrally-planned city 
and sub-provincial city are the pilot cities in administrative reform. Therefore, 
Qingdao and Jinan’s reform measures are important examples of local government 
reform in other municipalities. For example, administrative reform initiated by the 
Qingdao government has gone through many interesting experiences worthy of study 
among other municipalities. 
The data of this study are collected mainly from the local yearbooks, local 
statistical books and government reports published in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
municipalities between 1990 and 2005. The information compiled from these sources 
constitutes an indispensable part of the research. All the local yearbooks and local 
statistical books used were accessed at the Universities Service Centre for China 
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Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong from 6-12 December 2004. The local 
government reports were collected in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi municipalities in 
Shandong province from 2 June to 4 July 2005, when the author conducted her 
fieldwork. 
Since it is very difficult to conduct a large-scale survey of government officials 
and citizens in the three different municipalities, this study has relied on qualitative 
interviews with officials to provide information on local government reform. The 
author interviewed 30 local government officials in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi cities 
during the summer of 2005.23 The author selected 10 senior officials from each city 
as they are more familiar with the local policies in their fields than the junior officials. 
All 30 interviewees were selected from the government agencies working on social 
management and public services, such as the education bureau, the health bureau, the 
civil affairs bureau and the labour and social security bureau in the three cities.24 
Since this study focuses on three municipalities in Shandong province, its findings 
may not be generalized to all municipalities in China. The findings of Qingdao city 
are also not applicable to the other 16 cities of Shandong province, since Qingdao city 
has a number of preferential policies in relation to economic and administrative 
reforms. 
The author also acknowledges that the 10 officials in each city may not represent 
all government officials in this city as it is very difficult to interview all officials due 
                                                        
23 For the list of these interviewees, see Appendix 1. 
24 I get the chance to interview these senior officials through personal connections. So they would like to tell me 
what they really thought about the reform. I also employed the method of in-depth interview, which normally took 
2-3 hours per interview. So, the officials could provide the detailed and reliable information to me. 
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to the funding and time limit. 
 
The Meaning of Local Government Reform 
 
Definition of Local Government 
The term “local government” has different meanings depending on the political 
system in which it is used. In the United States, local governments include counties, 
municipalities, townships, and school districts. 25  In the OECD26  countries, the 
sub-national governments include the regional governments and the local 
governments. “Local government” refers to the lowest level of government.27 In 
China, the local government is the administrative agency of the central government as 
well as the executive apparatus of the People’s Congresses at the local level.28 It 
comprises all types of sub-national governments including the provincial, municipal, 







                                                        
25 Lan, “Local Government Reform in the People’s Republic of China,” p. 211. 
26 The OECD groups 30 member countries (including Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, etc.), which share a commitment to democratic government and the 
market economy. 
27 Jeffrey Owens and Giorgio Panella, “The Role of Lower Levels of Government: the Experience of Selected 
OECD Countries,” in Jeffrey Owens and Giorgio Panella (eds.), Local Government: An International Perspective 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1991), p. 1. 
28 The Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s Governments of the People’s Republic 
of China, amended in 1995 and approved by the 12th Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National 
People’s Congress. 
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Source: State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2001 [China Statistical Yearbook 2001] 
(Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2001), pp. 1-3 and United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, “Local Government in Asia and the Pacific: China,” see 
http://www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/country/china/china.html, accessed on 4 April 2006. 
 































China has a highly centralized administrative system, which is ruled by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).29 Due to “China’s emphasis on the leadership of 
the Communist Party,” the Political Bureau of the CCP is the highest decision-making 
body.30 The next level is the State Council, headed by the Premier. The State Council 
consists of 29 ministries and commissions since 1998 (See Figure 1). 
Below the central level, China’s administrative units are based on a four-category 
system of provinces, municipalities, counties and townships. At the provincial level, 
there are provinces, autonomous regions31 and centrally administered municipalities 
(zhixiashi). 32  A province or an autonomous region is further subdivided into 
municipalities or autonomous municipalities. Centrally administered municipalities 
are subdivided into districts and counties. At the next level, municipalities or 
autonomous municipalities are subdivided into districts, counties or autonomous 
counties. A county or an autonomous county is subdivided into townships, ethnic 
townships and/or towns. Currently China is divided into 23 provinces, five 
autonomous regions, four centrally administered municipalities and two Special 
Administrative Regions, namely, Hong Kong and Macau, which are directly under the 
central government’s rule.33  
Traditionally, the central government has a direct working relationship with the 
                                                        
29  John P. Burns, “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” Public Administration and 
Development, Vol. 13, No. 4 (October 1993), pp. 345-346. 
30 Lan, “Local Government Reform in the People’s Republic of China,” p. 209. 
31 Autonomous regions are the areas where a large proportion of the residents are ethnic minority groups. 
32 There are four centrally administered municipalities in China: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing, which 
are on the same level as provinces. 
33 See United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, “Local Government in Asia and 
the Pacific: China,” see http://www.unescap.org/huset/lgstudy/country/china/china.html#descript, accessed on 4 
April 2006 and State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2001 [China Statistical Yearbook 2001], 
(Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2001), pp. 1-3. 
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provincial government, but not with the municipal or lower-level municipal 
governments in China. Therefore, the relationship between the municipal and central 
governments will only be maintained and operated through the provincial 
government. 34  Similarly, the relationship between the provincial and county 
governments must go through the municipal government.35 
The other aspect that defines local government is its functions. The role of local 
government differs in different countries. In Scandinavian states such as Iceland 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway, the local government provides services of a welfare 
state. In France and Italy, the local governments focus on monopolizing political 
representations and the access to public resources.36 For the Central and Eastern 
European countries, the local government’s responsibilities include utility services, 
housing management, financial management as well as the regulatory functions and 
internal management.37 
According to “The Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses and Local 
People’s Governments of the People’s Republic of China” as well as the government 
functions defined by the 16th National Congress of the CCP, the functions of local 
governments at and above the county level are mainly divided into four aspects, 
namely economic regulation, market supervision, social management and public 
                                                        
34 There are exceptions in this case, such as the centrally-planned cities (jihua danlie shi) or the sub-provincial 
cities (fushengji chengshi), which may enjoy certain level of authorities in the provincial fiscal management and a 
sense of power in the provincial economic management. 
35 Lan, “Local Government Reform in the People’s Republic of China,” pp. 210-211. 
36 John, Local Governance in Western Europe, p. 8. 
37 Kenneth Davey, “Local Government Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Form and Substance,” in Paul 
Collins (ed.), Applying Public Administration in Development: Guideposts to the Future (Chichester: Wiley, 2000), 
pp. 285-291. 
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services.38 The function of economic regulation refers to the local government’s 
implementation of the “strategy and budget of national economy and social 
development,” 39  which enhances economic growth, adjusts fiscal revenue and 
expenditure and improves social development. The function of market supervision 
means that the local government monitors market activities in accordance with the 
law instead of any directly managing enterprises and market activities for the purpose 
of improving enterprise development. The third function of social management refers 
to the local government’s protection of the rights of citizens, its coordination of social 
interests, its maintenance of social order and its solution of the social crisis. The final 
function of public services means that the local government is responsible for 
providing the citizens with public goods and services in “education, science, culture, 
health, sports, environment and resource protection, construction of city and town, 
finance, and civil affairs.”40 
Apparently, the functions of local government should be adapted to the local 
circumstances because the local government is presumably more familiar with the 
needs of local residents and the local circumstances. In this sense, the local 
government can respond to the local environment rapidly and deliver diversified 
public services to the local residents.41 This thesis highlights the functions in these 
four areas, which are also the most important parts of administrative reform in China. 
                                                        
38 See Article 59 of “The Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s Governments of the 
People’s Republic of China” (1995 version) and Jiang Zemin, Report at the 16th National Congress of the CCP, 
see http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-11/17/content_635147.htm, accessed on 20 October 2004. 
39 Article 59 of “The Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s Governments of the 
People’s Republic of China” (1995 version). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ping Xinqiao, Caizheng yuanli yu bijiao caizheng zhidu [Financial Theory and Financial Institution] (Shanghai: 
Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1995), p.353. 
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Definition of Administrative Reform 
Local government reform in China mainly refers to the administrative reform of local 
government in China. A major influence on this study is Quah’s work on 
administrative reform. In his article “Administrative Reform: A Conceptual Analysis,” 
Quah critically reviews several definitions of administrative reform in the field of 
public administration and provides his own definition.42 He defines administrative 
reform as: 
 
… a deliberate attempt to change both a) the structure and procedures of the public 
bureaucracy (i.e., reorganization or the institutional aspect) and b) the attitudes and 
behavior of the public bureaucrats involved (i.e., the attitudinal aspect), in order to 
promote organizational effectiveness and attain national development goals.43 
 
Quah argues that the definition of administrative reform must identify the goals of 
administrative reform and “combine both the institutional and attitudinal aspects of 
reform.”44 
Another definition of administrative reform is provided by Abueva. In his article 
“Administrative Reform and Culture,” Abueva defines administrative reform as 
“essentially a deliberate attempt to use power, authority and influence to change the 
goals, structure or procedures of the bureaucracy, and, therefore, to alter the behavior 
of its personnel.”45 Abueva’s definition also emphasizes both the institutional and 
attitudinal aspects of administrative reform.  
Since local government reform in China mainly refers to the kind of 
                                                        
42 Jon S. T. Quah, “Administrative Reform: A Conceptual Analysis,” Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 
Vol. 20, No. 1 (January 1976), p. 52. 
43 Ibid. , p. 58. 
44 Ibid. , p. 56. 
45 Jose V. Abueva, “Administrative Reform and Culture,” in Hahn-Been Lee and Abelardo G. Samonte (eds.), 
Administrative Reforms in Asia (Manila: Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, 1970), p. 22. 
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administrative reform in the local government, this thesis utilizes Quah’s definition in 
the process of analyzing reform, which covers both the institutional and attitudinal 
aspects of administrative reform. Among these two aspects, the more important and 
difficult aspect is to change the values and attitudes of the officials. Thus, this study 
focuses on the content of local government reform in three municipalities of 
Shandong province from both the institutional and attitudinal aspects of the reform. 
 
Content of Local Government Reform 
 
Different forces have driven local governments in many countries to push through the 
reform. Local government tends to take up some measures to appeal to the initial 
purpose of delivering public services to the public, mediating socio-economic change 
and improving economic development. According to Caiden, administrative reforms 
in the world can be generally categorized into five types: privatization and 
co-production, debureaucratization, reorganization, more effective public 
management and value for money. 46  Privatization and co-production introduce 
market principles to reduce government intervention and bureaucratic controls. 
Debureaucratization eliminates unnecessary, parasitic and unproductive government 
activities to improve public trust and confidence in government. This kind of reform 
incorporates the whole gamut of administrative reform such as streamlining the 
machinery of government, deconcentrating power and authority and reducing 
unnecessary red tape. Reorganization aims to improve government performance and 
service delivery through regrouping administrative units, redistributing government 
                                                        
46  Gerald E. Caiden, “Administrative Reform,” in Ali Farazmand (ed.), Handbook of Comparative and 
Development Public Administration (New York: Marcel Dekker, 2001), pp. 655-664. 
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functions and decentralizing activities that “could and should be better performed at a 
more local level closer to their intended publics.” More effective public management 
is designed to increase productivity, reduce incompetence and increase value for 
money in order to reduce the government’s debts and deficits.47  
   In this regard, Peters contends that there are four basic content categories of 
administrative reform: the budget, structures, procedures, and relations between the 
permanent civil service and political leaders. 48  His analysis is based on the 
experience of the western European and North American democracies. Furthermore, 
the reform strategy of “automaticity” discussed by him should be highlighted,49 given 
the fact that cutting off the unnecessary costs of government, reducing redundant civil 
servants and government departments are common and important measures of local 
government reform in China. 
   According to the ADB, there are three types of administrative reforms in China: 
organizational restructuring, improving the delivery of public services, and civil 
service reform.50 Some scholars have also discussed the content of administrative 
reform in China in terms of organizational streamlining, changing government 
functions and improving personnel management.51  Accordingly, this thesis will 
                                                        
47 Ibid. , pp. 656-662. 
48 B. Guy Peters, “Government Reform and Reorganization in an Era of Retrenchment and Conviction Politics,” 
in Farazmand (ed.), Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration, pp. 673-676. 
49 Ibid. , p. 679. 
50 Asian Development Bank, Development Management: Progress and Challenges in the People’s Republic of 
China (Manila: ADB, 2003), pp. 29-40, 54-63. 
51 See John P. Burns, “‘Downsizing’ the Chinese State: Government Retrenchment in the 1990s,” The China 
Quarterly, No. 175 (September 2003), pp. 775-802; Burns, “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market 
Economy,” pp. 350-356; Dali L. Yang, “Rationalizing the Chinese State: The Political Economy of Government 
Reform,” in Chien-min Chao and Bruce J. Dickson (eds.), Remaking the Chinese State: Strategies, Society, and 
Security (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 19-41; Maria Chan Morgan, “Administrative Reforms in China,” in 
Krishna K. Tummala (ed.), Comparative Bureaucratic Systems (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003), pp. 338-348; 
Che-po Chan and Gavin Drewry, “The 1998 State Council Organizational Streamlining: Personnel Reduction and 
Change of Government Function,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 29 (2001), pp. 553-572; Kjeld 
Erik Brodsgaard, “Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System in China,” The China Quarterly, No. 170 (June 
 19
discuss the content of local government reform in terms of three aspects: government 
restructuring, improving the delivery of public services and civil service reform. 
 
Government Restructuring 
In the current literature, most scholars argue that administrative reform has not 
achieved the goal of downsizing government and reducing personnel in China.52 The 
reasons are that most officials are transferred to other public institutions and “those 
staffing levels in local government are probably to a large extent politically 
determined.” 53  Moreover, “discarded public administrative functions tend to 
re-emerge, displaced bureaucrats will seek to return to their former positions and the 
Party is reluctant to allow the creation of better public administration at the expense of 
Party control.”54  
Some Chinese scholars also indicate that even though each time the local 
government’s workforce is reduced, the number of employees has quickly rebounded, 
ultimately surpassing its original number.55 Most scholars agree that this phenomenon 
is derived from the fact that the reform of government functions is not carried out 
completely or the local government has neglected the importance of the change of 
                                                                                                                                                              
2002), pp. 361-386; You Chunmei, “Current Administrative Reform in China,” International Review of 
Administrative Sciences, Vol. 52 (1986), pp. 123-144; and Andrew C. Mertha, “China’s ‘Soft’ Centralization: 
Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 184 (December 2005), pp. 791-810. 
52  See Burns, “‘Downsizing’ the Chinese State,” p. 775; Chan and Drewry, “The 1998 State Council 
Organizational Streamlining,” p. 553; and Brodsgaard, “Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System in China,” pp. 
361-386. 
53 Burns, “‘Downsizing’ the Chinese State,” p. 775. 
54 Brodsgaard, “Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System in China,” p. 386. 
55 See Zhiyong Lan, “Lingji yuanze nenggou yindao zhongguo de xingzheng gaige” [Zero-base Principles that 
Could Guide China’s Administrative Reform], in Wang Puju and Xu Xiangning (eds.), Jingji zhuanxingqi de 
zhengfu gongneng [The Functions of the Government in a Transitional Economy] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 
2000), pp.125-141; King K. Tsao and John Abbott Worthley, “Chinese Public Administration: Change with 
Continuity during Political and Economic Development,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 55, No. 2 
(March/April 1995), p. 171 and Chen, Chen and Zhang, “On the Reform of Local Government Organizations in 
China,” p. 99. 
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government functions in the process of reform.56 Therefore, according to Zhang and 
Zhang, government reform in China has constantly focused on the retrenchment of 
government organizations and the downsizing of personnel but it has neglected the 
changing style of governance and people’s values.57  
Some scholars argue that the administrative reform since 1990, to some extent, 
has changed the central and local government functions to adapt to the changing 
economic structure from a planned to a market economy.58 They state that through 
this reform, the functions of government are transformed as the government becomes 
more flexible in distributing materials, controlling prices and managing public and 
private enterprises. The functions of providing infrastructure, basic living conditions, 
public goods and services are increasingly enhanced and the citizen’s participation in 
government affairs has also increased.59 Tsao and Worthley state that “while the size 
of government has been little affected, organizational control of economic entities has 
been markedly altered” through administrative reform.60 
This thesis will argue that while the restructuring in the local government has 
changed its functions to be more adaptable to the market economy, it has, however, 
                                                        
56 See Zhejiang Public Administration Society Investigation Group, “Zhejiangsheng: shengji zhengfu jigougaige 
de diaoyan baogao” [Zhejiang: the Report of Investigation for Local Government Reform at the Provincial Level], 
in Zhang Zhijian and Tang Tiehan (eds.), Zhongguo difang zhengfu gaige yanjiu [The Study of Local Government 
Organization Reform in China] (Beijing: Guojia xingzheng xueyuan chubanshe, 1999), p. 51 and Hangzhou 
Government Set-up Committee Office, “Hangzhoushi: jigougaige de shexiang yu duice” [Hangzhou: the Design 
and Countermeasure of Local Government Reform], in Zhang and Tang (eds.), Zhongguo difang zhengfu gaige 
yanjiu [The Study of Local Government Organization Reform in China], p. 115. 
57 Zhang and Zhang, “Public Administration and Administrative Reform in China for the 21st Century,” p. 9. 
58 See Chan and Drewry, “The 1998 State Council Organizational Streamlining,” p. 553; Burns, “China’s 
Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” p. 345; Wang Yukai (ed.), Zhongguo xingzheng tizhi gaige 20 
nian [Administrative Reform in China during the Past 20 Years] (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 2001), 
pp. 7-13 and Xie Qingkui et al., Zhongguo difang zhengfu tizhi gailun [The Generality of Chinese Local 
Government System] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbodianshi chubanshe, 1998), pp. 43-59. 
59 See Chan and Drewry, “The 1998 State Council Organizational Streamlining,” p. 553; Burns, “China’s 
Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” p. 345; Wang (ed.), Zhongguo xingzheng tizhi gaige 20 nian 
[Administrative Reform in China during the Past 20 Years], pp. 7-13 and Xie et al., Zhongguo difang zhengfu tizhi 
gailun [The Generality of Chinese Local Government System], pp. 43-59. 
60 Tsao and Worthley, “Chinese Public Administration,” p. 171. 
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not effectively downsized the government. 
 
Improving Public Service Delivery 
According to the ADB, public services in China may be classified into three major 
categories: “infrastructure construction and operation, including public utilities; 
human services; and services of a regulatory nature, such as registration and 
licensing.” 61  Rather than discussing reform in the delivery of infrastructure 
construction, this thesis will focus on the improvement of the delivery of human 
services and services of a regulatory nature since these two aspects constitute the core 
of local government reform in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi cities. 
   For human service delivery, according to the ADB, privatization is the main theme 
in improving the quality of education, health and social security in China, a notion 
that is borrowed from international practice.62 The difference between China and 
other countries is that the marketization in China becomes a process of 
commercialization and an instrument of government off-loading while the purpose of 
introducing privatization in other countries is to reduce costs and raise efficiency and 
quality through competition.63 Therefore, this reform makes it possible for the local 
government to reduce its investment in education, health care and social security. In 
this sense, poor and low-income families are not provided with sufficient financial 
support from the government in these aspects.  
According to the ADB, the administrative approval reform has reduced 
                                                        
61 Asian Development Bank, Development Management, p. 55. 
62 Ibid. , p. 56 
63 Ibid. , p. 61. 
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government intervention and rationalized administrative procedures through 
eliminating duplication and abolishing unnecessary steps.64 In terms of transparency, 
even though local governments have improved the provision of public information 
and enhanced public participation, China’s efforts to improve transparency “have 
mainly proceeded based on good will rather than on a solid legal foundation.”65 
  Based on these arguments, this thesis analyzes local government reform by 
examining the aspects of human service delivery, the administrative approval reform 
and government transparency.  
 
Civil Service Reform 
Burns indicates that personnel management has emerged as a discipline in China since 
the 1980s and administrators “have begun to investigate the importance of law to 
regulate personnel administration.”66 The Chinese authorities have achieved some 
progress in “decentralizing civil service management, rationalizing recruitment and 
selection procedures, improving the system of performance appraisals, expanding 
training opportunities, and reforming the wage system.”67 However, Burns also 
indicates that the CCP still maintains its preeminent position in the civil service 
system of China. As a result, civil servants are mainly evaluated by a certain set of 
political criteria, i.e., loyalty to the CCP’s policies, rather than other criteria in many 
                                                        
64 Ibid. , p. 58. 
65 Ibid. , p. 61. 
66 See John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in Post-Mao China,” in Joseph Y. S. Cheng (ed.), China: 
Modernization in the 1980s (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1989), p. 119 and John P. Burns, “Civil 
Service Reform in Contemporary China,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 18 (July 1987), p. 82. 
67 Burns, “Civil Service Reform in Contemporary China,” p. 82. 
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multi-party systems.68 Therefore, “in order to increase the capacity and efficiency of 
the state, which is necessary for economic development, the Party must be prepared to 
surrender some of its authority in this area.”69 In his recent article, Burns provides a 
positive evaluation of the achievements of China’s recent civil service reforms on 
open recruitment, promotion and training of government officials in 1990 and 2000.70  
Similarly, Liu states that post-Mao administrative reforms have not only 
dramatically streamlined the administrative system, but have also made it possible for 
the younger and better educated cadres to be promoted to the central, provincial and 
municipal governments.71 Tsao and Worthley also argue that the civil service system 
has developed significantly in China. “A systematic process of compromise, 
consultation, and negotiation was employed successfully to produce a real reform,” 
which is similar to the United States’ experience in developing the Pendleton Act a 
century earlier.72  
This thesis will discuss the achievements of improving the personnel management 
system in recruitment, promotion, performance appraisal and training in the three 
municipalities in Shandong province. 
Apart from improving the personnel management system, the Chinese government 
has focused on the improvement of the bureaucratic accountability of officials at all 
levels in administrative reform. Burns argues that the Chinese authorities regard moral 
                                                        
68 John P. Burns, “The Chinese Civil Service System,” in Ian Scott and John p. Burns (eds.), The Hong Kong Civil 
Service and Its Future (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 223. 
69 Burns, “Civil Service Reform in Contemporary China,” p. 83. 
70 John P. Burns, “Governance and Civil Service Reform”, in Jude Howell (ed.), Governance in China (Lanham: 
Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), pp. 37-55. 
71 Meiru Liu, Administrative Reform in China and Its Impact on the Policy-Making Process and Economic 
Development after Mao (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), p. 196. 
72 Tsao and Worthley, “Chinese Public Administration,” p. 170. 
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education for cadres, which is often referred to as a renewed study of the ‘mass line’ 
theory of leadership, as one of the most important means to overcome bureaucratism 
and curb corruption in the process of bureaucratic reform. This “mass line” leadership 
style is described as a “human relations approach” by Western sociologists and 
organization theorists, which include the “Three Main Rules of Discipline” and the 
“Eight Points of Attention.” It values “close ties to the masses, relying on the masses, 
and demonstrating concern for their welfare.”73 However, Burns contends that this 
“mass line” theory of leadership is too universalistic to recognize the distinction 
between macro- and micro-levels and administrative reform requires the “revision of 
the universalistic official theory of leadership style at the micro-level to take into 
account different leadership situations.”74 
Tsao and Worthley argue that Chinese administrative reform in the 1990s has 
emphasized moral education, “spiritual civilization” and the credibility and survival 
of the CCP in order to combat corruption and bu zheng zhi feng “unhealthy 
tendencies.”75 These efforts have included the issue of Civil Service Act and official 
edicts, “mobilization of an anti-corruption propaganda campaign, and use of wide 
publicity of examples of punishment.”76 
Recently, Burns discusses how Chinese local government has achieved some 
progress in improving bureaucratic accountability by implementing the new systems: 
the auditing system, the cadre responsibility system and the system of performance 
                                                        
73 John P. Burns, “Reforming China’s Bureaucracy, 1979-82,” Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 6 (June 1983), p. 700. 
74 Ibid. , p. 703. 
75 Tsao and Worthley, “Chinese Public Administration,” pp. 171-172. 
76 Ibid. , p. 171. 
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pledges for public services.77  
This thesis will explore the history of improving accountability among 
government officials in China. It will also explore the new reform measures of 
improving bureaucratic accountability implemented by the three municipalities in 
Shandong province. 
Regarding improving integrity of government officials, many scholars have 
concluded that the result of the anti-corruption work is not optimistic.78 Morgan 
indicates that administrative reform in China has failed to achieve the goal of creating 
a rule-bound bureaucracy to prevent corruption. 79  Quah also argues that 
anti-corruption in China is ineffective since there is a lack of political will to 
prosecute senior party officials.80 Furthermore, Chan has argued that it is because 
many officials believe that the costs of corruption are much lower than the benefits 
that corruption becomes rampant in China.81 Hors et al. also state that “despite 
significant efforts from the CCP and government leaders, corruption remains a serious 
problem for both citizens and business, particularly for foreign direct investment.”82 
   This thesis will explore the anti-corruption measures taken by local governments 
and analyze the reasons for the existence of rampant corruption in the three 
                                                        
77 Burns, “Governance and Civil Service Reform,” pp. 40-41. 
78 See Huang Weiding, “Fighting Corruption Amidst Economic Reform,” in Laurence J. Brahm (ed.), China’s 
Century: The Awakening of the Next Economic Powerhouse (Singapore: John Wiley and Sons (Asia), 2001), pp. 
39-41; Jon S. T. Quah, “Curbing Asian Corruption: An Impossible Dream?” Current History, Vol. 105, No. 690 
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Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (eds.), Damage Control: The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin 
Era (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), p. 84. 
79 Morgan, “Administrative Reforms in China,” pp. 349-350. 
80 Quah, “Curbing Asian Corruption,” p. 179. 
81 Kin-Man Chan, “Corruption in China: A Principal-Agent Perspective,” in Hoi-Kwok Wong and Hon S. Chan 
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Preview of Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the analytical frameworks of administrative reform, 
the goals of administrative reform, the effectiveness of local government reform and 
the factors influencing local government reform.  
Chapter 3 discusses the policy context of local government reform in Qingdao, 
Jinan and Linyi cities in Shandong province. Qingdao’s status as a business centre has 
facilitated the implementation of the economic and administrative reform. Jinan’s 
status as a political centre has favoured it in terms of improving public service 
delivery. Linyi city, on the contrary, has suffered from its mountainous location, and 
its poor economic performance has hindered it from further social development. This 
chapter also identifies market economic reform, the problems in government 
organizations, human service delivery and personnel management as the main reasons 
for initiating local government reform in the three municipalities. To advance 
economic reform and to solve these problems, local government has identified four 
reform goals: improving efficiency, quality of services and transparency, and 
minimising corruption. 
Chapter 4 discusses the process of restructuring local government including 
streamlining government and changing the functions of government in the three 
municipalities. Through analyzing the reform measures that the three municipalities 
initiated, this chapter suggests that these reforms have not reduced the size of 
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government agencies or removed redundant officials. Nevertheless, the three 
municipalities have enhanced government efficiency through curtailing the 
micro-economic functions of government. This chapter also analyzes the 
improvements in public service delivery. It argues that through the privatization of 
education, health and social security, all the relevant agencies in the three 
municipalities have increased the volume of enrolment in education as well as the 
percentage of medical and pension contributors among the total urban employees. 
However, the local government has considered such a reform measure as an 
instrument of government off-loading its duties instead of improving public services. 
It also argues that government efficiency has been enhanced through simplifying the 
procedures of granting administrative approval. In addition, the three municipalities 
have made great efforts to improve the level of government transparency and public 
participation, even though the process of recruiting and promoting officials still needs 
to become more transparent and local government needs to encourage a larger scope 
of public participation. 
Civil service reform is the main subject of Chapter 5. This chapter first discusses 
the improvement of the personnel system. It argues that reform has enhanced the 
quality of civil servants through recruiting more well-educated officials, instilling 
competition for those government officials who want to be promoted, and intensifying 
training programmes for civil servants. Nevertheless, some important systems, such as 
the performance appraisal system, the reward and punishment system and the 
dismissal system, are yet to be institutionalized. Through the training programmes, 
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many government officials have gradually changed their attitudes on the direct 
economic management that was formulated during the period of planned economy. 
Second, this chapter discusses the issues of improving bureaucratic accountability and 
integrity in the three municipalities. It argues that the three municipalities have 
attempted to model “clean governments” by implementing the performance pledges 
for public service, the accountability assurance system and the auditing system. 
However, the popular political culture of guanxi (personal connections), renqing 
(favour) and mianzi (face) in China has hindered government agencies from 
implementing these systems firmly and consistently. A more serious problem is that 
these three municipalities have not yet curbed corruption effectively.  
Chapter 6 offers an overall assessment of the effectiveness of local government 
reform in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi municipalities. This chapter employs the 
indicators used by some organizations such as the World Bank and International 
Institute for Management Development (IMD) and scholars such as Burns and Porta 
et al. to evaluate the effectiveness of local government reform in the three 
municipalities. It concludes that the Qingdao municipal government is the most 
successful among the three municipalities. The Jinan government is ranked second 
and the Linyi government is ranked third. 
Chapter 7 tackles the question of how and why the three municipal governments 
have achieved different results during administrative reform by analyzing two factors: 
the relationship between the central and local governments and their style of 
leadership. For the first factor, this chapter suggests that the decentralization of 
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economic management authority and the delegation of local law-making to Qingdao 
and Jinan cities, respectively as a centrally-planned city and a sub-provincial city, 
have encouraged them to promote administrative reform. Furthermore, because of 
their close relationship with the central government, the Qingdao and Jinan 
governments have acquired more support from the central government for their 
administrative reforms. In contrast, as a prefecture-level city, Linyi city does not have 
a close relationship with the central government. Accordingly, it does not have any 
economic management and local law-making autonomy, as well as political support 
from the central government. All these factors have hindered the process of 
administrative reform in Linyi city. More specifically, as a centrally-planned city, 
Qingdao city enjoys more autonomy in the management of fiscal revenue and 
expenditure than the Jinan and Linyi governments, which has facilitated Qingdao’s 
administrative reform. However, the shortage of financial revenue has hampered the 
Jinan and Linyi governments’ efforts to improve public services. For the second factor, 
this chapter suggests that the attitudes of the local leaders in Qingdao city and the 
implementation of effective reform measures have facilitated its local government 
reform. In sum, local government reform has been facilitated by these factors: the 
preferential policies from the central government, the close relationship with the 
central government, and the attitudes of the local leaders. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarizing the major findings and discussing 
the limitations and theoretical contributions of this study.
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CHAPTER TWO  




This chapter will identify the scope of knowledge on local government reform in 
China and the research gaps in current scholarship. For this purpose, this chapter first 
discusses how to fill the research gap by employing the analytical frameworks 
provided by Quah, Caiden, Burns and Yang to analyze local government reform in 
China. In this case, this thesis analyzes local government reform by focusing on its 
goals and contents, and illustrating how the local context, the relationship between the 
central and local governments and the leadership influence the course and outcome of 
the reform.  
Second, this chapter identifies the reasons for introducing local government 
reform according to the opinions of some scholars such as Chapman, Turner, Lan and 
Tsao. It also identifies the goals of administrative reform on the basis of the 
discussion of some scholars such as Quah, Farazmand and Huque. 
Third, since few scholars have evaluated the effectiveness of local government 
reform in China, this chapter identifies some useful indicators for evaluating the 
effectiveness of local government reform. According to Price, Leemans and Quah, the 
reform goals are important indicators for evaluating the effectiveness of 
administrative reform. This chapter then identifies some helpful criteria utilized by 
some scholars such as Burns and Porta et al., and organizations such as the World 
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Bank, the International Institute of Management Development (IMD) and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and governments 
such as the Ministry of Personnel of China to evaluate the effectiveness of local 
government reform. 
Finally, according to some scholars such as Goodman, Burns, Lieberthal and 
Wang, this chapter discusses how the local context, the relationship of the central and 
local governments, and the leadership play an important role in the analysis of local 
government reform. 
 
Analytical Framework for Studying Local Government Reform 
 
Goals, Strategies and Important Factors of Administrative Reform 
Quah’s enumeration of the variables for administrative reform provides a valuable 
contribution to the analytical approach used in this study. These variables of analyzing 
administrative reform are highly instructive. Quah argues that researchers undertaking 
the comparative study of administrative reform should focus on the following five 
variables:1 
 
1) The content of the administrative reform, that is, both the institutional and 
attitudinal aspects. 
2) The goals of the administrative reform regardless of whether such goals have 
been announced or undisclosed by the political leadership. 
3) The approach selected by the political leadership toward administrative reform 
especially the relative weight given to both the incremental and comprehensive 
strategies. 
4) The nature of the environment in which the administrative reform is being 
                                                        
1  See Jon S. T. Quah, “Administrative Reform: A Conceptual Analysis,” Philippine Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol. 20, No. 1 (January 1976), p. 66 and Jon S. T. Quah, “Bureaucracy and Administrative 
Reform in the ASEAN Countries: A Comparative Analysis,” Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 31, No. 
3 (July/September 1985), pp. 987-988. 
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implemented, i.e., whether the environment favours reform or whether the reform 
effort is being hindered by the existence of various obstacles. 
5) The attitude of the political leadership toward administrative reform, i.e., 
whether it provides or withholds its sponsorship and support of the reform effort. 
This variable is perhaps the most crucial one because it is the political leadership 
of a country which first decides on whether there is any need for administrative 
reform, and if so, what are the goals, contents and approaches to administrative 
reform. The political leaders also assess the extent to which the various 
environmental influences hinder or promote administrative reform.2 
 
Although Quah deals with these five variables from the national perspective, these 
variables are also suitable for the analysis of the administrative reform in the local 
government. Following this logic, this study analyzes the goals and contents of local 
government reform in three municipalities in Shandong province and illustrates how 
the factors of leadership and the environment influence the course and the outcome of 
the reform. 
 
Factors Influencing Administrative Reform 
Analyzing the factors that influence administrative reform, Caiden has indicated that 
there are seven obstacles to administrative reform in a country namely, geography, 
history, technology, culture, economy, society and polity.3 Caiden explains that “the 
circumstances giving rise to bureaupathologies are likely to inhibit the progress of 
administrative reform.”4 First, with regard to the factor of geography, Caiden argues 
that the physical location, the sheer size and diversity of topography may obstruct the 
progress of any administrative reform. In addition, the climate and the natural 
resources indirectly influence the administrative reform. Second, historical records of 
                                                        
2 Quah, “Administrative Reform,” pp. 66-67. 
3 Gerald E. Caiden, Administrative Reform (London: Allen Lane, 1970), pp. 165-183. 
4 Gerald E. Caiden, “Administrative Reform,” in Randall Baker (ed.), Comparative Public Management: Putting 
U.S. Public Policy and Implementation in Context (Westport: Praeger, 1994), p. 111. 
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the reform can be regarded as a tool applied by both advocates and opponents to 
support or discourage the administrative reform. Furthermore, the administrative 
traditions in a country may hinder the modes of the administrative reform. Third, the 
level of technology in a country may be another obstacle to administrative reform 
because the downgrading of technological and administrative skills is an obstacle to 
administrative reform and the success of technology will facilitate administrative 
reform.5  
Fourth, culture is another important obstacle to administrative reform, which 
features language, religion, nationalism and kinship ties. “Cultural diversity is a 
handicap in administrative cooperation as is well illustrated in national 
administrations embracing diverse cultures and in international organizations.”6  
The fifth factor is economy. The economy can be an impediment in the sense that 
it is difficult for a state to push the administrative reform when it lacks financial 
resources and trained personnel. As administrative reform needs time, effort, and 
investment, the scarce resources in any state may affect the capability of government 
to afford the risk of reform failure. In addition, the scarcity of trained personnel, i.e., 
people who lack administrative and political skills, may also be a hindrance to 
planning and carrying out administrative reform.7 
Sixth, the society itself is an obstacle to reform since it intends to preserve the 
status quo as much as possible. At the same time, the attitude of indifference to 
administration among people is one of the most important social obstacles to 
                                                        
5 Caiden, Administrative Reform, p. 173. 
6 Ibid. , p. 173. 
7 Ibid. , pp. 176-178. 
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administrative reform.8 
Finally, the polity can affect the outcome of administrative reform. The astute 
political tactics and manipulation of political forces determine the extent to which 
reformers are successful. “In one-party totalitarian states, administrative reforms must 
conform with centrally approved policies and directions.”9 Therefore, for the six 
factors, the political factor “appears to be the most significant one.”10  
This study will place its emphasis on such political factors as the leadership and 
the relationship between the central and local governments. This study also focuses on 
the aspects of local geography, economy and culture, which are summarized as the 
“local context” in this thesis. Although the above mentioned factors may be obstacles 
to local government reform, they may also facilitate the administrative reform of local 
government. This research will go beyond these obstacles and study the factors which 
facilitate or hinder local government reform. In sum, the study will use the following 
factors, namely, the local context including environment, economic conditions and 
tradition, the central and local government relationship and leadership to analyze 
administrative reform in the three municipalities of Shandong province. 
Although Quah’s and Caiden’s analyses provide valuable contributions to the 
understanding of administrative reform in general, they have not applied such factors 
in analyzing administrative reform at the local level. This study uses these analytical 
frameworks to analyze local government reform in China. 
 
                                                        
8 Ibid. , pp. 178-181. 
9 Ibid. , p. 181. 
10 Quah, “Administrative Reform,” p. 64. 
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Administrative Reform and Assessment: Focus on China 
Some scholars have echoed Quah’s and Caiden’s views to analyze the factors which 
affect China’s administrative reform. Some scholars have highlighted the impact of 
political factors on reform. Burns discusses the influence of political factors on 
China’s administrative reforms in the early 1990s.11 According to him, China’s 
central leadership’s support for administrative reform has wavered from time to time 
to some extent, and a lack of administrative capacity “has hampered implementation 
of administrative reform.” In terms of bureaucratic support, provincial bureaucracies 
have supported reforms since they could gain from decentralization whereas some 
central bureaus have opposed them to avoid losing power.  
   Burns further indicates that there are three factors which constrain China’s leaders 
from implementing administrative reform.12 First, “the failure of leaders in China to 
admit the inadequacies of the official administrative theory of leadership prevents the 
legitimate use of more directive, task-oriented types of leadership in appropriate 
situations.”13 The more important point is that “leadership and management skills 
directly influence the operation of organizations, and have a major impact on 
organizational effectiveness.”14 Second, the action of seeking departmental interest is 
an important constraint on the Chinese government to carry out administrative reform. 
Finally, informal organization and personal connections (guanxi) which are pervasive 
within the bureaucracy in China will hamper administrative reform. “Protection of 
                                                        
11  John P. Burns, “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” Public Administration and 
Development, Vol. 13, No. 4 (October 1993), pp. 357-358. 
12 John P. Burns, “Reforming China’s Bureaucracy, 1979-82,” Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 6 (June 1983), pp. 
718-720. 
13 Ibid. , p. 719. 
14 Ibid. , p. 720. 
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relatives, friends, colleagues, and classmates has already undermined the campaign 
against corruption among senior cadres” and abused personnel administration.15 In 
addition, “personal loyalty and use of personal connections have characterized the 
recruitment, appraisal, and training processes.”16 
   Lam and Chan have also argued that the political dynamics involved in the 
attempt to introduce a civil service system is the most important factor in analyzing 
Chinese civil service reform.17 They state that the non-separation of the CCP and 
government and the Nomenklatura system “have loomed large in China’s effort to 
introduce a civil service system.”18 Moreover, “central and local leaders have not 
accorded much importance to the civil service system.”19 Similarly, Cabestan has 
argued that the promotion and advancement of senior officials in the Chinese civil 
service system is still dictated by political considerations and “‘red and expert’ remain 
the fundamental qualities required of a good civil servant in communist China.”20 
In addition to discussing political factors, Burns indicates that the civil service 
reform in China has been influenced by tradition and China’s size and poverty.21 
“China’s hundreds of years of experience of operating a sophisticated civil service 
system” has prepared “the nation for rule by generalists” and has reinforced “popular 
notions of the distance between rulers and the ruled and on the importance of personal 
                                                        
15 Ibid. , p. 720. 
16 Ibid. , p. 720. 
17 Tao-chiu Lam and Hon S. Chan, “China’s New Civil Service: What the Emperor is Wearing and Why,” Public 
Administration Review, Vol. 56, No. 5 (September/October 1996), p. 479. 
18 Ibid. , p. 480. 
19 Ibid. , p. 483. 
20 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Civil Service Reform in China: The Draft ‘Provisional Order Concerning Civil 
Servants’,” International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 58 (1992), p. 433. 
21 See John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in Post-Mao China,” in Joseph Y. S. Cheng (ed.), China: 
Modernization in the 1980s (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1989), pp. 96-98 and John P. Burns, 
“Civil Service Reform in Contemporary China,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 18 (July 1987), pp. 
50-52. 
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connections (guanxi) to bridge the gap.”22 As “China’s vast size, and huge population 
require a large civil service,” it is formidable to co-ordinate and control this personnel 
system with millions of employees. The poor situation in China has resulted in 
corruption since “scarce supply in the face of growing demand has contributed to 
corruption and has undermined discipline within the civil service.”23 
Yang also discusses administrative reform in China by using both political and 
economic factors in his recent book, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market 
Transition and the Politics of Governance in China.24 He focuses on the changing 
economic conditions, internal politics/political leadership, and crises to analyze the 
economic transition and the politics of government reforms in China. Yang indicates 
that the market reform prompted the national leaders to initiate institutional 
restructuring and state building to respond to the demand of market economic reform 
in China.25 He also admits that although “the degree of the Chinese leadership’s 
political commitment to reforms has varied with time and circumstances,”26 the 
political machinery remains in the CCP, which notably “through the power to appoint 
and remove officials,” provides China’s national leaders “the luxury and leverage to 
promote and implement both short-term stopgap measures and long-term fundamental 
reforms.”27 
   In sum, some scholars such as Burns and Yang have analyzed the factors which 
                                                        
22 See Burns, “Civil Service Reform in Post-Mao China,” pp. 96-97 and Burns, “Civil Service Reform in 
Contemporary China,” pp. 50-51. 
23 Burns, “Civil Service Reform in Post-Mao China,” p. 97 
24 Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 2, 17-21. 
25 Ibid. , p. 19. 
26 Ibid. , p. 19. 
27 Ibid. , p. 295. 
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affect administrative reform in China. However, their analyses focus on administrative 
reform at the national level instead of the local level. More specifically, different from 
their analyses, which only utilize one or two factors to analyze the reform, this thesis 
attempts to combine the three factors: local context, the relationship between the 
central and local government and leadership to analyze local government reform in 
China. 
 
Reasons for Introducing Local Government Reform and Its Goals  
 
Local government reform is the choice of local government when it faces a series of 
external and internal challenges and problems, such as economic reform, political 
transformation and the deficiency of the government.  
 
Reasons for Introducing Local Government Reform 
Local government reform is a result of internal economic reform, political reform and 
various social conflicts. Chapman argues that “one of the essential features of 
administrative reform in public administration is the relationship of administrative 




Local government reform in Western Europe, which includes reforms of the functions 
of the public sector and the welfare state, is mostly driven by the open economy.29 “In 
                                                        
28 Richard A. Chapman, “Administrative Reform,” in Frank Bealey, Richard A. Chapman and Micheal Sheehan 
(eds.), Elements in Political Science (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 280. 
29 Gerard Marcou, “New Tendencies of Local Government Development in Europe,” in Robert J. Bennett (ed.), 
Local Government in the New Europe (London: Belhaven Press, 1993), pp. 51-52. 
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both eastern and western Europe, local government is dominantly now entangled in an 
open economy, based on the market, sharing increasingly similar political values.”30 
As some East and Southeast Asian countries move from a centrally planned to a 
market-oriented economy, the local governments have been engaged in changing their 
governing system.31 
China is not an exception. China’s administrative reform is also stimulated by 
economic reform. Yang argues that rapid market expansion in China has prepared the 
ground for administrative reform. 32  According to Burns, China’s economic 
development produces additional pressure for conducting administrative reform and 
economic modernization which relies on a rational and efficient bureaucracy.33 He 
further indicates that “one of the consequences of China’s economic reform has been 
recurrent government budget deficits, which, in turn, have encouraged cost-cutting.” 
This has sparked the authorities’ attempts to streamline the government.34 In addition, 
the change of governmental functions is lagging behind economic reform. As China is 
transformed from a planned economy toward a socialist market economy, the 
monopoly status of the State in allocating resources has diminished gradually.35 
Consequently, the original role of the government cannot meet the increasing 
demands for economic reform.  
                                                        
30 Ibid., p. 52. 
31 Mark Turner, “Local Government Reform and Community-Driven Development: Asia-Pacific Experiences,” in 
Collins (ed.), Applying Public Administration in Development, p. 115. 
32 Dali L. Yang, “Rationalizing the Chinese State: The Political Economy of Government Reform,” in Chien-min 
Chao and Bruce J. Dickson (eds.), Remaking the Chinese State: Strategies, Society, and Security (London: 
Routledge, 2001), p. 19. 
33 See Burns, “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” p. 349 and Burns, “Reforming China’s 
Bureaucracy, 1979-82,” p. 692. 
34 Burns, “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” p. 349. 
35 Chengfu Zhang and Mengzhong Zhang, “Public Administration and Administrative Reform in China for the 
21st Century-from State-Centre Governance to the Citizen-Centre Governance,” (Paper presented at the American 
Society for Public Administration 62nd Annual Conference, in Newark, USA, March 10-13, 2001), p. 4. 
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Tsao and Worthley have argued that the “recognition of the need for a more 
competent civil service to sustain economic development was probably the single 
most important catalyst to [administrative] reform in China.”36 Therefore, local 
government reform in China has been urgently propelled in accordance with the 
advancement of economic reform. 
 
Problems in local government 
In Central and Eastern European countries, political reforms have led to the collapse 
of the communist regime and local governments in these countries have to react to the 
crucial changes of a political reform.37 “Local government systems in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) are creatures of the 1990 political transformation.”38  
The existence of many organizational, functional and personnel problems in 
government indicates an urgent need for carrying out administrative reform. Burns 
argues that “organizational overlapping, unclear jurisdictions, overstaffing and so 
forth, often the product of bureaucratic inertia, have impeded the activities of 
government at both the central and local levels.”39 Lan indicates that government jobs, 
which are described as “iron rice bowls” (secure jobs which cannot be broken in any 
way) at the local level become “a harbor for many in need of good jobs” in China.40 
Thus, “overstaffing cannot fully and reasonably allocate the manpower resources, but 
                                                        
36 King K. Tsao and John Abbott Worthley, “Chinese Public Administration: Change with Continuity during 
Political and Economic Development,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 55, No. 2 (March/April 1995), p. 173. 
37 Marcou, “New Tendencies of Local Government Development in Europe,” p. 51. 
38 Kenneth Davey, “Local Government Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Form and Substance,” in Paul 
Collins (ed.), Applying Public Administration in Development: Guideposts to the Future (Chichester: Wiley, 2000), 
p. 279. 
39 Burns, “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” p. 348. 
40 Zhiyong Lan, “Local Government Reform in the People’s Republic of China: Stipulations, Impact, Cases and 
Assessment,” Chinese Public Administration, Vol. 1, No.1 (2002), p. 214. 
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it does increase financial pressures.”41  
In addition, Yang has indicated that the expanded figures of the government 
administrative expenditure illustrate the deep problems of bureaucratism and 
inefficiency in the Chinese central and local governments.42 Tsao and Worthley 
contend that “corruption in the Chinese bureaucracy during the 1980s seems to have 
been a main catalyst to reform in China,” which is similar to the situation of the 
United States during the Grant administration.43 The enactment of civil service 
reform is an active response to the concerns raised by prominent Chinese leaders 
including Deng Xiaoping, who recognized that official corruption would be harmful 
to China’s reforms and opening to the outside world.44 Likewise, Burns has argued 
that China has suffered from chronic problems including overstaffing, waste, 
corruption, and inertia in the civil service, which have led its leaders to initiate 
administrative reform.45 
   This thesis will discuss the reasons for introducing local government reform in the 
three municipalities from the aspects of economic reform and problems in local 
government. 
 
Goals of Local Government Reform 
This study has dealt with the reasons for introducing local government reform, and the 
next question is: what are the goals of local government reform? Chapman has 
                                                        
41 Qingyun Chen, Ji Chen and Qingdong Zhang, “On the Reform of Local Government Organizations in China,” 
Chinese Public Administration Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2002), p. 93. 
42 Yang, “Rationalizing the Chinese State,” pp. 21-22. 
43 Tsao and Worthley, “Chinese Public Administration,” p. 172. 
44 Ibid. , p. 171. 
45 Burns, “Reforming China’s Bureaucracy, 1979-82,” p. 692. 
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identified the goals of administrative reform as “achieving greater efficiency, 
effectiveness and economy in the provision of public services.”46  
Toonen identifies these three core values in public administration: “responsiveness 
and satisfaction,” “integrity and trust” and “reliability and confidence.”47  Quah 
observes that the goals of administrative reform are “to promote organizational 
effectiveness and attain national development goals.”48 Quah argues that enhancing 
organizational effectiveness not only includes enhancing institutional efficiency but 
also changing the attitudes of government officials.49 Similarly, Farazmand says that 
“reform means significant process changes by which implementation as well as policy 
development contributes to efficient and effective national development.”50 
In particular, Abueva argues that there are manifested or declared goals and 
undisclosed or undeclared goals. According to him, the manifested goals include 
efficiency, economy, effectiveness, political responsibility, improved service, 
streamlined organization and procedures, coordination, unified direction, and 
indigenization or ethnic representation. The undisclosed goals of administrative 
reform are often not publicized to the society because of ideology and expediency 
reasons; and “political control of policy and personnel is perhaps the most common 
undisclosed objective and consequence of administrative reform.”51 
For China, Zhang and Zhang believe that “too often, administrative reform in 
                                                        
46 Chapman, “Administrative Reform,” p. 284. 
47 Theo A. J. Toonen, “Administrative Reform: Analytics,” in B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre (eds.), Handbook of 
Public Administration (London: SAGE, 2003), p. 470. 
48 Quah, “Administrative Reform,” p. 58. 
49 Ibid. , p. 58. 
50  Ali Farazmand, “Administrative Reform and Development: An Introduction,” in Farazmand (ed.), 
Administrative Reform in Developing Nations, p. 6. 
51 Jose V. Abueva, “Administrative Reform and Culture,” in Hahn-Been Lee and Abelardo G. Samonte (eds.), 
Administrative Reforms in Asia (Manila: Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, 1970), p. 25. 
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China has focused on enhancing and improving government efficiency, of which the 
value orientation is three ‘Es’: efficiency, effectiveness and economy.”52 Chen also 
indicates that the 1999 administrative reform in China intended to “transform 
governmental functions, reform the administration and personnel system, perfect the 
operational mechanism, and gradually establish an administrative system suited to the 
socialist market economy.”53 
Although Chapman, Quah and other scholars have defined the goals of 
administrative reform from the national perspective, the improvement of 
organizational effectiveness and national development are also relevant at the local 
level. Therefore, the goals of local government reform in this research include the 
concrete objectives of enhancing organizational effectiveness, such as transforming 
government functions, improving services, as well as the general goal of attaining 
national and local development.  
 
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Local Government Reform 
 
Few scholars have conducted research on evaluating the effectiveness of local 
government reform in China. Even though Lan, Chen et al. and Xie et al. have made 
some assessment on local government reform, they have not used indicators to 
provide a comprehensive evaluation on the effectiveness of local government 
reform.54 
                                                        
52 Zhang and Zhang, “Public Administration and Administrative Reform in China for the 21st Century,” p. 8. 
53 Ruilian Chen, “Administrative Reform in Guangdong of PRC and Its Characteristics,” Chinese Public 
Administration, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2002), p. 18. 
54 See Lan, “Local Government Reform in the People’s Republic of China,” pp. 209-220; Chen, Chen and Zhang, 
“On the Reform of Local Government Organizations in China,” pp. 91-100; and Xie Qingkui et al., Zhongguo 
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This study relies on the indicators employed by some scholars and organizations 
to evaluate the effectiveness of local government reform. Before discussing these 
indicators, the concept of “effectiveness” must be defined. Price has defined 
“effectiveness” generally as “the degree of goal-achievement.”55 The goal appears to 
be an important indicator of the efficacy of local government reform. Leemans has 
also said that “the degree to which objectives are attained is a principal yardstick in 
judging the success or failure of administrative reform programmes.”56 Similarly, 
Quah contends that “Administrative reform can only succeed if its goals are clearly 
stated at the outset; and, in turn, the evaluation of the effectiveness of the reform is 
based on the degree of goal attainment.”57 Other scholars also agree that goals 
constitute an important indicator for evaluating the effectiveness of administrative 
reform.58  
Likewise, the World Bank also uses “goals” as an important indicator to evaluate 
the development of countries in the world. It employs eight development goals and 
“each of the eight goals comprises one or more targets, and each target has associated 
with it several indicators by which progress toward the target can be monitored.”59 
Therefore, the reform goals identified by the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
governments and the performance of local government before and after this reform 
are important criteria for assessing the effectiveness of local government reform in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
difang zhengfu tizhi gailun [The Generality of Chinese Local Government System] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
guangbodianshi chubanshe, 1998). 
55 Jame L. Price, Organizational Effectiveness (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1968), p. 3. 
56 Arne F. Leemans, “Administrative Reform: An Overview,” Development and Change, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1970-71), 
p. 10. 
57 Quah, “Administrative Reform,” p. 57. 
58 See Chapman, “Administrative Reform,” p. 284 and Leemans, “Administrative Reform,” p. 10. 
59 World Bank, 2003 World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C. : World Bank, 2003), p. 21. 
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three municipalities. 
The indicators used by the World Bank for evaluating the level of development 
worldwide, the world competitiveness indicators of the IMD, and the quality of 
government evaluation system developed by Porta et al are all related to government 
performance in terms of government transparency, public service delivery, 
government integrity and efficiency and can be readily used in this case to evaluate 
administrative reform in China. 60  Although these indicators are designed for 
assessing government at the national level, they can also be utilized for assessing local 
government. Apart from these indicator systems, some institutes such as the OECD 
and the ADB and scholars such as Burns, have also used “governance” as a criterion 
for evaluating the effectiveness of government reform, especially in China.61 
The Ministry of Personnel in China has designed “a new yardstick for rating local 
governments” (See Appendix 2). This system intends to appraise local governments in 
China by using a set of 33 performance indicators that focus on the overall 
governance and the improvement of living standards, rather than relying only on the 
GDP growth or job creation.62 The main tools for evaluating local governments are 
the indicators which examine the government functions and their performance in 
fulfilling these fundamental functions. The personnel management indicators focus on 
                                                        
60 See Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
1998), pp. 2, 22; World Bank, 2003 World Development Indicators, pp. 21, 25, 27; and IMD, The World 
Competitiveness Yearbook 1999 (Lausanne: International Institute for Management Development, 1999), pp. 48, 
51, 57. 
61 See Irene Hors, “Synthesis,” in Governance in China, pp. 11-41; Asian Development Bank, Governance: 
Promoting Sound Development Management: A Record of the Proceedings of a Seminar in Fukuoka, Japan on 10 
May 1997, during the 30th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors (Manila: ADB, 1997), p. 9; and John P. 
Burns, “Governance and Civil Service Reform”, in Jude Howell (ed.), Governance in China (Lanham: Rowan and 
Littlefield Publishers, 2004), pp. 37-55. 
62 See Chua Chin Hon, “China Draws up New Yardstick for Rating Local Governments,” Straits Times, 3 August 
2004, p. A2 and Liu Shixin, “Zhongguo zhengfu jixiaopinggu tixi mianshi” [The Appearance of a New System of 
Appraising Local Government in China], Zhongguo qingnianbao [China Youth Daily], 2 August 2004, p. A1. 
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human resources, clean government and the administrative efficiency of the local 
government. These indicators are relevant for evaluating the effectiveness of 
government reform in the three municipalities.  
In sum, this study tries to formulate an evaluation system for assessing local 
government reform in China, which has never been done by other scholars. The study 
identifies the indicators provided by the institutions such as the World Bank, the IMD, 
the OECD, the ADB and the Ministry of Personnel in China and some scholars such 
as Porta et al. and Burns to formulate an evaluation system. In addition, according to 
some scholars such as Price and Quah, the reform goals put forward by the 
governments constitute an important criterion for assessing the effectiveness of local 
government reform. 
 
Factors Affecting Local Government Reform 
 
The three factors of the local context, the relationship between the central and local 
governments and the leadership affecting the process of local government reform, 
affect the effectiveness of local government reform in China. 
 
Local Context 
The environment and conditions of a locality are key elements that have a significant 
impact on reform strategies. In discussing the factors affecting local government 
reform in Britain, Sullivan observes that “in fact there are underlying cultural and 
structural issues that provide an important dynamic in central-local relations and 
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which can act to mediate outcomes in unexpected ways.”63 She further argues that 
“local government reaction is informed by its traditions, cultures and practices, many 
of which are rooted in the local context.”64 
In the 1980s and 1990s, some scholars of political science and sociology in the 
United States have introduced the analytical frameworks of “Unitary Interest” theory 
(1981), “The Growth Machine” theory (1987) and “Multiple Orientations” theory 
(1998) for studying the communities in many cities in the United States.65 Williams 
and Adrian have argued that there are four kinds of communities in cities in the 
United States, namely, “promotion communities”, “amenity communities”, “caretaker 
communities” and “arbiter communities.” 66  These scholars have analyzed the 
different characteristics and qualities of communities and emphasized the influence of 
the local context on the management of local government.  
The economic and resource conditions, tradition, political culture and the social 
psychology of citizens affect the governance of a locality.67 The differences and 
interactions among China’s provinces affect each province’s government reform 
differently. “Natural resources, location and the political skills of provincial 
leaderships have all been important determinants of the specific development of 
                                                        
63 Helen Sullivan, “Local Government Reform in Great Britain,” (Paper presented at the Joint International 
Conference of the International Political Science Association’s Research Committee on the ‘Comparative Study of 
Local Politics and Government’ and the German Political Science Association Workgroup, ‘Local Government 
Studies,’ 2002), p. 27. 
64 Ibid. , p. 29. 
65 R. C. Box, Citizen Governance: Leading American Communities into the 21st Century (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 1998), pp. 27-65. 
66 O. Williams and C. Adrian, Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1963). 
67 Sun Baiying, Dangdai difang zhili [Contemporary Local Governance] (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 
2004), pp. 126-127. 
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provinces during the reform era.”68 On the other hand, Burns indicates that the lack 
of material resources will constrain Chinese leaders in implementing administrative 
reform. For instance, the scarcity of material resources has undermined the efforts 
invested in preventing corruption and the low educational level of personnel has 
hampered the implementation of personnel reform.69  
This thesis will analyze this factor of the local context to explore its impact on 
local government reform in the three municipalities in Shandong province. 
 
The Relationship between the Central and Local Governments 
The working relationship between the central and local governments focuses on the 
process of decentralization. Decentralization is considered to be a consequence when 
a national government has failed to function in an efficient way to provide public 
goods and services.70 In developed countries, decentralization in particular illustrates 
a kind of demand for more efficient and effective forms of governance in order to 
secure the competitiveness of a national economy.71 In developing countries, on the 
other hand, decentralization is boosted by demands for economic development and 
more political stability.72  
With regard to the contemporary governmental changes, the term decentralization 
is commonly used to refer to deconcentration, delegation, devolution or 
                                                        
68 David S. G. Goodman, “China in Reform: the View from the Provinces,” in David S. G. Goodman (ed.), 
China's Provinces in Reform: Class, Community, and Political Culture (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 2. 
69 Burns, “Reforming China’s Bureaucracy, 1979-82,” p. 719. 
70 Robert J. Bennett, “An Overview of Developments in Decentralization,” in Robert J. Bennett (ed.), Local 
Government and Market Decentralization: Experiences in Industrialized, Developing, and Former Eastern Bloc 
Countries (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003), p. 34. 
71 Ibid. , p. 34. 
72 Ibid. , p. 35. 
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privatization. 73 Deconcentration focuses on the allocation of administrative 
responsibility to the lower government levels. It implies that the “lower level officials 
or units are given more discretion in adjusting plans or directives to local 
conditions.”74 Nevertheless, deconcentration transfers power to the local levels with 
some limits, while the central government is still in direct control over the local 
government. Delegation centres on the transfer of decision-making and management 
authority to organizations which are predominantly public enterprises, 
semi-autonomous units and a variety of parastatal organizations.75 Delegation to 
organizations is indirectly controlled by the government. Devolution seeks to transfer 
the ultimate responsibility to lower government levels. “Through devolution the 
central government relinquishes certain functions or creates new units of government 
that are outside its direct control.”76 Privatization refers to the kind of transition of 
administrative responsibility and public functions “from government to voluntary, 
private, or non-government institutions.”77 Decentralization means different things to 
different people. Among the four forms of decentralization, deconcentration has been 
“the most frequent form of decentralization in developing countries since the early 
1970s.”78 In China, decentralization is commonly considered to be a process that 
coincides with the process of deconcentration. 
                                                        
73 See Dennis A. Rondinelli, “Government Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Theory and Practice in 
Developing Countries,” International Review of Administrative Sciences, No.2 (1981), pp. 137-138 and Dennis A. 
Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization in Developing Countries-A Review of Recent 
Experience (Washington D.C.: Working Bank Staff Working Papers No. 581, 1983), pp. 10-26. 
74 Ole Odgaard, Private Enterprises in Rural China: Impact on Agriculture and Social Stratification (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 1992), p. 16. 
75 Dennis A. Rondinelli and G. Shabbir Cheema, “Implementing Decentralization Policies: An Introduction,” in G. 
Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli (eds.), Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in 
Developing Countries (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983), pp. 20-21. 
76 Ibid., p. 22. 
77 Ibid., p. 24. 
78 Odgaard, Private Enterprises in Rural China, p. 16. 
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The relationship between the central and local governments affects the reform of 
local government. In France and Australia where the local governments have 
relatively limited power, the precondition of pushing through local government 
reform is to adjust the intergovernmental relationships, i.e., the devolution of power 
from the central government to the local government so that the local government can 
have their own initiatives and independence in dealing with local business.79 In Japan, 
the government is highly centralized at both the central and the local levels. In this 
case, the central government always sends delegating personnel to the local 
government and controls local government affairs. “The prefectures are supposed to 
assume this double role of representing and supporting cities and towns on the one 
hand and controlling them on the other.”80 According to the recent experiences of the 
British local government, the central government has a great capacity “to reorder and 
reshape local government to meet its own needs.”81  
In China, it is necessary to deconcentrate the power from the central to local 
governments because the country could not attain its political and economic goals 
without the function of decentralization in facilitating planning and implementation of 
programmes at the local level, which would allow the local people to actively take 
part in the development process.82 The central government affects local government 
reform through deconcentration of economic management power, taxation sharing 
                                                        
79 Sun, Dangdai difang zhili [Contemporary Local Governance], pp. 131-132. 
80 Kengo Akizuki, “Intergovernmental Relationships and Local Government Reform in Japan: A Case of the 
Integrative System,” in Erik Amna and Stig Montin (eds.), Towards a New Concept of Local Self-government: 
Recent Local Government Legislation in Comparative Perspective (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2000), p. 37. 
81 Sullivan, “Local Government Reform in Great Britain,” p. 22. 
82  Diana Conyers, “Administration in China: Some Preliminary Observations,” Journal of Administration 
Overseas, Vol. 16, No. 2 (April 1977), p. 106. 
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with the local government and rigorous political control. 
Regarding economic management, the central government in China transfers 
moderate degrees of power to the local government 83  and makes the local 
government more independent in dealing with local affairs. As You argues, 
government reform focuses on reducing direct management by the central government 
and transferring decision-making power to local governments so that they could 
acquire more decision-making power in terms of local affairs.84 Burns has also 
indicated that decentralization and economic development have given the local 
government more power to manage the economy and provincial bureaucracies which 
have supported local reforms since they could gain profits from decentralization.85 
More specifically, the central government in China provides some preferential 
policies to local governments in the process of reform. Chen argues that Guangdong 
province is the typical region which has made full use of all the advantages granted by 
the central government’s policies on reform and has made “bold explorations into 
seeking innovative reform practices.”86 
Regarding the taxation system, some scholars stress that decentralization or 
deconcentration on fiscal powers in China has weakened the capacity of the central 
state by strengthening the power of local governments.87 According to Wang, “the 
                                                        
83 Taijun Jin and Zaijian Qian, “The Construction of an Institutionalized Relationship of Chinese Central and 
Local Government in the New Century,” Chinese Public Administration Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2002), p. 37. 
84 You Chunmei, “Current Administrative Reform in China,” International Review of Administrative Sciences, 
Vol. 52 (1986), p. 133.  
85 Burns, “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” pp. 357-358. 
86 Chen, “Administrative Reform in Guangdong of PRC and Its Characteristics,” p. 20. 
87 The exemplary works are Jae Ho Chung, “Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People’s Republic of 
China: a Mid-term Appraisal,” The China Quarterly, No. 142 (1995), pp. 487-508; Shaoguang Wang, “The Rise of 
the Regions: Fiscal Reform and the Decline of Central State Capacity in China,” in Andrew G. Walder (ed.), The 
Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995), pp. 87-113; and Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin (eds.), Changing Central-Local 
Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity (Boulder: Westview, 1994). 
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decline of central extractive capacity has had three important political consequences: 
decline of central-state steering capacity; decline of legitimization capacity; and 
growth of the power of local government.”88 On the contrary, other scholars have 
argued that with the implementation of the fenshuizhi (division of the tax-collection 
system) in 1994, the central government has strengthened the centralization of fiscal 
power for its macro-control.89 
Considering the above two views, this thesis contends that the central government 
has centralized the power of taxation collection, especially since 1994 when the 
central government implemented the fenshuizhi. However, at the same time, the 
hierarchical control through vertical administration (chuizhi guanli) in the taxation 
system has also decentralized more power to the centrally-planned city (jihua danlie 
shi). 
In addition, with regard to political control, some scholars indicate that the central 
political power has been strengthened through the nomenklatura system.90 The term 
nomenklatura comes from the former USSR, a notion that consists of “lists of leading 
positions over which party units exercise the power of appointment and dismissal, 
lists of reserve candidates for those positions, and rules governing the actual processes 
of appointments and dismissals.”91 Some scholars have discussed thoroughly China’s 
                                                        
88 Wang, “The Rise of the Regions,” p. 105. 
89 See Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2004), p. 253; and Jin Taijun and Zhao Hui, Zhongyang yu difang zhengfu guanxi jiangou yu tiaoxie 
[Relationship between the Central and Local Governments: Construction and Adaptations] (Guangzhou: 
Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2005), p. 174. 
90  For an informative discussion on nomenklatura, see John P. Burns, The Chinese Communist Party’s 
Nomenklatura System (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989); John P. Burns, “China’s Nomenklatura System,” Problems 
of Communism, Vol. 36 (September-October 1987), pp. 36-51; John P. Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP 
Control of Leadership Selection: the 1990 Nomenklatura,” The China Quarterly, No. 138 (June 1994), pp. 
458-491; and Hon S. Chan, “Cadre Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System, 1990-1998,” The 
China Quarterly, No. 179 (September 2004), pp. 703-734. 
91 Lieberthal, Governing China, p. 234. 
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nomenklatura system. As Burns indicates, the nomenklatura system “centralizes 
authority over the national personnel system in the party.”92 Through this system, 
positions and individuals are ranked and matched and officials are appointed by 
superior party committees at appropriate levels of the CCP hierarchy.93 Through 
appointing top leaders in provinces and centrally-planned cities, the mutual trust and 
support between the central and local governments are established.94  
   This thesis argues that this close relationship with the central government 
obligates it to give more support for administrative reform in the centrally-planned 
cities and the sub-provincial cities. 
 
Leadership 
The success or failure of local government reform is not only related to the local 
context and the relationship between the central and local governments, but is also 
closely related to the leadership at the central and local levels. The attitudes and 
management styles of the leaders have had a significant impact on the reform 
process.95 Burns has also indicated that the leadership and their management skills 
may directly affect the organizational effectiveness in China.96  
In addition, Liu argues that the administrative reform at the central and local 
levels of China was initiated and supported by Deng Xiaoping himself. His speech 
entitled “The Reform of the Leadership System of the Party and the State” at the 
                                                        
92 Burns, “China’s Nomenklatura System,” p. 50. 
93 Yumin Sheng, “Central-Provincial Relations at the CCP Central Committees: Institutions, Measurement and 
Empirical Trends, 1978-2002,” The China Quarterly, No. 182 (2005), pp. 338-355. 
94 Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection,” p. 470. 
95 Quah, “Administrative Reform,” pp. 66-67. 
96 Burns, “Reforming China’s Bureaucracy, 1979-82,” p. 720. 
 54
extended Politburo meeting in 1980 symbolizes the start of the administrative reform 
in China and “recognized an urgent need for reforming the Party and State leadership 
system.”97 On the other hand, the local leadership has also played a pivotal role in the 
process of local government reform. As Chung argues, the attitudes of local leaders to 




After reviewing the current literature, this study relies on the analytical frameworks of 
Quah and Caiden to analyze local government reform in China. It acknowledges 
Quah’s framework to analyze local government reform in China from two aspects: the 
goals and content of reform, and the impact of leadership and environment on the 
course and outcome of the reform. The study also uses the following factors provided 
by Caiden, that is, the local context, the relationship between the central and local 
governments and leadership to analyze local government reform in China. In addition, 
some scholars such as Burns and Yang have analyzed the political and economic 
factors affecting administrative reform in China. 
The analyses of these scholars provide valuable contributions for the 
understanding of administrative reform at the national level but not at the local level. 
Accordingly, this study attempts to fill this research gap by employing these analytical 
frameworks to analyze administrative reform at the local level in China. 
This chapter also identifies the reasons for introducing local government reform 
                                                        
97 Meiru Liu, Administrative Reform in China and Its Impact on the Policy-Making Process and Economic 
Development after Mao (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), p. 64. 
98 Jae Ho Chung, “Shandong: The Political Economy of Development and Inequality,” in Goodman (ed.), China's 
Provinces in Reform, p. 132. 
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according to the discussion of some scholars. Chapman and Marcou have indicated 
that administrative reform is driven by economic reform in European countries. 
Turner, Yang and Burns have also argued that economic reform has influenced 
administrative reform in China. In addition, some scholars such as Lan, Tsao and 
Zhang argue that the organizational, functional and personnel problems existing in 
government indicate an urgent need for carrying out administrative reform in China. 
According to Quah, Farazmand and other scholars, the goals of administrative 
reform in this research include the concrete objectives of enhancing organizational 
effectiveness and the general goal of attaining national economic development.  
Regarding the evaluation of the effectiveness of local government reform, few 
scholars have focused on this aspect. Even though Lan, Chen et al. and Xie et al. have 
made some assessment on local government reform in China, they have not conducted 
a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of local government reform by using 
a set of indicators. This study will use the indicators employed by some scholars and 
organizations to evaluate the effectiveness of local government reform.  
According to Price, Leemans and Quah, the goals are the important indicators for 
evaluating the effectiveness of administrative reform. Therefore, the reform goals 
identified by the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments constitute an important 
criterion for assessing the effectiveness of local government reform. This chapter also 
identifies the indicators for evaluating government transparency, public service 
delivery, government integrity and efficiency provided by the World Bank, the IMD, 
the OECD, the ADB and the Ministry of Personnel in China. In addition, it also 
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borrows some indicators from some scholars such as Porta et al. and Burns. 
This chapter has also identified the three factors of the local context, the 
relationship between the central and local governments and the leadership, and 
assesses their impact on local government reform in the three municipalities in 
Shandong province. According to some scholars such as Sullivan, Box, Williams and 
Goodman, the local context including environment, economic conditions and tradition 
of a locality largely affects local government reform.  
This chapter acknowledges that the central government affects local government 
reform through the deconcentration of economic management power, taxation sharing 
with the local government and rigorous political control. In regard to economic 
management, Burns and You have indicated that the central government in China 
transfers moderate degrees of power to the local government, and supports local 
reforms since the local government gains profits from such decentralization. For the 
taxation system, this chapter critically reviews the opinions of some scholars such as 
Wang and Chung that the central government has centralized the power of taxation 
collection whereas the hierarchical control through vertical administration (chuizhi 
guanli) in the taxation system has also decentralized more power to the 
centrally-planned city (jihua danlie shi). In terms of political control, this chapter 
analyzes the opinions of some scholars such as Burns and Lieberthal to show that the 
close relationship with the central government obligates it to give more support for 
administrative reform in the centrally-planned cities and the sub-provincial cities. 
Finally, this chapter acknowledges the opinions of some scholars such as Quah, 
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Liu and Chung that the success or failure of local government reform is closely 
related to the leadership at the central and local levels.
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CHAPTER THREE 
POLICY CONTEXT AND PROBLEMS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
 
This chapter will describe the policy context and analyze the problems of local 
government in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi municipalities. It begins with a 
description of the policy context and discusses how the policy context affects 
administrative reform in the three municipalities. It then analyzes how economic 
reform has played a crucial role in facilitating the administrative reforms. Finally, the 
problems of local government are discussed. 
This chapter argues that Qingdao’s status as a business centre and Jinan’s status as 
a political centre have facilitated their implementation of economic and administrative 
reforms. On the contrary, Linyi’s mountainous location and poor economic 
performance have hindered it from further social development. This chapter also 
argues that market economic reform has forced the local government to launch an 
administrative reform so as to change its functions to suit a market economy and 
promote economic reform. With the transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
market economy, some problems in government organization, human service delivery 
and personnel management have been exposed in the administrative system of local 
government, indicating the need for administrative reform. In response to economic 
reform and to solve the problems in local government, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
governments have identified these four goals of carrying out administrative reform: 
improving efficiency, quality of services and transparency, and minimising corruption. 
This chapter analyzes these aspects based on extensive archival research and 
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Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi cities are all located in Shandong province, which is 
situated in the eastern part of China on the lower reaches of the Yellow River (See 
Appendix 1). Shandong province borders the Bohai sea and Yellow sea on the eastern 
side, and overlooks South Korea and Japan across a vast stretch of sea. Because of 
this geographical advantage, Shandong province is an important coastal and economic 
province in China. It has a total area of 156,000 square kilometres and a total 
population of over 90 million.1  
Shandong province has undergone significant changes since 1990. Its GDP has 
been increasing gradually during the last decade. In 2003, the GDP of Shandong 
province reached RMB 1,243 billion, an increase of 13.7% over the previous year.2 
Moreover, Shandong province is rich in natural resources, particularly in oil and coal. 
It is also a large agricultural province in China. The inherent advantages in economic 
development such as its rich natural resources and the coastal location of Shandong 
facilitate the development of foreign trade and local economic growth. 
Shandong province is divided into 17 municipalities, 49 districts, 31 county-level 
cities and 60 counties (See Figure 2). The 17 municipalities include Jinan (capital), 
Qingdao, Yantai, Weihai, Zibo, Weifang, Tai’an, Dongying, Jining, Rizhao, Liaocheng, 
                                                        
1  Shandong Yearbook Editorial Department, “Ziran huanjing” [The Natural Environment], see 
http://sd.infobase.gov.cn/shizhi/ztk/d00/a.htm#a18, accessed on 19 December 2005. 
2 Shandong Statistics Bureau, Shandong tongji nianjian 2004 [Shandong Statistical Year Book 2004] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2004), p. 3. 
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Linyi, Laiwu, Heze, Zaozhuang, Dezhou and Binzhou.3 
 
Figure 2: Administrative Hierarchy of Shandong Province 
 
Source: Shandong Yearbook Editorial Department (ed.), “Lishi jianjie” [A Brief History of Shandong 
Province], see http://sd.infobase.gov.cn/shizhi/ztk/d00/a.htm#a18, accessed on 19 December 2005. 
 
1. Qingdao City 
Qingdao city is located at the southern tip of the Shandong Peninsula facing the 
Yellow Sea (See appendix 4). It covers an area of 10,654 square km and has a 
population of 7.31 million in 2004.4 It is currently divided into seven urban districts, 
namely, Shinan, Shibei, Sifang, Licang, Laoshan, Chengyang, Huangdao, and five 
county-level cities, namely, Jimo, Jiaozhou, Jiaonian, Pingdu, and Laixi.5  
Compared to other municipalities in Shandong province, Qingdao city is a 
relatively young city with a history of 114 years. It became a German colony in 1897 
after the Opium War and was occupied by Japan in 1914 during the First World War. 
Its short but complicated history of being colonized by foreign countries had prepared 
the Qingdao people in terms of interacting with other cultures. This interactive 
                                                        
3 Ibid. , p. 3. 
4  Qingdao Statistical Bureau, “Qingdao shiqing” [The General Situation of Qingdao City], see 
http://www.qingdao.gov.cn/n172/n1523/index.html, accessed on 9 November 2005. 
5  Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Yearbook 2003] 
(Qingdao: Qingdao shizhi bangongshi, 2003), p. 18. 
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relationship with other cultures was accelerated after Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reform 
which exposed China to the outside world. Thus, Qingdao’s characteristic of being 
open-minded has made its government officials more open to accepting new ideas of 
economic management and government administration than other municipalities such 
as Jinan and Linyi. 
Qingdao city is also the business centre of Shandong province. Its coastal location 
enables Qingdao city to undertake foreign trade more conveniently. Consequently, it 
is one of the five major ports for foreign trade in China. According to the survey of 
economic competitiveness of 17 cities in Shandong province, Qingdao city was 
ranked first in terms of the economic development level in 2001.6 In 2002, its GDP 
was RMB 151.82 billion and overseas investment was USD 2.38 billion. In these two 
respects, Qingdao’s economic performance was ranked number one in Shandong 
province.7 In addition, there are many famous enterprises located in Qingdao city, 
such as the Haier Group, Tsingtao Beer Co., Ltd and the Hisense Group. Tsingtao 
Beer ranks the highest in China’s beverage industry in terms of its export volume.8 In 
contrast, Jinan and Linyi cities lack such excellent enterprises to support their own 
economic development. 
Qingdao’s strong economic power has facilitated the implementation of economic 
and administrative reforms. Obviously, a city with strong economic power will have 
                                                        
6  Shandong Statistical Bureau, “17 chengshi jingzhengli diaocha yu paihang” [The Report of Survey of 
Competitiveness of 17 Cities in Shandong Province], Dazhong ribao [Dazhong Daily], 4 September 2002, p. A1. 
7 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Yearbook 2003], pp. 
25-26. 
8 “Survey of Qingdao,” see http://www.qingdaochina.org/english/Survey/em.htm, accessed on 9 November 2005. 
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more revenues to improve city infrastructure and social security.9 With regard to city 
infrastructure, Qingdao government invested RMB 1985.02 million in 2002 for 
capital construction10 and in Jinan city, it was RMB 163.99 million.11 In contrast, the 
expenditure of capital construction in Linyi city was only RMB 0.30 million.12 As for 
social relief, the minimal living security standard for urban residents in Qingdao and 
Jinan cities was both RMB 230 per month in 200513 while that in Linyi city was only 
RMB 160, which ranked 16th among 17 cities in Shandong province.14  
 
2. Jinan City 
Jinan city is an inland city, located in the mid-western part of Shandong province (See 
appendix 4). On the north side of Jinan city lies the Yellow River, which is considered 
the “cradle of the Chinese nation.” Jinan city covers an area of over 8,177 square km 
and has a population of 5.90 million. It includes five districts (Lixia, Licheng, Huaiyin, 
Tianqiao and Shizhong), four counties (Changqing, Pingyin, Shanghe and Jiyang) and 
Zhangqiu county-city.15 
   Jinan city is one of the birthplaces of the Chinese civilization and its history can 
be traced back 4,000 years. Since the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), it has been the 
capital of Shandong Province. Therefore, Jinan city has always been the political and 
                                                        
9 Interview with the Dean of General Office of Qingdao Urban Administrative Bureau, 22 June 2005. 
10 Qingdao Statistic Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Statistical Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2003), p. 93. 
11 Jinan Statistic Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 2003 [Jinan Statistical Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji 
chubanshe, 2003), p. 178. 
12 Linyi Statistic Bureau, Linyi tongji nianjian 2003 [Linyi Statistical Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji 
chubanshe, 2003), p. 346. 
13 Interview with the Director of Social Relief Department of Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau, 20 June 2005 and the 
Director of Civil Organizations Management Department of Jinan Civil Affairs Bureau, 16 June 2005. 
14 Interview with an official of Linyi Civil Affairs Bureau, 27 June 2005. 
15  Jinan Statistical Bureau, “Jinan gaikuang” [The General Situation of Jinan City], see 
http://www.jinan.gov.cn/20050808/column/639.htm, accessed on 11 September 2005. 
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cultural centre of Shandong province. 16  Hence it is not surprising that Jinan 
municipality has performed well in education and health care since its prominent 
status has attracted many professional and technological people.  
Shandong University, a famous university in China, was founded in Jinan city in 
1901 with the name Shandong Grand School (Shandong daxuetang).17 At present, 
there are 70 full-time universities and colleges in the city, with a total enrolment of 
382,900 students.18 Jinan city has more full-time universities than Qingdao and Linyi 
cities, which respectively has 10 colleges and universities19 and two universities.20 
This indicates that the Jinan government far exceeds the Qingdao and Linyi 
governments in improving education conditions and enlarging the enrolment in higher 
education. In addition, the cultural centre also attracts many professional medical 
personnel and the city’s public health undertakings also have achieved great 
development. In 2002, Jinan city had 31,945 various professional medical personnel,21 
which exceeded the 31,469 professional medical personnel of Qingdao city22 and the 
21,300 professional medical personnel of Linyi city.23  
Jinan city is not only the capital city but also the relatively more developed area in 
Shandong province.24 Its economic development level was ranked third among the 17 
                                                        
16 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 2003), pp. 28-29. 
17  “Shandong daxue lishi yange” [A Brief History of Shandong University], see 
http://www.sdu.edu.cn/2005/second/xxgk01.html, accessed on 19 December 2005. 
18 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003], p. 371. 
19 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Yearbook 2003], p. 358. 
20 Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 2003), p. 242. 
21 Jinan Statistic Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 2003 [Jinan Statistical Yearbook 2003], pp. 449-450. 
22 Qingdao Statistic Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Statistical Yearbook 2003], p. 332. 
23 Linyi Statistic Bureau, Linyi tongji nianjian 2003 [Linyi Statistical Yearbook 2003], p. 17. 
24 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003], p. 29. 
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cities in Shandong province,25 behind Qingdao and Yantai cities. Its GDP amounted 
to RMB 120.00 billion and its overseas investment in 2002 was USD 0.70 billion.26  
 
3. Linyi City 
In contrast, Linyi city is situated in the Southeast region of Shandong province (see 
appendix 4) surrounded by mountains. It is the largest administrative region in 
Shandong province because it covers a total area of 17,201 square km, occupying 11 
per cent of the total area of the province, and contains a population of 10.11 million, 
taking up 11 per cent of the whole population of Shandong province.27 In December 
1994, Linyi municipality as a prefecture-level city (diji shi) was established in order 
to dissolve the Linyi region’s administrative office in Shandong province.28 Linyi 
municipality only contains three urban districts, namely, Lanshan, Luozhuang and 
Hedong, and other sub-prefecture units are nine counties: Tancheng, Cangshan, Yishui, 
Yinan, Pingyi, Feixian, Mengyin, Junan and Linshu. About 75 per cent of Linyi’s total 
population still lives in rural areas.29  
   Its mountainous location has delayed Linyi’s process of opening up like the other 
cities in Shandong province. Not surprisingly, it is a relatively poor area and its 
economic development level was ranked 16th among the 17 cities in Shandong 
province in 2001.30 Its GDP was RMB 70.21 billion and its overseas investment was 
                                                        
25 Shandong Statistical Bureau, “17 chengshi jingzhengli diaocha yu paihang” [The Report of Survey of 
Competitiveness of 17 Cities in Shandong Province], p. A1. 
26 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003], p. 28. 
27  Linyi Statistical Bureau, “Linyi gaikuang” [The General Situation of Linyi City], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/lygk/lygk.htm, accessed on 9 November 2005. 
28 Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2004 [Linyi Yearbook 2004] (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 2004), p. 23. 
29 Ibid. , p. 24. 
30 Shandong Statistical Bureau, “17 chengshi jingzhengli diaocha yu paihang” [The Report of Survey of 
Competitiveness of 17 Cities in Shandong Province], p. A1. 
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only USD 0.47 billion in 2002.  
The poor economy and large proportion of a poorer population have hindered 
Linyi city from further economic development and administrative reform. For 
instance, the level of social relief of Linyi city is relatively lower compared with other 
cities in Shandong province. The officials of Linyi Civil Affairs Bureau said that the 
minimal living security standard for urban residents relied heavily on local economic 
development and this standard could be increased when the level of local economic 
development was enhanced.31 
Linyi city also enjoys a history of over 2,480 years and is a famous historical and 
cultural city in Shandong province. During the period of the anti-Japanese war 
(1937-1945) and the liberation war (1945-1949) in China, Linyi city was an important 
base for the Shandong Liberation Zone.32 The tradition of revolution has also made 
Linyi people very obedient to the central government. This obedient characteristic has 
ensured that the Linyi government officials have strictly followed the directions of the 
central government and have not taken any creative measures to improve its 






                                                        
31 Interview with an official of Linyi Civil Affairs Bureau, 27 June 2005. 
32 Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2004 [Linyi Yearbook 2004], pp. 23-24. 
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Table 2: The Policy Context of Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Municipalities  
 Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
Feature Business centre Political centre Regular city 
Location Southern tip of 
Shandong 
Midwest Shandong Southeast Shandong 
Area 10,654 square km 8,177 square km 17,201 square km 
Population 7.31 million 5.90 million 10.11 million 
History 114 years 4,000 years 2,480 years 
Economic 
Development Level 
No.1 No.3 No.16 
GDP RMB 151.82 billion RMB 120.00 billion RMB 70.21 billion 
Overseas Investment USD 2.38 billion USD 0.70 billion USD 0.47 billion 
 
Economic Reform  
 
During the Third Session of the 11th National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) in 1978, Deng Xiaoping requested that the government should focus on 
the reconstruction of national economy and implement the policy of reform.33 Deng’s 
speech signalled the beginning of implementing policies of reform and the opening-up 
of China. From then on, the market economic reform was initiated in the central and 
the local governments. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s trip to the southern part of China34 
and the 14th National Congress of the CCP further liberated the minds of the 
government officials and encouraged them to further carry out the policy of reform. 
“The reforms have moved the country away from a centrally planned economy, 
dominated by the state sector, towards a market economy, with a growing collective 
and private sector.”35 
                                                        
33 The Party Literature Research Centre of the CCP Central Committee, “Zhonggong shiyijie sanzhong quanhui 
yilai dashiji” [Great Events since the Third Session of the 11th National Congress of the CCP], Renmin ribao 
[People’s Daily], 14 December 1998, p. A1. 
34 Deng Xiaoping, Zai Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai he Shanghai deng di tanhua yaodian [The Speech Made by 
Deng Xiaoping on His Trip to The South], see 
http://www.southcn.com/NEWS/gdnews/sz/dxp/ll/200407290462.htm, accessed on 13 May 2006. 
35  John P. Burns, “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” Public Administration and 
Development, Vol. 13, No. 4 (October 1993), p. 345. 
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The market economic reform required local governments like Qingdao, Jinan and 
Linyi to implement administrative reform to change government functions to satisfy 
the requirements of a market economy.36  
In the three municipalities, government agencies in charge of the central planning 
such as the Textile Bureau, the Machinery Bureau, the Electronic Industrial Bureau, 
the Chemical Industrial Bureau, and the Light-industry Bureau were dissolved and 
replaced with associations or councils across different sectors (hangye xiehui).37 
Moreover, market economic reform has revealed the need for setting up new 
organizations to perform new functions. The Administrative Commission of the 
Economic and Technological Development Area and the State-owned Assets 
Administration Bureau in Jinan and Qingdao cities were established in response to the 
requirements of the opening-up policy and the SOE reform.38 
Therefore, the first objective of administrative reform in the three municipalities 
was to change government functions to suit the need of the market economic reform 
through curtailing the microeconomic functions of local government.39 According to 
                                                        
36 Interview with the Director and Deputy Director of Government Set-up Department of Jinan Personnel Bureau, 
14 June 2005; an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005; and the 
Deputy Director of Linyi Personnel Bureau, 29 June 2005. 
37 See Yu Zhengsheng, “Zai shiwei qijie sanci quanweihuiyi shang de jianghua” [The Lecture of the Third Plenary 
Session of the Seventh Congress of the Qingdao Municipal Committee of the CCP], in Qingdao Local Chronicles 
Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1996 [Qingdao Yearbook 1996] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996), p. 4; Jinan 
Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1995 [Jinan Yearbook 1995] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 
1995), p. 25; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1997 [Jinan Yearbook 1997] (Jinan: 
Jinan chubanshe, 1997), p. 33; and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1997 [Linyi 
Yearbook 1997] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1999), p. 97. 
38 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2000 [Qingdao Yearbook 2000] 
(Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2000), pp. 20-22 and Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), 
Jinan nianjian 1996 [Jinan Yearbook 1996] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 1996), p. 80. 
39 See Ocean University of China Group, “Qingdaoshizhengfu shixian zhineng zhuanbian de xingxiang sheji yu 
duice yanjiu” [The Study on the Image Design and Countermeasures of Shifting Governmental Functions of 
Qingdao City], in Qingdao Social Science Association (ed.), Qingdaoshi jingji shehui fazhan yanjiu baogao [The 
Study Report of Economic and Social Development of Qingdao City] (Beijing: Shehuikexue wenxian chubanshe, 
2003), pp. 278-279; Bao Zhiqiang, “2004 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Jinan Government Work Report of 2004], in 
Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2004 [Jinan Yearbook 2004] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 2004), p. 10; and Lian Chengmin, “2004 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Linyi Government Work Report 
of 2004], see http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 26 July 2005. 
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the “Suggestions on Organizational Reform at Municipality, County, and Township 
Government of Shandong Province,” the administrative reform in municipalities of 
Shandong province sought to separate local government functions from enterprise 
management. This was the central theme of local government reform.40 
 
Problems of Local Government 
 
In making the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, 
some problems were encountered in the administrative system of local government, 
which indicated an urgent need for administrative reform. These problems were 




Regarding government organization, the administrative system in China is a unitary 
system which is similar to the Soviet model of socialism. As mentioned in the 
literature review, China emphasizes the leadership of the CCP which controls almost 
all aspects of the society through the state apparatus. Therefore, the government is the 
executive agency which represents the state power. It performs all the functions such 
as organizing and managing the state administrative affairs as well as leading and 
managing the economy.41 Moreover, in the centrally planned system, lower level 
government should unconditionally implement the decisions made by a higher level 
                                                        
40 Shandong Provincial Government, Shi xian xiang jigougaige de yijian [Suggestions on the Organizational 
Reform at the Municipal, County, and Township Governments in Shandong Province], 2000, pp. 2-3. 
41 Xie Qingkui et al., Zhongguo difang zhengfu tizhi gailun [The Generality of Chinese Local Government System] 
(Beijing: Zhongguo guangbodianshi chubanshe, 1998), p. 25. 
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government. In this sense, local government agencies follow the same political 
structure and also duplicate policies from the central government agencies.  
In this case, the government in China performs all functions of management of the 
society, at the macro or the micro levels. As a consequence, the government tends to 
expand itself to meet the needs of management at both the central and local levels. 
From 1950 to 1982, the number of government agencies in the Qingdao and Jinan 
governments increased from 22 to 60.42 When the number of government agencies 
increased, government agencies became more specialized in certain fields, but were 
inclined to duplicate other duties and working methods.43 Therefore, the functions of 
government agencies overlap. In 1996, eight agencies were responsible for urban 
planning in the Qingdao and Jinan governments: the Construction Commission, the 
Construction Management Bureau, the Real Estate Bureau, the Land Management 
Bureau, the Urban Planning Bureau, the Office of Urban Management Commission, 
the Public Utility Administration Bureau and the Administration Bureau of Garden, 
Environment and Sanitation.44 The problem of overlapping bureaucracy also existed 
in Linyi municipality as before 1999, there were five bureaus whose functions 
focused on agriculture management. These five bureaus were the Agriculture Bureau, 
the Agriculture Office, the Animal Husbandry Bureau, the Agricultural Machinery 
                                                        
42 See Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1989 [Jinan Yearbook 1989] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 1989), p. 74 and Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1988 [Qingdao 
Yearbook 1988] (Qingdao: Qingdao chubanshe, 1989), p. 433. 
43  Dao Minh Chau, “Administrative Reform in Vietnam: Need and Strategy,” Asian Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol. 19, No. 2 (December 1997), p. 307. 
44 See Qingdao Municipal Government, Guanyu jigougaige de shishi yijian [Suggestions on Organizational 
Reform], 2001, pp. 3-5 and Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2002 [Jinan Yearbook 
2002] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 2002), pp. 20-21. 
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Administration Bureau and the Township Enterprise Management Bureau.45  
Obviously, the overlapping government agencies had contributed to the problem 
of overstaffing in the local government as government officials in several bureaus 
were expected to do the work that could be done by officials affiliated with just one 
bureau. Even within one bureau, the problem of overstaffing also existed. An official I 
interviewed told me that in some bureaus of Qingdao city, there was one director and 
nine vice-directors, which made each one’s responsibility rather obscure.46 With the 
increase of government bureaus, the number of local government officials was also on 
the rise. In Qingdao city, the number of government staff increased from 51,000 in 
1994 to 64,757 in 1997.47 The same situation also occurred in Jinan and Linyi cities. 
As the salary of government officials constitutes the most part of administrative 
expense of local government, if the percentage of administrative expense of the total 
local government expenditure is high and continuously increasing, it might indicate 
that the number of officials is beyond the right staffing level in local government. To 
examine whether the percentage of administrative expense of the total local 
government expenditure is high or not, it may be helpful to compare the percentages 
of these three municipalities with those of the local governments in U.S. In 1996, the 
average percentage of administrative expense of the total local government 
expenditure in U.S. was only 4.56%.48 In comparison, this percentage in Qingdao city 
                                                        
45 Linyi Municipal Government, Guanyu shiji dangzheng jiguan jigougaige de shishi yijian [Implementing 
Suggestions on Organizational Reform], 2001, pp. 9-10. 
46 Interview with an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005. 
47 See Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 1996 [Qingdao Statistical Yearbook 1996] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1996), pp. 18, 39 and Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 1998 
[Qingdao Statistical Yearbook 1998] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1998), pp. 31, 40. 
48 U.S. Census Bureau, “Table 1. Summary of State and Local Government Finances: 1981-82 to 1996-97,” see 
http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/97stlosummary.html, accessed on 25 August 2007. 
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was 7.89% and that in Jinan city was 9.02% in 1996. The percentage of administrative 
expense of the total local government expenditure was even increased to 14.23% in 
Linyi city in the same year.49 Thus, the overstaffing problem exists in the three 
municipal governments and the Linyi government faces the most serious situation. 
These limitations of the old administrative system hindered the local government 
from enhancing efficiency and effectiveness. According to the “Suggestions on 
Organizational Reform at Municipality, County, and Township Government of 
Shandong Province” in 2000, the administrative reform in municipalities should 
downsize relevant government agencies and incorporate some government agencies 
which were obviously sharing a set of overlapping responsibilities.50 This document 
also indicated that after the reform the number of government agencies at the 
municipal level should be reduced to 40 in Jinan and Qingdao cities, the two 
sub-provincial level cities, and 35 in the other 15 prefecture-level cities like Linyi. 
The number of government officials should be reduced by 30 per cent.51  
 
Public Service Delivery 
The transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy has brought 
about the emphasis on government functions in the public service sector. In a centrally 
planned economy, SOEs provided their employees with all kinds of benefits such as 
child care, medical care, pensions, housing and security. After the transition to a 
market economic system, the SOEs would unavoidably reduce some of these benefits 
                                                        
49 Refer to Appendix 9. 
50 Shandong Provincial Government, Shi xian xiang jigougaige de yijian [Suggestions on the Organizational 
Reform at the Municipal, County, and Township Governments in Shandong Province], p. 1. 
51 Ibid. , pp. 2- 4. 
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such as medical and child care due to the urgent need to cut budgets to enhance their 
competitiveness in the market. On the other hand, in a market economy, the SOEs 
might also be bankrupt, which is “a phenomenon inconceivable in a centrally planned 
economy, but quite possible in a market economy.”52 Therefore, employees may face 
more risks than ever such as being retrenched and the loss of pension or other welfare 
benefits. This situation had produced much pressure for the three municipal 
governments to carry out the administrative reform for strengthening the service 
delivery functions. 
Although the three municipalities needed to strengthen their public service 
functions, the problems that the three municipalities encountered were different in 
nature. The Linyi government faced the most serious problems in providing social 
security, education and health care. In terms of social security, the average 
unemployment rate from 1994 to 1998 was 3.42 per cent, the highest among the three 
municipalities (See Table 3). Similarly, in the education and health care sectors, the 
average number of tertiary students enrolled per 10,000 persons and the average 
number of hospital beds per 1,000 people were the lowest among the three 
municipalities. More specifically, the local finance department in Linyi city could not 
fully afford to pay the salaries of teachers, which led to a rampant unauthorized 
collection of fees in many primary and secondary schools. The unauthorized fees 
included forced donations, desk-and-chair maintenance fees, and other forms of extra 
expenses, which increased the financial burden for the students’ families. To make 
                                                        
52 Asian Development Bank, Development Management: Progress and Challenges in the People’s Republic of 
China (Manila: ADB, 2003), p. 56. 
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things worse, some primary and secondary schools in the countryside could not 
maintain their normal teaching duties because they were not getting any financial 
support from the government.53 The financial budget in general was too limited to 
implement compulsory education in a number of counties and towns of Linyi city. 
 
Table 3: The Indicators of Public Service Level in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
Municipalities, 1994-1998 
 Itema Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
Social Security Average unemployment rate of 
total labour force  
2.07% 2.83% 3.42% 
Education Average number of student 
enrolment of tertiary education 







Health Average number of hospital 







a For details of the calculation of these indicators, see Appendices 12, 14 and 19. 
 
In comparison, the Jinan and Qingdao governments were in a much better 
situation than the Linyi government. As the political and cultural centre in Shandong 
province, the educational level of people in Jinan was the highest among the three 
municipalities as it has 70 full-time universities and colleges whereas Linyi has only 
two universities.54 As the economic centre, the Qingdao government also secured 
enough funding for providing social security, health care and education. However, this 
does not suggest that the Qingdao and Jinan governments performed well in terms of 
public service since the transition to a market economy had required the local 
government to provide more human services for employees. Therefore, local 
government reform in the three municipalities since 1999 sought to improve 
                                                        
53 Interview with the Secretary of the Party Committee of Linyi Education Bureau, 30 June 2005. 
54 See Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003], p. 371 and 
Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2003], p. 242. 
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government functions in human service delivery.55 
Moreover, the transition from a planned economy to a market economy also 
required the local government to improve its regulatory services. As mentioned above, 
the market economic reform allowed the local government to be freed from managing 
the enterprises. However, the increasing influence of the private sector in the market 
required the local government to rely more heavily on implementing the regulations 
given the severity of the problems in the market place in China, such as unfair 
competition, lack of protection of intellectual properties and fraud which had 
disrupted the market order and dampened consumers’ interests. In this case, the 
regulatory activities of local government became rapidly expansive.56  
This expansion of regulation created a situation where enterprises and citizens 
must go through many different government departments to obtain approvals for their 
private business. For instance, for foreign investors who wanted to start a business in 
Qingdao city, they needed to produce 10 sets of approved documents from eight 
government agencies in the early years of the 1990s.57 With the development of 
economic reform, the number of approvals needed for private business was reduced 
greatly in Qingdao city as the government realized that it must simplify the procedure 
of obtaining administrative approvals in order to create a favourable environment to 
attract foreign investment. The issue of the expansion of regulation was more serious 
in Jinan and Linyi cities. In the 1990s, it was compulsory for foreign investors in 
                                                        
55 Shandong Provincial Government, Shi xian xiang jigougaige de yijian [Suggestions on the Organizational 
Reform at the Municipal, County, and Township Governments in Shandong Province], p. 2. 
56 Asian Development Bank, Development Management, pp. 57-58. 
57 Interview with an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005. 
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Jinan city to obtain 16 sets of approved documents from 12 government agencies 
before they could start a business, which usually took more than 50 working days.58 
For a housing construction project, eight sets of architectural drawings had to be 
submitted to eight government agencies for approval in Linyi city, a process which 
also cost at least 50 workings days.59 These cumbersome administrative procedures 
were blamed for wasting too much time for foreign investors and clients; at the same 
time, these procedures weakened the efficiency of local government. 
The local government often utilized its regulatory power to “protect or expand 
departmental or local interests rather than to further develop the market. As a result 
rent-seeking opportunities abound.”60 For instance, in the Linyi government, some 
government agencies, with power in the process of administrative examination and 
approval, took actions of “consuming, taking, blocking, and demanding” (chi, na, ka, 
yao) on enterprises and citizens. At the same time, the phenomenon of “sanluan 
(Three Unrulies)”: unruly levies (luanshoufei), forced donations (luantanpai), and 
fines (luanfakuan) had also breached the trust of the public for the local government. 
Some government agencies did not standardize the administrative and institutional 
costs (xingzheng shiyexing shoufei) on drugs, water, power supplies and medical care, 
which were essential to people’s everyday lives.61 
Therefore, administrative approval reform was carried out in the three 
                                                        
58 Interview with the Director of Investigation and Research Department of Jinan Administrative Examination and 
Approval Service Centre, 17 June 2005. 
59 Interview with the Deputy Director of Linyi Personnel Bureau, 29 June 2005. 
60 Asian Development Bank, Development Management, p. 62. 
61 Linyi Municipal Government, “Guanyu tigao xingzheng xiaolü youhua fazhan huanjing de yijian” [Suggestions 
on Enhancing Government Efficiency and Improving Development Environment], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 11 May 2005. 
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municipalities to minimise the items of administrative examination and approval, to 
rationalize the administrative procedure for the purpose of improving regulatory 
services of government and to enhance government efficiency.62 
In addition, another way of improving public services was to disclose government 
information to the public and to encourage citizens’ participation in monitoring local 
government affairs. However, before the economic reform in 1978, much government 
information was listed as confidential according to the document of “Provisional 
Regulation on Guarding State Secrets” circulated in 1951. In 1988 “The Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets” was enforced, which narrowed 
the scope of national secrets down to seven aspects including national defence, 
diplomatic activities, national economic and social development.63 However, the 
scope of confidential government information was still broad but the released 
government information was relatively limited. 
In this case, citizens could only get limited government information such as 
government news from newspapers or on television. More information, such as the 
official documents of local government, the promotion and dismissal of officials, the 
revenue and expenditure of local government and government procurement were not 
accessible to the general public. Consequently, the public could not monitor the 
decision-making process effectively due to a lack of information and transparency 
                                                        
62 See Qingdao Municipal Government, Guanyu jigougaige de shishi yijian [Suggestions on Organizational 
Reform], p. 2; Jinan Municipal Government, Guanyu shi xian xiang jigougaige de baogao [Report for 
Organizational Reform of Municipality, County and Township in Jinan Municipality], 2002, p. 5; and Linyi 
Municipal Government, Guanyu shiji dangzheng jiguan jigougaige de shishi yijian [Implementing Suggestions on 
Organizational Reform], p. 4. 
63 Article 8, The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets, adopted at the Third Meeting 
of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 5 
September 1988. 
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which had hindered “attempts to hold government accountable for the delivery of 
public services.”64 Therefore, the administrative reform in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
cities was designed to improve the accessibility of public information and the 
reporting system by launching several open government campaigns.65 
Moreover, the lack of external scrutiny and observation by the public participation 
in the local government had also impeded the possible improvement of public service 
delivery. For a long time, contacting citizens was only an institutionalized form of 
public participation in China to solicit and deal with public complaints.66 This kind of 
political participation, to some extent, provided the governments with the “chance to 
systematically gather information about popular preferences and officials’ 
behaviour.”67 However, even contacting citizens could not fully perform the functions 
of scrutiny and supervision because the government has manipulated this channel. 
Therefore, local government reform in the three municipalities was aimed to 
strengthen the level of public participation through inventing more channels of public 
participation in order to improve services.68 
 
 
                                                        
64 Asian Development Bank, Development Management, p. 62. 
65 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002] 
(Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002), p. 345; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan 
nianjian 2001 [Jinan Yearbook 2001] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 2001), p. 107; and Linyi Municipal Government, 
“Guanyu tigao xingzheng xiaolü youhua fazhan huanjing de yijian” [Suggestions on Enhancing Government 
Efficiency and Improving Development Environment], see http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 11 
May 2005. 
66 Laura M. Luehrmann, “Facing Citizen Complaints in China, 1951-1996,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 5 
(September/October 2003), p. 847. 
67 Ibid. , p. 848. 
68 See Xia Geng, “2003 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Qingdao Government Work Report of 2003], in Qingdao 
Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Yearbook 2003], pp. 15-16; Bao 
Zhiqiang, “2003 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Jinan Government Work Report of 2003], in Jinan Local Chronicles 
Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003], p. 11; and Li Qun, “2002 Zhengfu gongzuo 
baogao” [Linyi Government Work Report of 2002], in Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi 
nianjian 2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2003], pp.353-354.  
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Personnel Management 
The transition to a market economy requires an improvement in quality in the 
government’s decision-making process, which also needs to raise the standard of 
public servants 69  who, to a greater extent, determine the quality of the 
decision-making process of the government. Yet, the personnel management system 
from the central to the local government in China is not rationalized in terms of 
recruitment, promotion, performance appraisal and training to suit a market 
economy.70  
   For a long time, all government jobs were allocated through the labour allocation 
schemes mainly for university systems instead of opening these jobs to external 
competitive examinations. This was not appropriate for the economy within a labour 
market.71 In Jinan city one government official I interviewed said that the old labour 
allocation system provided more opportunities for applicants who wished to obtain 
government work to establish underhanded connections (la guanxi) with officials and 
to go through the back door (zou houmen) for more ready access to government 
vacancies.72 This system could not avoid guanxi networks because this kind of 
recruitment of government official was not fair and transparent. Similar situations also 
existed in the promotion of officials. In the old personnel management system, the 
promotion of officials was mainly based on the evaluation provided by their 
                                                        
69 Burns, “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” p. 349. 
70 See John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in Contemporary China,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 
No. 18 (July 1987), pp. 48-49 and John P. Burns, “Reforming China’s Bureaucracy, 1979-82,” Asian Survey, Vol. 
23, No. 6 (June 1983), pp. 694-700. 
71 Burns, “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” p. 355. 
72 Interview with the Director of Civil Organizations Management Department of Jinan Civil Affairs Bureau, 16 
June 2005. 
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supervisor. Consequently, many competent government officials could not go through 
a formal channel to be promoted except by establishing personal connections (la 
guanxi) with their supervisors, one Qingdao official explained.73  
More specifically, in the old personnel management system, there was no 
performance appraisal system in local government. As a result, well-connected 
government officials would easily be promoted and incompetent officials could not be 
demoted or dismissed.74 Thus, the civil service reform in the three municipalities was 
aimed to improve recruitment, promotion and performance appraisal in civil service 
systems.75  
   The content of training programmes for government officials also did not meet the 
requirements of China’s newly emerged market economy.76 In Mao Zedong’s era, the 
redness training (a symbol of the CCP which means politically conscious) was the 
most important content in the official training programmes because it was an 
important gesture to show the superiors their loyalty to the CCP. However, in the era 
of Deng Xiaoping, the situation had gradually changed because the market economy 
and the opening-up to the outside world had changed the previous ideological 
personnel training programmes. Therefore, the curriculum for training government 
officials, including public finance, administrative law and public policy, had changed 
according to the rule of a market economy. Deng Xiaoping said that we should pay 
                                                        
73 Interview with the Director of Reform and Development Bureau of Laoshan District in Qingdao, 24 June 2005 
and the Director and Deputy Director of Government Set-up Department of Jinan Personnel Bureau, 15 June 2005. 
74 Interview with the Director of Civil Organizations Management Department of Jinan Civil Affairs Bureau, 16 
June 2005 and an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005. 
75 Shandong Provincial Government, Shi xian xiang jigougaige de yijian [Suggestions on the Organizational 
Reform at the Municipal, County, and Township Governments in Shandong Province], p. 1. 
76 Burns, “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” p. 355. 
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more attention to upgrading the technical and managerial skills of our government 
officials. “If we ourselves don’t know about the advanced methods of management, 
we should learn from those who do, either at home or abroad.”77  
As the practitioners of government functions, the attitudes of the local government 
officials also needed to change according to this new logic. Under a planned economy, 
the attitudes of government officials had been formulated and characterized by direct 
management and intervention in economic affairs, rather than concentrating on 
services for enterprises and the society.78 When economic reform was carried out, it 
required local government officials to get rid of the outmoded thoughts of direct 
management and intervention in economic affairs and move on to establishing the 
concept of providing public service. 
However, the ideas rooted in the planned economy still existed among some local 
officials, especially those in Jinan and Linyi cities. They were worried that the reform 
would reduce the number of government officials, which meant that the government 
agencies would also become smaller. When the agencies began to shrink, they could 
not manage or interfere with the economic affairs as before and accordingly their 
power and interest would also be weakened.79 Therefore, the local officials worked 
out many ways to retain their powers of controlling enterprises and local economic 
affairs. For instance, the staff of the Jinan Industry Bureau was reduced and became 
an association in the 1990s reform for the purpose of separating government functions 
                                                        
77 Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping [Deng Xiaoping wenxuan] (Beijing: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1984), p. 161. 
78 Interview with the Director of Civil Organizations Management Department of Jinan Civil Affairs Bureau, 16 
June 2005 and an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005. 
79 Ibid. 
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from enterprises. After the reform, however, this function, which was supposed to be 
eliminated, was still present because the association was operated by the local 
government in practice.80  
This indicated that the attitudes of some local government officials had not 
changed to meet the requirements of a market economy and to provide public 
service.81 One of the officials I interviewed said that: “the change of government 
functions in the three municipalities was incomplete and insufficient, which could be 
attributed to the conventional thinking patterns of government officials formulated 
over years of the planned economy.”82 Therefore, the administrative reform in the 
three municipalities was also aimed to change the attitudes of the government officials 
from intervening in market activities to public service through the training of 
government officials.83  
In addition, in the three governments, the thick piles of paperwork and endless 
meetings (wenshan huihai) affected government efficiency and slowed down the 
administrative process. The “image projects” (xingxiang gongcheng) or “vanity 
projects” (zhengji gongcheng) vividly represented the kind of bureaucratism and 
formalism in the existing government agencies, which wasted both money and 
manpower in the pursuit of personal fame of government officials. In this case, 
government officials became fascinated with seeking their own fame instead of public 
interests. Thus, it was necessary to institute an accountability system such as auditing 
                                                        
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Interview with the Director of Government Set-up Department of Jinan Personnel Bureau, 14 June 2005. 
83 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 
345; Bao, “2003 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Jinan Government Work Report of 2003], p. 11; and Li, “2002 
Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Linyi Government Work Report of 2002], p. 353. 
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system for holding the local officials accountable for their responsibilities to serve the 
public. 
“Economic reform in China has been associated with an epidemic of corruption 
among local government officials.”84 The growing cases of corruption in China can 
be attributed to several factors. The systemic and structural problems in China, i.e. the 
highly centralized system, provide opportunities for officials to be engaged in 
corruption. In making the transition from a planned economy to the market economy, 
China has implemented a kind of dual-track economy, Shuang Gui Zhi, which 
involves “the coexistence of newly instituted markets with pre-existing guanxi 
arrangements, whereby the allocation of resources depends in part on ‘personal 
connections’ among government officials and firm managers.”85 In this case, local 
government officials attempted to seek profit from the enterprise managers and cadre 
corruption had become rampant. Furthermore, the cause of corruption was seen 
primarily as an ideological problem by many China’s reformers. During the period of 
transition from a planned economy to a market economy, some officials “have 
abandoned traditional party principles and socialist morality.”86 In this case, the level 
of corruption engaged in by government officials had gradually become entrenched. 
In addition, an insufficient supervisory and legal system also contributed to this 
severe situation. 
Given these factors, cadre corruption had become increasingly rampant in local 
                                                        
84 Chengze Simon Fan and Herschel I. Grossman, “Entrepreneurial Graft in China,” The Providence Journal (May 
3, 2001), p. B5. 
85 Ibid. , p. B5. 
86 Burns, “Reforming China’s Bureaucracy, 1979-82,” p. 704. 
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government in China. In 1998, the corruption cases investigated in Qingdao city were 
769 and in Jinan city 672, whereas the number in Linyi city was 1,212 cases.87 
Facing this kind of situation, the local governments in the three municipalities sought 
to curb corruption in administrative reform by strengthening law enforcement and 
through moral education.88 
In response to economic reform and to solve the problems in local government, 
Jiang Zemin, the General Secretary of the CCP announced the long-term goals of 
administrative reform in the Report of the 16th National Congress of the CCP, which 
were to “form an administrative system featuring well coordinated and standardized, 
fairness, transparency, honesty and high efficiency.”89  More specifically, in the 
National Work Meeting on Organization Reform of Municipality, County and 
Township in 2001, Hu Jintao, the then Vice-President of the People’s Republic of 
China, identified the goals of administrative reform at the municipal, county and 
township governments as: to meet the needs of the socialist market economic 
development and to facilitate the change of government functions; to contribute and 
rationalize the relationships among governments at all levels and all government 
agencies; to serve and enhance the construction of grass-root units; to reduce the 
                                                        
87 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1999 [Qingdao Yearbook 1999] 
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number of civil servants; to cut administrative cost; to alleviate financial burdens; and 
to enhance government efficiency.90  
The Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments have identified these four goals of 
carrying out administrative reform: improving efficiency, quality of services, 
transparency, and minimising corruption. 91  The first objective was to build an 
efficient government. It included actions such as downsizing local government, 
curtailing the microeconomic functions of government, reducing items of 
administrative approval and rationalizing administrative procedure and improving the 
quality of civil servants. The second objective was to build a service-oriented 
government by improving service delivery in the education, health care and social 
security sectors. The third aim was to build a transparent government to improve the 
accessibility of public information and the level of public participation. The fourth 
goal was to build a clean government by improving the accountability and integrity of 




Among the three municipalities in Shandong province, the status of being a business 
centre and its open-minded characteristic has helped the Qingdao government in 
implementing economic and administrative reform. Similarly, the status of a political 
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and cultural centre also helps Jinan city in improving public service delivery in the 
education and health sectors. In contrast, the Linyi government with its mountainous 
location, large rural area and poor economy has not developed as rapidly as the other 
two governments. 
The transition from a planned economy to a market economy has influenced 
administrative reform in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments. With the 
economic reform, the problems encountered in the administrative system of local 
government indicated the need for administrative reform. In regard to government 
organization, the overlapping government agencies and overstaffing have hindered the 
local government from enhancing efficiency and effectiveness. Regarding human 
service delivery, a lack of service delivery in the education, health and social security 
sectors has increased the pressure on the three municipal governments to carry out the 
administrative reform. It was also necessary to minimise the items of administrative 
examination and approval and rationalize the administrative procedure. Moreover, the 
lack of transparency and external scrutiny by the public participation in the local 
government also impeded the possible improvement of public service delivery. In 
addition, the personnel management system from the central to the local government 
was not rationalized in terms of recruitment, promotion, performance appraisal and 
training to suit a market economy. It was also necessary to institute an accountability 
system for holding the local officials accountable for their responsibilities to serve the 
public and curb cadre corruption which became increasingly rampant in local 
government. 
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Therefore, in response to China’s economic reform while facing limitations in the 
present administrative system, the three municipalities identified these four reform 









Following the requirements of the central government, the local governments in China 
started to carry out administrative reforms at the provincial, municipal, county and 
township levels since 1999. As mentioned in the literature review, there were three 
types of administrative reforms in China: organizational restructuring, improving the 
delivery of public services and civil service reform. This chapter will discuss the first 
two types: organizational restructuring and improving the delivery of public services. 
This chapter will identify the goals of these two reforms and describe the contents and 
impact of local government reforms in the three municipalities of Shandong province. 
The third type of local government reform: civil service reform will be the focus of 
Chapter 5.  
This chapter begins with an analysis of the downsizing of government agencies 
and the reduction of government staff in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi municipalities. It 
then discusses the change of the scope and functions of the governments. Next, this 
chapter discusses the efforts of improving the delivery of public service through 
enhancing human service delivery, reforming the administrative examination and 
approval system and increasing government transparency and public participation in 
the three municipalities.  
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This chapter argues that government restructuring has achieved more progress in 
separating the government functions from managing and intervening in enterprises in 
the 1999 reform. However, it still does not solve the problem of overstaffing in the 
local government. Moreover, the administrative examination and approval reform has 
enhanced the efficiency of the delivery of public service and local government has not 
been effective in delivering the services in the education, health care and social 
security sectors. In addition, the issues of government transparency and public 
participation still remain problematic and need to be improved considerably. 
The author has relied on research documents and interviews to analyze the process 
of government restructuring and the improvement of public service delivery. The 
research documents used include local yearbooks and official government documents 
collected in the three municipalities. In addition, interviews with local government 




Historically, governments have reorganized and rearranged their structures when they 
realize that government agencies are not efficient and responsive enough.1 Different 
diagnoses for the illness of the government have been proposed to reduce public 
expenditure, to streamline the government, and to reduce the number of bureaucratic 
procedures involved in government management.2 Many countries have followed 
                                                        
1  Gerald E. Caiden, “Administrative Reform,” in Ali Farazmand (ed.), Handbook of Comparative and 
Development Public Administration (New York: Marcel Dekker, 2001), p. 660. 
2 B. Guy Peters, “Government Reform and Reorganization in an Era of Retrenchment and Conviction Politics,” in 
Farazmand (ed.), Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration, pp. 673-676. 
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these prescriptions and carried out relevant reforms, for example, the formation of the 
administration de mission in France and Belgium, the Project-gruppen in West 
Germany, and the “Next Steps” in the United Kingdom. 3  In this sense, local 
government reform in China is no exception. 
The Shandong provincial government issued the “Suggestions on Organizational 
Reform at Municipality, County, and Township Government of Shandong Province” 
in 2000 as the guiding document for its administrative reform.4 This document 
identified these four objectives of the reform: (1) to downsize government; (2) to 
incorporate some government agencies which were conducting overlapping 
responsibilities in performing government functions; (3) to further separate the local 
government functions from enterprise management, public institution (shiye danwei) 
management and non-governmental organizations; and (4) to administer in 
accordance with local legislation as well as to standardize the style of management.5 
Among these issues, “changing the functions and scope of government was the central 
theme.”6  
According to Burns, organizational restructuring in China can be categorized into 
two types: the first focuses on “streamlining or downsizing government agencies, 
principally to cut administrative expenses and to rationalize government functions by, 
for example, eliminating duplication;” and the second focuses on “changing the scope 
and functions of government through expansion of some agencies and contraction of 
                                                        
3 Ibid. , p. 675. 
4 Shandong Provincial Government, Shi xian xiang jigougaige de yijian [Suggestions on the Organizational 
Reform at the Municipal, County, and Township Governments in Shandong Province], 2000, p. 1. 
5 Ibid. , pp. 1-3. 
6 Asian Development Bank, Development Management: Progress and Challenges in the People’s Republic of 
China (Manila: ADB, 2003), p. 30. 
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others.” 7  Accordingly, this chapter focuses on these two types of government 
restructuring: downsizing government and changing the functions of government.  
 
Downsizing Government 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the overlapping government agencies and overstaffing are 
two main problems exposed in government organizations in the local administrative 
system. In view of this situation, the three municipalities had focused on reducing the 
overlapping government agencies and cutting down the number of redundant officials 
in response to the requirements of economic reform.  
In regard to reducing government agencies, the Jinan, Qingdao and Linyi 
municipalities implemented administrative reforms in 1993 and 1996 respectively. 
However, the number of administrative agencies remained the same in spite of these 
reforms. The total number of administrative agencies affiliated with the Qingdao 
government was 54 in 1996 and 1998.8 Similarly, the Jinan government also had 54 
agencies in 1996 and 1998.9 Likewise, the 49 administrative agencies in the Linyi 
government did not change from 1996 to 1998.10 According to Yang, the number of 
agencies remained unchanged because some bureaus were abolished while other 
functional institutions with new names were added to the list. The reason why these 
agencies were added might be explained by the fact that governance of the economy 
                                                        
7  John P. Burns, “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” Public Administration and 
Development, Vol. 13, No. 4 (October 1993), p. 351. 
8 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1996 [Qingdao Yearbook 1996] 
(Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996), pp. 45-47 and Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 
2000 [Qingdao Yearbook 2000] (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2000), pp. 20-22. 
9 See Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1996 [Jinan Yearbook 1996] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 1996), p. 61 and Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1999 [Jinan 
Yearbook 1999] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 1999), pp. 64-69. 
10 See Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1997 [Linyi Yearbook 1997] (Jinan: Qilu 
shushe, 1999), pp. 97-98 and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1999 [Linyi 
Yearbook 1999] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 2001), pp. 25-36. 
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in China still heavily depended on administrative intervention since the plan economy 
still existed. In this case, “the proliferation of new economic entities and growing 
economic complexities were used to justify the establishment of government agencies 
and expansion of personnel,” even though “various central government documents 
were calling for simplifying administration.”11 Many scholars have also argued that 
the repeated administrative reforms of China in the 1990s for streamlining and 
rationalizing administrative agencies fell into vicious cycles of 
“streamlining-bloating-more streamlining-and more bloating.”12 
In this case, the administrative reform after 1999 reduced the number of 
administrative agencies in all three municipalities. By the end of 2003, both the 
Qingdao and Jinan governments had only 43 government agencies. In contrast, the 
Linyi municipal government had only 38 government agencies because Linyi, a 
prefecture-level city (diji shi), had fewer administrative agencies than Jinan and 
Qingdao cities, which were both sub-provincial level cities (fushengji chengshi) in the 
first place. 13  Through the 1999 reform, all three municipalities reduced 11 
government agencies for the purpose of solving the problem of overlapping duties 
among all the local government agencies (See Table 4).  
 
                                                        
11 Dali L. Yang, “Rationalizing the Chinese State: The Political Economy of Government Reform,” in Chien-min 
Chao and Bruce J. Dickson (eds.), Remaking the Chinese State: Strategies, Society, and Security (London: 
Routledge, 2001), pp. 24-25. 
12 See ibid. , p. 23 and Chengfu Zhang and Mengzhong Zhang, “Public Administration and Administrative 
Reform in China for the 21st Century-from State-Centre Governance to the Citizen-Centre Governance,” (Paper 
presented at the American Society for Public Administration 62nd Annual Conference, in Newark, USA, March 
10-13, 2001), p. 9.  
13 According to the document of “Suggestions on Organizational Reform at the Municipality, County, and 
Township Government of Shandong Province” in 2000, the number of Jinan and Qingdao government agencies 
should be about 40 agencies after the reform and the number of other municipal government agencies should be 
reduced to about 35. For more details, see Shandong Provincial Government, Shi xian xiang jigougaige de yijian 
[Suggestions on the Organizational Reform at the Municipal, County, and Township Governments in Shandong 
Province], p. 1. 
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Table 4: Number of Government Agencies in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Municipalities in 
1998 and 2003 
Itema Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
Number of Government 
Agencies in 1998 
54 54 49 
Number of Government 
Agencies in 2003 
43 43 38 
Number of Government 
Agencies Eliminated from 
1998 to 2003 
11 11 11 
a For the list of government agencies in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments, see Appendices 
5-7. 
 
The number of Qingdao government agencies was reduced from 54 to 43 (See 
Table 4). Among the 11 reduced agencies, four agencies namely the Agriculture 
Office, the Animal Husbandry Bureau, the Agricultural Machinery Administration 
Bureau and the Township Enterprise Management Bureau, which were responsible for 
managing agriculture affairs originally, were slowly dissolved due to their overlapping 
responsibilities with the Agriculture Bureau. After the reform, the original functions 
of these four agencies were all transferred to the Agriculture Bureau. For the same 
reason, the Geology and Mineral Resources Bureau was dissolved; and the Real 
Estate Bureau was combined with the Land Management Bureau to form the Land 
Resources and Housing Management Bureau, which performed the functions of the 
above three bureaus. In addition, for the purpose of solving the problem of 
overlapping duties in urban planning, this reform replaced these four bureaus: the 
Administration Bureau of Garden, Environment and Sanitation, the Public Utility 
Administration Bureau, the Municipal Engineering Administration Bureau and the 
Office of Urban Management Commission with the Urban Public Utility 
Administrative Bureau. Similarly, the size of three offices focusing on internal 
 93
economy, such as the Economic and Technical Cooperation Office, the 
Pairing-assistance Office and the Internal Business Invitation Office, was also reduced 
and their functions were transferred to the Internal Economic Cooperation Office (See 
Appendix 5). 
Similarly, the number of the Jinan government agencies was reduced from 54 to 
43 (See Table 4). Among the 11 reduced agencies, the Adult Education Bureau was 
dissolved and its main functions were transferred to the Education Bureau. The 
Geology and Mineral Resources Bureau and the Land Management Bureau were 
combined to form the Land Resources Bureau. Moreover, six bureaus which had 
overlapping functions in urban planning were dissolved and their functions were 
performed by the Urban Public Utility Administrative Bureau. Likewise, three 
bureaus focusing on agriculture affairs, namely the Agriculture Commission, the 
Animal Husbandry Bureau and the Vegetables Bureau were dissolved and their 
functions were transferred to the Agriculture Bureau. In addition, the Press and 
Publication Bureau was replaced with a public institution (shiye danwei) in Jinan 
Municipality (See Appendix 6). 
In contrast to the Qingdao and Jinan governments, the number of government 
agencies in Linyi city was reduced from 49 to 38 (See Table 4). In this reform, the 
Linyi government dissolved 13 old agencies. For the purpose of reducing the 
overlapping agencies, the State-owned Assets Administration Bureau was 
incorporated with the Finance Bureau; the Office of Housing Committee was also 
incorporated with the Real Estate Bureau; the Trade Bureau was incorporated with the 
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Economic and Trade Commission; and the Press and Publication Office was 
incorporated with the Culture Bureau. Moreover, the three bureaus that were 
responsible for urban planning, such as the Construction Commission, the 
Construction Management Bureau and the City Appearance Bureau, were replaced by 
the Construction Bureau. Similarly, the five bureaus focusing on agriculture 
management, namely the Agriculture Bureau, the Agriculture Commission, the 
Agricultural Machinery Administration Bureau, the Animal Husbandry Bureau and 
the Aid-the-Poor Development Office, were replaced with the Agriculture Bureau, 
which would be in charge of agriculture management (See Appendix 7). 
In addition, the Aquatic Product Bureau was dissolved and its function was 
performed by the Water Resources Bureau. The Geology and Mineral Resources 
Bureau was combined with the Land Management Bureau to form the Land 
Resources and Housing Management Bureau, which would perform the functions of 
the two bureaus. Likewise, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office was combined with 
the Foreign Affairs Office to form the Foreign Affairs and Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Office. 
The Linyi government also added two new agencies: the Committee for 
Restructuring Economic System and the Tourism Administration. Therefore, the 
actual number of government agencies in 2003 was only reduced by 11. 
Through this series of actions to reduce government agencies, a logical outcome 
would emerge: since so many government agencies were dissolved, the government 
officials in these agencies should also be dismissed. However, this did not happen. In 
 95
fact, in the process of reform, when some government bureaus were dissolved or 
incorporated with other bureaus, the government officials in the previous bureaus 
were simply transferred to the newly established bureaus or other existing bureaus 
which performed similar functions of the dissolved bureaus.14 In this case, the 
number of local government officials remained the same or even kept increasing 
rather than decreasing after reform.  
So why did the central government allow the local governments to transfer these 
dismissed officials to other bureaus? A possible explanation is that the central 
government was afraid that dismissed officials would increase unemployment rate in 
a city, which would endanger the stability of a society. As Yang observed, “[local 
officials] feared that the massive government restructuring might trigger conflicts and 
strong reactions in light of the slowing economic growth and tensions in state-society 
relations.15 Officials in Jinan city also reasoned that the municipal leaders were 
worried that too many officials would be losing their jobs which would affect social 
stability. That was why they encouraged the new and existing bureaus to take in these 
officials who originally belonged to the dissolved bureaus.16 As Harding argued, one 
of the reasons for expanding government staff in China is that the political leaders 
may see “increasing the size of the public bureaucracy as a convenient way of 
providing political patronage and relieving unemployment.”17 
                                                        
14 Interview with the Director of Civil Organizations Management Department of Jinan Civil Affairs Bureau, 16 
June 2005. 
15 Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 44. 
16 Interview with the Director and Deputy Director of Government Set-up Department of Jinan Personnel Bureau, 
14 June 2005. 
17 Harry Harding, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1981), p. 6. 
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According to the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Local Statistical Bureaus, the number 
of government officials actually increased from 1994 to 2003 (See Table 5). Since 
1999, this number had mostly remained the same. For instance, this number of 
government officials in Qingdao city saw a change from 63,000 in 1999 and 2001 to 
67,000 in 2003. Similarly, the number of government officials in Jinan witnessed an 
increase from 72,380 in 2000 and 2001 to 75,868 in 2003 (See Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Number of Government Officials in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Municipalities, 
1994-2003 
Number of Government Officials Year 
Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994 51,000 58,981 53,136 
1995 53,000 61,052 56,310 
1996 61,183 63,884 60,572 
1997 64,757 66,744 65,600 
1998 63,977 71,398 68,489 
1999 63,000 71,072 69,785 
2000 64,200 72,380 71,529 
2001 63,000 72,380 73,611 
2002 66,000 71,958 73,182 
2003 67,000 75,868 78,000 
Source: see Appendix 8. 
 
However, the objective of streamlining government has pushed the local 
government to implement personnel reduction in the newly established or existing 
bureaus. Accordingly, the measures of reassigning redundant officials in the three 
municipalities need to be examined. In order to implement the policy of personnel 
reduction smoothly, in 1999 the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments introduced 
three measures to reassign excessive administrative staff aside from just transferring 
them to other public institutions (shiye danwei). The three measures are “daizhi 
fenliu” (transferred officials will keep their original ranks and benefits); “dingxiang 
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peixun” (transferred officials will receive professional training and will enjoy the 
priority to be selected for an appropriate position) and “jiaqiang qiye” (transferred 
officials will be transferred to work in private enterprises).18  
“Daizhi fenliu” suggests that some of the transferred civil servants are allowed to 
keep their original ranks and benefits. Following this measure, the three governments 
encouraged government officials to leave their original position by practising “tiqian 
ligang” (leaving position in advance) and “tiqian tuixiu” (retirement in advance). To 
some extent, these measures have persuaded some of the officials with low skills or 
low educational level to leave their positions earlier than the legal age by retaining 
their original ranks and associated benefits. With regard to the measure of retirement 
in advance (tiqian tuixiu), the Interim Regulations on National Public Servants (guojia 
gongwuyuan zanxing tiaoli) has stipulated that government officials, who have 
worked for 30 years or worked for at least 20 years but in the age range of 55-60 for 
males and 50-55 for females, could retire in advance.19  
For the purpose of transferring redundant officials more promptly, the Qingdao 
government further suggested that if government officials could retire ahead of the 
statutory age of retirement by 0.5 to 2 years, the government would raise one salary 
grade (gongzi dangci) for them as a reward; if government officials could retire ahead 
of the statutory age of retirement by 2 to 3 years, the government would raise one 
                                                        
18 See Qingdao Municipal Government, Shiji dangzheng jiguan jigougaige renyuan fenliu yijian [Suggestions on 
Assigning Officials of Organizational Reform], 2001, pp. 1-5; Linyi Municipal Government, Shiji dangzheng 
jiguan jigougaige renyuan fenliu yijian [Suggestions on Assigning Officials of Organizational Reform], 2001, pp. 
1-5; and Jinan Municipal Government, Guanyu shi xian xiang jigougaige de baogao [Report for Organizational 
Reform of Municipality, County and Township in Jinan Municipality], 2002, p. 3.  
19 Article 88 of the Civil Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China, approved by the 15th Session of the 
Standing Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress on 27 April 2005. 
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salary grade (gongzi dangci) and one salary rank for them; if government officials 
could retire ahead of the statutory age of retirement by 3 to 4 years, the government 
would raise two salary grades (gongzi dangci) and one salary rank (gongzi jibie) for 
them; if government officials could retire ahead of the statutory age of retirement by 
four or more years, the government would raise three salary grades (gongzi dangci) 
and two salary ranks (gongzi jibie) for them.20 The Jinan and Linyi governments also 
have similar regulations for encouraging retirement in advance.21 Because of these 
advantages, there is little resistance to the dismissal procedure in the three 
municipalities. 
“Dingxiang peixun” suggests that the transferred officials will receive expertise 
and professional training. After their graduation, they will have to look for jobs by 
themselves. These people will have the priority to be selected for an appropriate 
position when vacancies come up in government. Although some officials are 
attracted by this measure, some officials are reluctant to receive higher level education 
at the expense of their current positions. 
“Jiaqiang qiye” suggests that the redundant persons will be transferred to work in 
other enterprises. In fact, these enterprises are willing to employ government officials 
as they are familiar with related policies made by the central and local governments 
and usually have good relationships with other government bureaucrats. This kind of 
connection is often seen as a plus factor for the development of private enterprises in 
                                                        
20 Qingdao Municipal Government, Shiji dangzheng jiguan jigougaige renyuan fenliu yijian [Suggestions on 
Assigning Officials of Organizational Reform], p. 1-7. 
21 See Jinan Municipal Government, Shiji dangzheng jiguan jigougaige renyuan fenliu yijian [Suggestions on 
Assigning Officials of Organizational Reform], 2001, pp. 1-6 and Linyi Municipal Government, Shiji dangzheng 
jiguan jigougaige renyuan fenliu yijian [Suggestions on Assigning Officials of Organizational Reform], pp. 3-8. 
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China. The Qingdao government also claims that if any enterprise would like to 
accept retrenched officials, the local government would pay them at least two years of 
subsidy per capita (rentou jingfei) for these officials. After two years of employment, 
these retrenched officials will be paid by their employers.22 Usually, if officials are 
able to find a job in a big and profitable enterprise, they would be rather happy to be 
reassigned to this enterprise because working there means an increase in bonus and a 
raise in their salaries which often exceed their previous total income. But government 
officials would not like to work in small enterprises because they regarded such jobs 
as unstable and risky with no lifelong tenure.  
Very few officials have preferred the second and third measures, namely, 
“Dingxiang peixun” and “Jiaqiang qiye”. Most of them chose the first option: “tiqian 
ligang” (leaving position in advance) and “tiqian tuixiu” (retirement in advance). 
Although these measures encourage some officials to retire and leave in advance, 
the number of government officials still remains the same. The reason lies in that the 
local government would recruit younger and better-educated civil servants to take 
over the positions of those reassigned officials. In this case, the total number of 
government officials has not significantly changed. In addition, recruiting new 
officials has increased the financial burden of the government since the local 
government has to pay for the bonuses and salaries for those officials, who are asked 
to leave their positions, and also to pay for the newly recruited officials. In this case, 
the reform has not really relieved the financial burden of the government. Burns 
                                                        
22 Interview with an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005. 
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explains why downsizing in local government in China has not been particularly 
successful as “the Party’s goal of maintaining as many official positions as possible to 
preserve political patronage and social stability conflicts with the need to curb 
administrative expenses and cut government deficits.”23 
Since the number of officials remains the same after the reform and the financial 
burden remains unchanged, it is easy to reach the conclusion that the reform is 
unsuccessful in solving the problem of overstaffing.  
Although the number of government officials has remained the same, and the 
financial burden has become heavier, the newly recruited officials, who have replaced 
the older and less-qualified pre-retired or dismissed officials, are much younger and 
have better qualifications. In general, they are considered to be more efficient and 
competent than those dismissed officials. 24  For instance, after the reform, the 
percentage of government officials above fifty years old of the total number of 
officials in Jinan municipality has decreased from 21 per cent to 18 per cent. The 
percentage of government officials with bachelor’s degree of the total number of 
officials has increased from 28 per cent to 35 per cent by the end of 2002.25 In this 
case, they would be more qualified to perform in those positions that were held by 
previous officials. 
More specifically, among the three municipalities, the Qingdao government 
always had fewer officials than the Jinan and Linyi governments from 1994 to 2003. 
                                                        
23 John P. Burns, “‘Downsizing’ the Chinese State: Government Retrenchment in the 1990s,” The China 
Quarterly, No. 175 (September 2003), p. 775. 
24 Interview with the Director of Civil Organizations Management Department of Jinan Civil Affairs Bureau, 16 
June 2005. 
25 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 2003), p. 95. 
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In fact, the number of government officials in Qingdao and Jinan cities should be 
larger than that of Linyi city since these two are both sub-provincial level cities 
(fushengji chengshi). In contrast, in Linyi city, a prefecture-level city, the number of 
government officials was always larger that of Qingdao city. This number even 
matched the number of government officials in Jinan city in the period from 1999 to 
2003 (See Table 5). This indicated that among the three cities, the Qingdao 
government was more effective in carrying out personnel reduction while the Linyi 
government was less effective. The reason might be that unlike Qingdao and Jinan 
cities, Linyi city, as a developing area in Shandong, does not have enough financial 
support to implement the measures of “daizhi fenliu” (transferred officials will keep 
their original ranks and benefits) and “jiaqiang qiye” (transferred officials will be 
transferred to work in private enterprises), which would cost the local government 
more than what it was willing or able to pay. Obviously, as the economic centre of 
Shandong province, Qingdao city may experience fewer difficulties in effectively 
implementing these measures and transferring their excessive staff to other sectors. 
 
Changing the Functions of Government 
Streamlining government is only one aspect in the whole process of government 
restructuring. The more significant aspect is that since the 1990s, the Chinese leaders 
have attempted to change the functions of the government “to suit the needs of 
China’s emerging market economy.”26 The government’s role was identified as a 
“long-term planning, policy-making, information gathering, organization and 
                                                        
26 Burns, “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” p. 353. 
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coordination, and providing services and oversight.”27 
Economic reform required the three municipalities to change their functions to 
suit the needs of a market economy. According to the “Suggestions on Organizational 
Reform at Municipality, County, and Township Government of Shandong Province,” 
the central theme of the administrative reform in the municipalities of Shandong 
province was to separate the local government functions from the general enterprise 
management.28 
The Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments have taken several actions to change 
the functions of government during the period of these reforms. First, they called for a 
strengthening in management style in some government agencies that were in charge 
of the macro-economic management of the economy and the delivery of public 
services. In the 1993 and 1996 reforms, the three governments expanded the Tax 
Bureau, the Planning Commission and the Economic Commission, which were in 
charge of macro-economic management. Since 1999, apart from these departments, 
the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments have strengthened the functions of some 
bureaus which were responsible for providing public welfare and other services. 
These bureaus included the Civil Affairs Bureau, the Public Security Bureau, the 
Labour and Social Security Bureau, the Environmental Protection Bureau and the 
Health Bureau.29 
                                                        
27 Asian Development Bank, Development Management, p. 30. 
28 Shandong Provincial Government, Shi xian xiang jigougaige de yijian [Suggestions on the Organizational 
Reform at the Municipal, County, and Township Governments in Shandong Province], pp. 2-3. 
29 See Qingdao Municipal Government, Guanyu jigougaige de shishi yijian [Suggestions on Organizational 
Reform], 2001, pp. 8-9; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2002 [Jinan Yearbook 
2002] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 2002), p. 20-21; and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi 
nianjian 2002 [Linyi Yearbook 2002] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002), pp. 67-69. 
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In addition, the reforms have also involved the setting up of new organizations to 
cope with the changed functions of the government in a market economy and to 
facilitate more effective municipal management. For this purpose, in the 1990s, the 
Qingdao and Jinan governments both set up the Administrative Commission of 
Economic and Technological Development Area and the State-owned Assets 
Administration Bureau to meet the needs of the market economy and municipal 
development. 30  The Qingdao government has also endeavoured to set up the 
Administrative Commission of Qingdao High-Tech Industrial Park.31 In contrast, the 
Linyi government was not interested in setting up the commission. It seemed that the 
Linyi government did not respond to the internal and international economic 
challenges and opportunities. In 1999, all the three municipal governments set up two 
new agencies, namely the Administration Bureau of Safety Production as well as the 
Drug Administration for the purpose of strengthening the functions of government in 
production supervision and drug administration.32 
Second, changing the functions of government sought to separate administration 
from business operations and no longer supervise and intervene in enterprises. In 
China, the separation of local government from enterprise management was called 
zhengqi fenkai. The functions, which were turned over to enterprise from the local 
government included setting product price, making personnel decisions, determining 
                                                        
30 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2000 [Qingdao Yearbook 2000], pp. 
20-22 and Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1996 [Jinan Yearbook 1996], p. 80. 
31 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2000 [Qingdao Yearbook 2000], pp. 
20-22. 
32 See Qingdao Municipal Government, Guanyu jigougaige de shishi yijian [Suggestions on Organizational 
Reform], pp. 8-9; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2002 [Jinan Yearbook 2002], 
pp. 20-21; and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2002 [Linyi Yearbook 2002], pp. 
67-69. 
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investment plans, designing marketing strategies, and engaging directly in foreign 
trade.33 
To separate the local government from involvement in enterprise management 
(zhengqi fenkai) was the focus of changing the functions of local government in the 
1990s. According to the government work reports of the three municipalities, Yu 
Zhengsheng,34 the Mayor of Qingdao city, Xie Yutang,35 the Mayor of Jinan city, and 
Zhang Shouye, the Mayor of Linyi city, all placed heavy emphasis on the transition of 
government functions in the 1990s. They indicated that the government at all levels 
should pass the micro-management functions over to the enterprises and concentrate 
on performing the functions of overall planning (tongchou guihua), coordinating 
(zuzhi xietiao), providing services (tigong fuwu), and checking and supervision 
(jiancha jiandu).36  Although this reform removed some functions of enterprise 
management from the local government, the main government functions were still not 
suitable for the market economy in the 1990s. For instance, in the Qingdao 
government, some government agencies were still very used to the idea of intervening 
in some management and personnel affairs in private enterprises, which was expected 
to change after the reform.37 One of the reasons was that “the proliferation of new 
                                                        
33 Burns, “China’s Administrative Reforms for a Market Economy,” p. 353. 
34 In November 2002, Yu Zhengsheng was promoted to become a member of the Political Bureau Standing 
Committee. 
35 On January 12, 2003, Xie Yutang was promoted to become the Vice Governor of Shandong Province at the 33rd 
Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth People’s Congress of Shandong Province. 
36 See Yu Zhengsheng, “1993 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Qingdao Government Work Report of 1993], in 
Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1993 [Qingdao Yearbook 1993] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo youyi chuban gongsi, 1994), p. 10; Xie Yutang, “1993 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Jinan Government 
Work Report of 1993], in Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1993 [Jinan Yearbook 
1993] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 1993), p. 7; and Zhang Shouye, “1995 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Linyi 
Government Work Report of 1995], in Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1995 
[Linyi Yearbook 1995] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1997), p. 453. 
37 Interview with an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005. 
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economic entities and growing economic complexities were used to justify the 
establishment of government agencies and expansion of personnel because 
governance of the economy was heavily dependent on administrative intervention as 
long as the plan continued to exist.”38  
The reform of separating the local government from enterprise management was 
further carried out after 1999. The Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments were all 
dedicated to change the subordinate relationship between the State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) and any administrative agencies, and to improve the methods of supervising 
the SOEs by sending representatives to participate in their board of supervisors, or 
sending audit commissioners and financial controllers to enterprises.39 
Moreover, unlike the 1990s reform, the three municipal governments sought to 
remove some functions such as the supervision of professions, coordination, auditing 
and service from the local government, which were supposed to be transferred to 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including a number of law offices, 
accounting firms, audit firms and associations. Leaders in the three cities had 
attempted to change the government functions since they realized that many NGOs 
might be able to perform these functions more effectively.40 These NGOs are mainly 
funded by social and overseas donations with preferential policies such as tax 
reduction offered by the local government. 
                                                        
38 Yang, “Rationalizing the Chinese State,” pp. 23-24. 
39 See Qingdao Municipal Government, Guanyu jigougaige de shishi yijian [Suggestions on Organizational 
Reform], p. 2; Jinan Municipal Government, Guanyu shi xian xiang jigougaige de baogao [Report for 
Organizational Reform of Municipality, County and Township in Jinan Municipality], p. 3; Linyi Municipal 
Government, Guanyu shiji dangzheng jiguan jigougaige de shishi yijian [Implementing Suggestions on 
Organizational Reform], 2001, pp. 3-4. 
40 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, these three governments also called for removal of the 
administrative examination and approval functions, including supervision, 
qualification authentication, quality inspection, appraisal and examination, from the 
public institutions (shiye danwei) and pass these functions over to the local 
government.41 Public institutions would be gradually funded only by themselves and 
the local government would provide partial funding for these institutions, which 
would take over the responsibilities in such sectors as hospitals, schools, universities, 
professional training organizations and museums. 
Finally, this reform corporatized some government agencies and replaced other 
government agencies with associations or councils (hangye xiehui) for the purpose of 
tailoring the local government to the needs of the market economy. In the 1990s, the 
Machinery Industry Bureau, the Light Industry Bureau, the Textile Bureau, the 
Electronic Industry Bureau, the Chemical Industry Bureau and the Commodities 
Bureau in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments had all become associations or 
councils.42 
In sum, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments have undertaken substantial 
restructuring of the government since the 1990s, especially after 1999. These policies 
have gradually changed the local government’s role to one that relates better to a 
market economy. Therefore, government functions are more concentrated on duties 
such as the economic regulation and market supervision, which were largely 
                                                        
41 Ibid. 
42 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1996 [Qingdao Yearbook 1996], p. 
342; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1995 [Jinan Yearbook 1995] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 1995), p. 54; and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1997 [Linyi 
Yearbook 1997], p. 97. 
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neglected during the past years.43 
 
Improving Public Service Delivery 
 
Apart from government restructuring, the three municipal governments also aimed to 
strengthen the delivery of public services through local government reform. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the transition from a planned economy to a market economy 
had indicated the lack of human service delivery in the three municipalities as the 
SOEs would no longer provide human services for the citizens. Moreover, the market 
economic reform also required the local government to improve its regulatory 
services in order to keep the market order and to protect consumers’ interests. In 
addition, for the purpose of improving service delivery, to make government 
information more accessible to the public and to strengthen public scrutiny had 
become also a necessary part of the reform. Therefore, the improvement of public 
service delivery has become the central task of the administrative reform in Qingdao, 
Jinan and Linyi municipalities. 
 
Improving Human Service Delivery 
Local government reform in 1999 had concentrated on improving government 
functions on human service delivery, including education, social security and health 
care, which had undergone a radical change in relation to government restructuring.44  
                                                        
43 See Jinan Municipal Government, “Guominjingji he shehuifazhan dishige wunian jihua gangyao” [The Outline 
of the 10th Five Year Plan for National Economy and Social Development], in Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation 
Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2001 [Jinan Yearbook 2001] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 2001), p. 14; Qingdao 
Municipal Government, Guanyu jigougaige de shishi yijian [Suggestions on Organizational Reform], p. 1; and 
Linyi Municipal Government, Guanyu shiji dangzheng jiguan jigougaige de shishi yijian [Implementing 
Suggestions on Organizational Reform], pp. 1-2. 
44 See Asian Development Bank, Development Management, p. 56 and Li Junpeng, Gonggong fuwuxing zhengfu 
[Public Service Oriented Government] (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004), p. 243. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 3, improving human service delivery resulted from the 
fact that with the transition from a planned economy to a market economy, work 
units45 would no longer provide human services for the citizens in terms of education, 
health and social security.46 Moreover, the local government could hardly provide 
sufficient human services due to the lack of funding,47 especially for Linyi city, the 
less developed area in Shandong. Drawing from international experience, the local 
governments in China mainly implemented privatization, which was primarily aimed 
to attract more resources from society to supplement the public school and the 
university system, and to share the responsibility of improving the quality of human 
service and relieving their own financial stress.  
With regard to privatization in education, the Jinan, Qingdao and Linyi 
governments were dedicated to attracting more resources from the society to 
supplement the public school and the university system, an approach called “shehui 
liliang banxue.” In primary and secondary education, the government encouraged 
investors to set up private schools by providing them with preferential policies. These 
policies have made it possible for the investors to gain profits by investing in private 
schools while having the status of an authorized educational institution approved by 
the government.48 By the end of 2002, the total number of students in private schools 
of Qingdao city reached 126,600, contributing to 0.17 per cent in the total number of 
                                                        
45 The work units in China include government agencies, SOEs and public institutions. 
46 Asian Development Bank, Development Management, p. 56. 
47 Li, Gonggong fuwuxing zhengfu [Public Service Oriented Government], p. 258. 
48 See Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2004 [Jinan Yearbook 2004] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 2004), p. 213; Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao 
Yearbook 2003] (Qingdao: Qingdao shizhi bangongshi, 2003), p. 231; and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation 
Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003), p. 246. 
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students in public primary and secondary schools.49  
In the field of higher education, private colleges and universities had emerged in 
the three municipalities increasingly, especially in Jinan and Qingdao cities. This 
measure allowed more students, who could not meet the admission criteria of more 
well-established public universities, to enroll in private colleges or universities to 
receive higher education. In 1999, the number of enrolment in universities per 10,000 
persons in Jinan city was 130 students and in 2002, this figure rose to 669 students. 
Likewise, in Qingdao city, this number in 1999 was 48 students and in 2002 it had 
increased to 115 students.50 Even in Linyi city, the number of university enrolment 
per 10,000 persons had increased from 8 students in 1999 to 16 students in 2002 (See 
Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Student Enrolment in Tertiary Education in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
Municipalities, 1999-2002 
Student Enrolment in Tertiary Education per 10,000 persons Year 
Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1999 48 130 7.7 
2000 65 165 10.5 
2001 85 302 15.1 
2002 115 669 16.1 
Source: see appendix 12. 
 
The privatization of education has forced citizens to bear more financial 
responsibilities on their own in receiving education, which relieved the government 
from financial stress to a certain extent. Since 1998, the Ministry of Education has 
allowed that Shandong University in Jinan city and Qingdao Ocean University, the 
                                                        
49 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Yearbook 2003], p. 231. 
50 See Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 2000 [Qingdao Statistical Yearbook 2000] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2000), p. 17 and Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 2003 [Qingdao 
Statistical Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2003), p. 15.  
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two famous public universities in Shandong province, to charge higher tuition fees. 
From then on, all public universities in Jinan, Qingdao and Linyi cities, started to 
charge or raise tuition fees which were free previously. 
However, such privatization has also enabled the local government to reduce its 
involvement in compulsory education in China including primary and secondary 
education, which should be the government’s responsibility in the first place. For 
instance, the percentage of public expenditure on education in the budget of the Jinan 
government’s expenditure decreased from 14.46% in 1998 to 13.07% in 2003.51 As a 
consequence, primary and secondary schools would collect more unauthorized fees 
from the students since they could not seek sufficient funding support from the 
government. Various fees including involuntary donations, stationery, school 
maintenance, after-school tuition and even fees for selecting a particular school, were 
collected from the parents who would choose to send their child to a better school 
than any other school that does not seem to guarantee a brighter future for the child. 
These fees increased drastically each year and imposed severe financial burden on any 
average family.  
“Some of the fees violate official rules, but continue to exist in practice partly 
because of the shortage of funds.” 52  Unfortunately, local government regarded 
education reform as an instrument of government off-loading instead of improving 
public service in education. In this case, the local governments did not effectively 
                                                        
51 See Jinan Statistical Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 1999 [Jinan Statistical Yearbook 1999] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
tongji chubanshe, 1999), p. 147; Jinan Statistical Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 2004 [Jinan Statistical Yearbook 
2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2004), p. 174; and “Government Expenditure in 17 Municipalities of 
Shandong Province in 2003,” see http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000003245, accessed on 16 
February 2006. 
52 Asian Development Bank, Development Management, p. 56. 
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curb these unauthorized fees since they would not be willing to provide schools with 
more funds. Due to the shortage of funding, schools continued to collect these fees. 
The unauthorized collection of fees was more obvious in Linyi city, especially at the 
county and township levels. Before the reform, the problem of unauthorized 
collection of fees had already existed in Linyi city since the government at all levels 
had experienced more fiscal restraints than Jinan and Qingdao cities.53 However, this 
situation did not improve even after the reform since the government did not increase 
its support for education during the reform. 
In response to the issue of unauthorized fees, since 2003 the Ministry of Education 
required that all primary and secondary schools could not collect any other fees from 
students except for text book fees, assignment exercise book fees and accommodation 
fees. 54  However, if the central and the local governments would not increase 
education investment to a higher level, this problem could not be completely solved.55 
   Similarly, in regard to social security and health care, the Qingdao, Jinan and 
Linyi governments introduced a responsibility sharing system, where the government, 
employers, and employees all made their contribution to the employees’ welfare 
package. Pension insurance, medical insurance and unemployment insurance are the 
three basic types of insurance that are covered by this system.56 However, the 
distribution model has yet to be established to determine to what extent employers, 
employees and the government should pay for the insurance premium until the present 
                                                        
53 Interview with the Secretary of the Party Committee of Linyi Education Bureau, 30 June 2005. 
54 Ministry of Education of PRC, “Jiaoyubu deng qi bumen 2006 zhili jiaoyu luanshoufei gongzuo shishi yijian” 
[Suggestions on Rectifying the Unauthorized Fees in 2006]. 
55 Interview with the Secretary of the Party Committee of Linyi Education Bureau, 30 June 2005. 
56 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Yearbook 2003], pp. 
268-269. 
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time. The current situation is that the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments had 
different policies for distributing the insurance premium among the local government, 
employers and employees. Even within a municipality, different districts, counties and 
villages would have different policies. Therefore, this reform was still in the process 
of experimentation and the local government was seeking an ideal model for 
improving this social security system.  
The only confirmed matter in this reform was that employees would pay for the 
major part of the insurance premium, although in rich areas the local government or 
profitable enterprises would cover a larger proportion of the insurance premium for 
their employees. This led to different coverage rates of insurance among Qingdao, 
Jinan and Linyi cities. Among these cities, the coverage rates of pension insurance in 
Qingdao and Jinan cities were higher, 82.96% and 82.71% respectively in 2002, while 
this rate in Linyi city was only 76.74%.57 
For instance, in the villages of Laoshan district in Qingdao city, the village and 
Laoshan district pay up to 30 per cent of pension and medical insurance premium for 
farmers who would only need to pay for the remaining 70 per cent. If farmers in these 
villages are 60 years old for a man or 55 years old for a woman,58 they could receive 
RMB 352 per month as their pension and RMB 1,000 as an additional subsidy, which 
would be paid in full by the district government and the village. In contrast, in some 
villages in Linyi city, Heze city and Liaocheng city, the poorer areas in Shandong, 
                                                        
57  See “Total Urban Employees in 17 Municipalities of Shandong Province in 2002,” see 
http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000000267 and “Total Contributors of Basic Insurances in 17 
Municipalities of Shandong Province in 2002,” see http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000000284, 
accessed on 15 March 2006. 
58 Interview with an official of Qingdao Labour and Social Security Bureau, 22 June 2005. 
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farmers would have to pay the total insurance premium since the county and village 
would not have sufficient funds for paying the insurance premium. Not surprisingly, 
in these poorer areas, it was very difficult to persuade farmers to pay for the insurance 
premium since most of them, living in poverty or just above the poverty line, would 
not want to pay additional money for the insurance premium, which was often 
considered unnecessary.59  
   Apart from the process of privatization, what has attracted wide attention has been 
the establishment by the Qingdao government in 2004 of a new urban and rural social 
security system, called the “Sunshine Aid Project” (yangguang jiuzhu gongcheng) to 
ensure transparency, openness, fairness, and kindness (wennuan) in this system.60 
The aim of this project was to provide more assistance of social security for the poor 
rather than only focusing on delivering the poor from starvation, and to openly and 
fairly distribute the limited funds of social security in the districts and villages of 
Qingdao city.61 
The “Sunshine Aid Project” has devised five mechanisms for improving social 
security: (1) the “four category administrative mechanism” which consists of city, 
district (county), street (township/town), and neighbourhood (village) committees; (2) 
the “household eligibility evaluation mechanism” which investigates pensioners’ 
income and living conditions; (3) the “procedure standardization mechanism” which 
regulates every step of the social security process from application to approval; (4) the 
                                                        
59 Ibid. 
60 Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau, Jingxin dazao “yangguang jiuzhu” pinpai jianli guifan de chengxiang shehui 
jiuzhu tixi [Establishing the “Sunshine Aid Project” and Constructing Urban and Rural Social Security System in 
Qingdao City], 2004, p. 1. 
61 Interview with the Director and Section Chiefs of Social Relief Department of Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau, 20 
June 2005. 
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“classification mechanism” which provides different services according to pensioners’ 
individual and family conditions; and (5) the “supervision mechanism” which 
incorporates citizens, social security inspectors and the media.  
The project has also proposed multiple methods for providing social security. 
Apart from meeting the basic living needs of the poor people, the Qingdao Civil 
Affairs Bureau has explored several methods for enhancing the connections between 
the urban and the rural social security system in terms of granting temporary aid, 
housing, health, and education aid, and private mutual aid.62 
By the end of November 2004, the Qingdao municipal government had spent 
RMB 60.55 million to provide social security for over 15,870 households and 37,110 
persons in urban areas of Qingdao city, which accounted for 1.5 percent of its total 
population. 63  In this sense, the establishment of the “Sunshine Aid Project” 
safeguarded basic living conditions for the poor people in urban and rural areas and 
guaranteed family and social stability significantly. More important, it was a good 
example to show how the Qingdao government is trying to take care of its citizens’ 
interests and the vulnerable communities in the society. 
 
Reforming Administrative Examination and Approval System 
Apart from the improvement in delivering human services, the three authorities have 
also carried out reform in improving the service of a regulatory nature. As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, administrative reform was carried out for the purpose of solving the 
                                                        
62 Ibid. 
63 Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau, Jingxin dazao “yangguang jiuzhu” pinpai jianli guifan de chengxiang shehui 
jiuzhu tixi [Establishing the “Sunshine Aid Project” and Constructing Urban and Rural Social Security System in 
Qingdao City], p. 4. 
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problem of the expansion of regulation, which had not only wasted too much time for 
foreign investors and clients but also had weakened the efficiency of local 
government. Moreover, it was an imperative task for the local government to change 
the administrative examination and approval system. This was because numerous 
approval and licensing requirements had empowered the government agencies to 
make decisions for private firms and for the market, which had generated many 
rent-seeking opportunities for the agencies accordingly.64  
Therefore, in 1999, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments requested the 
government agencies to reduce the items of administrative examination and approval 
and to simplify and standardize the procedures of examination and approval.65 This 
reform focused on two aspects: reducing government intervention and rationalizing 
administrative procedure.  
Reducing government intervention has taken the form of narrowing down the 
scope of examination and approval and limiting the agencies’ power. The Qingdao, 
Jinan and Linyi governments eliminated the administrative approval items which were 
in conflict with the rules of WTO such as the approval of financial registration for 
foreign invested enterprise,66 the check on the accounting of revenue and expenditure 
for foreign invested enterprise67 and the examination on direct import and export for 
the industrial enterprise. They also eliminated the items which could not be adapted to 
                                                        
64 Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan, p. 152. 
65 See Qingdao Municipal Government, Guanyu jigougaige de shishi yijian [Suggestions on Organizational 
Reform], p. 2; Jinan Municipal Government, Guanyu shi xian xiang jigougaige de baogao [Report for 
Organizational Reform of Municipality, County and Township in Jinan Municipality], p. 5; and Linyi Municipal 
Government, Guanyu shiji dangzheng jiguan jigougaige de shishi yijian [Implementing Suggestions on 
Organizational Reform], p. 4. 




the separation of local government from the enterprise, such as the approval of the 
merger and bankruptcy of enterprises under the jurisdiction of the municipal 
government and the examination of a changing equity structure of share-holding 
enterprises approved by the municipal government.68  
As a result, through the reform, the administrative approval items in the Qingdao 
government were reduced by 70.63% and those in the Jinan government were reduced 
by 65.41% from 1998 to 2003. Similarly, the number of administrative approval items 
in Linyi city was reduced by 57.81% (See Table 7). Thus, the Qingdao government 
had reduced the most administrative approval items among the three municipalities.  
 
Table 7: Number of Administrative Approval Items in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
Municipalities in 1998 and 2003 
Number of Administrative Approval Items Year 
Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1998 1,263 1,113 1,088 
2003 371 385 459 
Number of Eliminated Items 892 728 629 
Percentage of Eliminated Items of the 







Source: see appendix 10. 
 
This is not surprising as the Qingdao government had faced more pressure than 
the Jinan and Linyi governments in terms of reducing government intervention so as 
to attract more foreign investment. After China’s entry into WTO, more and more 
foreign investors came to Shandong province to establish factories and Qingdao city 
was always the most favoured city with its status as the economic centre of Shandong. 
                                                        
68 See Qingdao Municipal Government, Guanyu jigougaige de shishi yijian [Suggestions on Organizational 
Reform], p. 2; Jinan Municipal Government, Guanyu shi xian xiang jigougaige de baogao [Report for 
Organizational Reform of Municipality, County and Township in Jinan Municipality], p. 5; and Linyi Municipal 
Government, Guanyu shiji dangzheng jiguan jigougaige de shishi yijian [Implementing Suggestions on 
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In contrast, the Linyi government faced less pressure than the Qingdao and Jinan 
governments since foreign investors were unlikely to establish factories there due to 
the poor economy and the unfavourable geographical location. 
The other factor that has contributed to the effective reform in Qingdao city was 
its various government leaders, such as Yu Zhengsheng,69 Wang Jiarui70 and Zhang 
Huilai,71 the Mayors of Qingdao city and Secretaries of the Qingdao Municipal 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 1994 to 2003. These leaders 
in the Qingdao government were the most famous in Shandong province because of 
their open-minded attitudes and ability to enforce reform effectively. 
Apart from reducing the items in applying for administrative approval, this reform 
was also aimed at rationalizing the administrative procedure to enhance the efficiency 
and transparency of administrative approval. 72  The three municipalities had 
eliminated duplication in the administrative examination process, simplified work 
flows and set definite time limits. For this purpose, the Jinan government had 
incorporated some administrative approval work for the items that were originally 
approved by overlapping departments. These items were mainly the fixed asset 
                                                        
69 Yu Zhengsheng was the Mayor of Qingdao city from September 1989-November 1994 and was the Secretary of 
Qingdao Municipal Committee of the CCP from March 1992 to October 1997. In October 1997, He was promoted 
to become the Vice Minister, Vice Party Secretary of Ministry of Construction of China. In March 1998, he was 
promoted to be the Minister and Party Secretary of Ministry of Construction of China. Successively, in November 
2001, Yu Zhengsheng was appointed as the Secretary of Hubei Provincial Committee of the CCP and in 
November 2002, he was promoted to become a member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee. 
70 Wang Jiarui was the Mayor of Qingdao city from February 1998 to October 2000. He was promoted as the Vice 
Head of International Department of Central Committee the CCP in 2001 and was appointed as Head of 
International Department of Central Committee the CCP in 2003. 
71 Zhang Huilai was the Secretary of the Qingdao Municipal Committee of the CCP from October 1997 to January 
2003. 
72 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002] 
(Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002), p. 243; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan 
nianjian 2000 [Jinan Yearbook 2000] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 2000), p. 62; and Linyi Municipal Government, 
“Guanyu tigao xingzheng xiaolü youhua fazhan huanjing de yijian” [Suggestions on Enhancing Government 
Efficiency and Improving Development Environment], see http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 11 
May 2005. 
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investment and the utilization of foreign investment. Moreover, the Jinan government 
stipulated that these items should be approved within 10 working days.73 Similarly, 
the Qingdao government issued the “Provisional Regulations on Administrative 
Examination and Approval” to simplify the procedures of administrative approval and 
set time limits for granting administrative approval. After the reform, the speed of 
granting administrative approval was accelerated.74 Moreover, the Linyi government 
stipulated that those items that should be processed within the municipal government 
should be approved within three working days; and those items beyond the 
responsibility of the municipal government should be approved within three working 
days after the approval granted by the provincial or central government.75 
The Qingdao and Jinan governments had also set up several effective service 
models such as the one-stop shops (yizhanshi fuwu) and the government affairs hall 
(zhengwu dating), “physically concentrating related units so that customers can go 
through all formalities in a single designated place.” 76  One-stop shops were 
established for the purpose of reducing costs and enhancing efficiency as well as 
customer service. Citizens and enterprises, especially foreign invested enterprises in 
Qingdao and Jinan cities could get the examination and approval from government 
agencies more easily and quickly than before. These agencies including the Local 
Taxation Bureau, the Administration for Industry and Commerce, the Environmental 
Protection Bureau and the Health Bureau, opened representative offices in the 
                                                        
73 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2000 [Jinan Yearbook 2000], p. 62. 
74 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 243. 
75 Linyi Municipal Government, “Guanyu tigao xingzheng xiaolü youhua fazhan huanjing de yijian” [Suggestions 
on Enhancing Government Efficiency and Improving Development Environment], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 11 May 2005. 
76 Asian Development Bank, Development Management, p. 58. 
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government affairs hall.77 Moreover, the Qingdao and Jinan governments also set up 
one-stop shops in districts and county governments for the purpose of enhancing 
efficiency and customer service at the lower level governments.78 Such one-stop 
shops (yizhanshi fuwu) and the government affairs hall (zhengwu dating) provided a 
model for other cities in Shandong province, such as Linyi, Laiwu and Zibo.79  
 
Government Transparency and Public Participation 
Government transparency and public participation have been the main goal for the 
three municipalities to improve public service delivery. As mentioned in Chapter 3, a 
lack of transparency would hinder citizens from monitoring the decision-making 
process carried out by the government. Therefore, the three municipalities aimed to 
improve the level of local government transparency. 
In China, government transparency is achieved in the form of disclosing 
government information such as government regulations, financial revenue and 
expenditure, statistical data on the national economy and social development and 
personnel appointment and removal to the public. To achieve this goal, the Shandong 
provincial government issued a document of “Suggestions on Further Intensifying 
Government Transparency” to address the issues in implementing government 
transparency, which had become the tool of improving the working style of the CCP 
and the government, the general plan for ruling the country by law, and the important 
                                                        
77 See Jinan Administrative Examination and Approval Centre, 2004 gongzuo zongjie [Summary of 2004 Work], 
pp. 3-5 and Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Yearbook 2003], 
p. 86. 
78 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Yearbook 2003], p. 
86 and Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2000 [Jinan Yearbook 2000], p. 62. 
79 Interview with the Director of Investigation and Research Department of Jinan Administrative Examination and 
Approval Service Centre, 17 June 2005. 
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measure to prevent and tackle corruption from its roots.80 The open government 
campaigns had focused on improving the public accessibility to government 
information and the establishment of a reporting system. 
Improving the accessibility of information was mainly implemented by the 
municipal governments in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi. Zhang Huilai, the Secretary of 
the Qingdao municipal Committee of the CCP, had required governments at all levels 
to double their efforts towards the goal of making government affairs transparent to 
the public in order to ensure that this system could be institutionalized and become a 
regular practice.81 The establishment of the government information website is an 
important step forward for improving public information in Qingdao city. The 
effectiveness of the Qingdao government’s website was ranked number one among 
333 municipalities in China and the 17 municipalities in Shandong province because 
it provides comprehensive, detailed and swift information to the public. 82  This 
government website not only provides free general information such as government 
documents, regulations, local statistical data on national economy and social 
development, department information and government news, but also some critical 
information such as personnel appointment and removal, government procurement, 
financial revenue and expenditure.83  
The Jinan government also issued the “Suggestions on Implementing Open 
                                                        
80 Linyi Municipal Government, Guanyu jinyibu tuixing zhengwu gongkai gongzuo de shishi yijian [Suggestions 
on Further Intensifying Government Transparency], 2002. 
81 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 345. 
82 State Council Informatization Office of China, “2005 Dishiji zhengfu wangzhan jixiao pinggu jieguo” [Report 
of the Effectiveness of Municipal Government Websites in 2005], see 
http://www.ccidconsulting.com/2005govtop/default.shtml, accessed on 27 March 2006. 
83 Ibid. 
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Government in Jinan” and set up a leading committee for making government affairs 
known to the public.84 Government agencies in Jinan city had set up systems to make 
the information on public security, health and education affairs more accessible to the 
public. 85  By the end of 2000, the Jinan government had set up 4,224 “open 
government boards” (zhengwu gongkai lan) and 1,838 public telephones (zhengwu 
gongkai dianhua).86  
Similarly, the Linyi government had focused on improving government 
transparency in regard to making important decisions about local reform, 
development and stability. For example, it implemented important projects in urban 
infrastructure, urban planning, economic development, environment, administrative 
examination and approval, administrative law enforcement, and a series of Foreign 
Service projects that are closely related to the interests of people.87 
The lower level governments such as county and township in the three 
municipalities focused on a reporting system for implementing the transparent 
government campaigns to the public. County and district governments in Jinan city 
were required to make public their annual work plans and reform measures, official 
documents of revenue and expenditure, appointment and dismissal of administrative 
personnel, government procurement, and bidding for construction of important 
projects.88 The township government in Linyi city focused on making financial 
                                                        
84 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2001 [Jinan Yearbook 2001], p. 107. 
85 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2002 [Jinan Yearbook 2002], p. 67. 
86 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2001 [Jinan Yearbook 2001], p. 107. 
87 Linyi Municipal Government, “Guanyu tigao xingzheng xiaolü youhua fazhan huanjing de yijian” [Suggestions 
on Enhancing Government Efficiency and Improving Development Environment], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 11 May 2005. 
88 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2002 [Jinan Yearbook 2002], p. 67. 
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affairs known to public, including publishing reports on the annual financial 
budgeting, government performance review, the strategies taken to relieve farmer’s 
burden, issues on inviting bids for township projects, and issues on social services and 
public welfare.89 In addition, the 12 districts and county-cities and 208 towns in the 
Qingdao government were required to provide official websites (zhengfu shangwang) 
for the purpose of making information more accessible to the public.90  
In addition to improving government transparency, the lack of public scrutiny in 
local government affairs also impeded the improvement of public service delivery. In 
this case, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments opened numerous channels for 
broader public participation in order to improve government services in 1999. One 
channel was to place the service agencies, including the Civil Affairs Bureau, the 
Labour and Social Security Bureau, the Urban Public Utility Administrative Bureau, 
and the Education Bureau,91 under public scrutiny and monitoring. The main methods 
for collecting public suggestions and feedback were questionnaire surveys in 
communities, questionnaire surveys in enterprises, publishing online public 
announcements and hot lines. The Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau had regarded the 
views and comments gathered from the public as important indicators for evaluating 
the performance of government officials by the end of each year.92  
   The second channel was to solicit and deal with public complaints through letters 
                                                        
89 Linyi Municipal Government, “Guanyu tigao xingzheng xiaolü youhua fazhan huanjing de yijian” [Suggestions 
on Enhancing Government Efficiency and Improving Development Environment], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 11 May 2005. 
90 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Yearbook 2003], p. 183. 
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92 Interview with the Director of Social Relief Department of Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau, 20 June 2005. 
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and telephone calls, which was a continuation of the “correspondence and visit 
system” (xinfang zhidu) established in the 1950s. The contents of public complaints 
often varied from community relations, public service, economic livelihood, to 
political affairs and appeals.93 Since the mid-1990s, in addition to writing complaint 
letters to the relevant bureau and making personal visits to the bureau, people could 
use more channels to express complaints, such as sending letters to the media or call 
various “hotlines.”94 After 1999, the three municipalities established the Mayor 
public telephone and Mayor email box to handle complaints, protests and consultation. 
By the end of 2001, the Mayor public telephone and e-mail box of Qingdao city had 
received 119,398 letters and calls from various institutions and citizens, and 90% of 
these letters and calls were answered by the mayor and the leaders of related 
government departments.95 Moreover, the district and county level governments in 
Jinan city also set up this kind of hot line to help citizens and to settle their 
complaints.96 
   However, the communication of a complaint between the government official and 
citizens does not necessarily lead to the resolution of the problem. Sometimes, the 
complaints made by people “are often mishandled by leaders, being ignored at best 
and manipulated at worst.”97 Luehrmann argued that “leaders attempt to limit input 
from the masses, by specifying formal restrictions on group complaints and by 
                                                        
93 Laura M. Luehrmann, “Facing Citizen Complaints in China, 1951-1996,” Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 5 
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94 Ibid. , p. 846. 
95 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Yearbook 2003], p. 57. 
96 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2001 [Jinan Yearbook 2001], p. 107. 
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making it politically difficult to pursue sensitive grievances.”98 Nonetheless, the 
voices of citizens had indeed provided important information to “help local leaders 
understand the sources of popular discontent, and possibly even discern avenues for 
heading off problems or even full-blown crises.”99  
In this case, local government in China must not only widen the methods of 
receiving public complaints but also take the problems raised by citizens seriously. 
Fortunately, since the 1999 reform, the three municipalities started to resolve the 
problems raised by citizens. For instance, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments 
and the broadcasting stations in each city had jointly set up hot lines for public 
complaints. Since this kind of communication was in the form of a live one-on-one 
conversation, the local leaders who were responsible for answering particular 
questions needed to respond to the audience’s enquiries immediately. This kind of 
communication has proven to be more effective than other communication channels 
(letters, visits and email) in settling public complaints.100 Moreover, the Qingdao 
government has set up a supervision office to deal with the specific issues reported in 
the newspapers, broadcasting stations or television programmes. From January to 
October 2001, this office had resolved 124 issues reported in news papers, 
broadcasting stations or television programmes.101  
Thirdly, all three municipalities focused on carrying out an evaluation system 
based on international experience. However, unlike the local government in other 
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countries, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments mainly carried out the 
examinations and reviews by the officials themselves, which was “essentially an 
internal exercise carried out in a top-down manner.”102 Only the Qingdao government 
had endeavoured to improve not only the internal evaluation system, but also an 
external evaluation system of examining the effectiveness of the administrative 
agencies. This external system had given power to the general public and independent 
intermediate bodies or NGOs. The evaluation results of service effectiveness 
constituted an important component and basis for performance appraisals, awards and 
punishment, and appointments of government officials at all levels.103  
This external evaluation system was first carried out in the Qingdao Civil Affairs 
Bureau. To prevent opaque administration (anxiang caozuo), the “Sunshine Aid 
Project” in the civil affairs bureau established a social security evaluation committee 
to discuss whether the applicants for social security met the standards for pensioners. 
This committee included applicants for social security, accredited deputies of the 
National People’s Congress in the community, members of the Political Consultation 
Congress in the community, the supervisor of social security from the civil affairs 
bureau of district government, officials of social security from the neighbourhood 
residents’ committee and the street affairs agency, as well as representatives of 
residents including the neighbours of the applicants and the administrator of the 
applicants’ residence. 104  This prompted a self-governing function of the 
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neighbourhood committee and reduced problems caused by opaque administration. 
Finally, the latest form of public participation in the three municipalities was 
public hearings. Unlike the 1990s reform, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments 
had started to conduct public hearings on the pricing system since 2002.105 The 
public hearing on the pricing system established a new mechanism which involved the 
local government, managers of monopoly trade and customers. It had also provided a 
way for citizens to participate in the decision-making process. In 2000, the citizens 
invited to the public hearing meetings on collecting fees in primary and secondary 
schools in Qingdao city had successfully persuaded the schools to reduce some of the 
unauthorized fees.106 This case showed that this kind of public hearing meeting had 
contributed to the enhancement of citizens’ participation. Yet, it was still a 
preliminary step because these public hearings only focused on the issues of public 
utilities such as adjusting water prices and taxi surcharges. More important subjects 
such as government decisions, administrative law enforcement and procuratorate 
affairs were yet to be discussed.  
Moreover, those citizens who were invited to attend public hearing meetings did 
not represent a consensus among all citizens. For instance, in 2002, the public hearing 
meeting on increasing bus fare was held by the Jinan Price Control Bureau. Twenty 
eight representatives were selected to participate in this meeting. Among these 
representatives, nine representatives were senior government officials from different 
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bureaus. Among the other 19 customer representatives, there was only one grass-root 
customer and the other 18 were company managers, scholars, senior engineers, 
representatives of the People’s Congress, and members of the Municipal Committee 
of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, who enjoyed higher social 
status and had rarely used any public transportation. 107  In this case, it was 
understandable that the result of the public hearing was an increase in the bus fare. 
Therefore, many public hearing meetings that intended to evaluate the price had 
ironically become the means for “increasing price” after these public hearings. 
Among the three municipalities, the Qingdao and Jinan governments seemed to 
perform better than the Linyi government because they started to encourage citizens 
to participate in meetings and make suggestions on some government decisions, 
which were closely related to their daily life. For instance, the Jinan government 
carried out a series of public hearings on the “decision of prevention and control of 
motor vehicles’ pollution” for the purpose of solving the issue of environmental 
pollution in Jinan city. The representatives of citizens, officials of the environmental 
bureaus, and representatives from motorcycle companies communicated with each 
other in the public hearing meetings and some citizens brought up many valuable 
suggestions for improving environmental pollution in Jinan city.108 Moreover, the 
Qingdao and Jinan governments started to invite citizens to participate in meetings to 
discuss cases on remission and parole in order to make these cases more transparent to 
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the public than before.109 In addition, these two governments had both held public 
hearing meetings on cases of administrative penalty to secure the right to defend 




Government restructuring and the improvement of public service delivery in the 
Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi municipalities was conducted “in the context of a radical 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy” in China111 and 
had undergone dramatic changes during the past decade, especially since 1999. 
However, the three municipal governments had not solved the problem of overstaffing 
in local government. Personnel reduction was not an effective strategy as reducing 
government agencies since the number of officials in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
governments actually increased from 1994 to 2003 while government agencies were 
cut by 11. Although personnel reduction did not result in a reduced number of 
government officials, it had improved the quality of the government staff by recruiting 
younger and better-educated officials. In comparison, the Qingdao government was 
more effective in carrying out personnel reduction than the Jinan and Linyi 
governments since Qingdao city, as the economic centre of Shandong province, had 
sufficient funding to effectively implement the reform measures of transferring 
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and Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Yearbook 2003], pp. 
198-200. 
111 Asian Development Bank, Development Management, p. 55. 
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excessive staff.  
The restructuring of government had also gradually changed the functions of local 
government to suit the needs of a market economy. The three municipalities 
accomplished remarkable progress in separation of administration from business 
operations and no longer directly administered enterprises. Moreover, unlike the 
1990s reform, the three municipalities strengthened the functions of social 
management and public services through removing some functions such as the 
supervision of professions, coordination, auditing and service from the local 
government, and turning them over to the NGOs. In addition, the reform reduced the 
financial burden of local government because many public institutions, previously 
funded by the local government, were able to fund themselves gradually. 
Moreover, public service delivery in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments 
was substantially different in the 1993 and 1996 reforms. Borrowing from 
international experiences, local governments in the three municipalities adopted the 
measure of privatization in improving the education services. Although this measure 
produced more opportunities for students to receive higher education, it became an 
instrument of government off-loading caused by financial restraints. It forced families 
to bear more financial responsibilities for their children in primary and secondary 
education, which should have been funded by the government. The local governments 
also needed to increase the volume of education investment in schools for the purpose 
of rectifying unauthorized fees due to the lack of education funds in schools. 
Moreover, in the social security and health care sectors, a uniform social security 
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system needed to be established in Shandong province and even in China for the 
purpose of providing pension, medical and unemployment insurances. Yet, due to a 
regional disparity in development, the Qingdao government was able to accomplish 
more in improving the service delivery sector in the social security system through the 
“Sunshine Aid Project,” while the Linyi government lagged behind. 
Administrative approval reform improved the administrative examination system 
in the three municipalities. The three governments minimised the administrative 
approval items by 50 per cent and the highest rate was 70 per cent in the Qingdao 
government. The reason why Qingdao city took more effective reform measures was 
that the local government was facing more pressure from foreign investors to reduce 
the administrative approval items in order to attract more investment. Moreover, this 
reform had simplified the procedures of granting administrative approval through 
eliminating duplication and setting time limits. In comparison, the Qingdao and Jinan 
governments seemed to perform effectively in rationalizing administrative procedures 
since they opened one-stop shops to enhance efficiency and customer services. 
Since 1999, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments increased the level of 
government transparency and public participation. They implemented a series of 
reforms such as improving the provision of public information and establishing a 
reporting system to make the information on national economy, social development, 
government regulations, local financial revenue and expenditure, personnel 
appointment and dismissal, more accessible to the public. Compared with the Jinan 
and Linyi governments, the Qingdao government website played an important role in 
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providing comprehensive and timely information to the public. Nevertheless, in the 
three municipalities the objective of achieving government transparency was not 
institutionalized. 
With regard to public participation, the three municipalities adopted numerous 
forms of public participation to improve their services. These forms included 
subjecting government agencies to public scrutiny, soliciting and dealing with public 
complaints, carrying out an evaluation system and organizing public hearings. Among 
the three municipalities, only the Qingdao government implemented an external 
evaluation system by inviting the public and NGOs to assess the level of government 
effectiveness. Unlike the Linyi government, the Qingdao and Jinan governments had 
started to organize more public hearing meetings in some government 
decision-making and administrative law enforcement. All three municipalities 
endeavoured to solve the problems raised by citizens by addressing the public 
complaints. They have also tried to further enhance the level of public participation by 
encouraging NGOs and independent intermediate bodies to implement external 
scrutiny and evaluation. However, the local government should have invited more 
grass-roots citizens to participate in these public hearing meetings and should have 
valued their opinions more seriously. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  




As discussed in Chapter 4, local government reform in the municipalities of Qingdao, 
Jinan and Linyi can be categorized into three types: restructuring of government 
agencies, improving public service delivery and reforming the civil service system. As 
the first two types have been discussed in Chapter 4, civil service reform will be the 
focus of this chapter. 
This chapter discusses the reform measures and their impact on the personnel 
system in the three municipalities. It assesses the extent to which reform efforts have 
improved accountability and integrity in the public service in these municipalities. 
First, this chapter discusses personnel reform in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
governments before and after 1999. It then analyses how the three municipalities have 
implemented the responsibility system to improve the bureaucratic accountability of 
government officials. Finally, this chapter discusses the efforts made in improving 
integrity and their results in the three municipalities. 
This chapter argues that personnel reform in these three cities has made some 
progress by practising open recruitment examinations and training of civil servants. 
New regulations for promoting officials have improved government transparency and 
reduced the opportunities for practising guanxi (personal connections) and houmen 
(“backdoor” practices) although the sale and purchase of government positions still 
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exist in the three municipalities. Moreover, the performance appraisal system has 
contributed to the institutionalization of promoting or demoting government officials 
based on their performance. However, this system needs to focus on the evaluation of 
the public service performance rather than on the individual economic achievements 
of the officials.  
The three municipalities have focused on improving bureaucratic accountability 
by implementing the performance pledges for public service and the auditing system, 
all of which need to be further institutionalized. In addition, although the three 
municipalities have adopted many measures to prevent and curb corruption, it 
continues to be a serious problem that threatens the credibility of local government 
officials. 
 
Improving Personnel Management 
 
Improving personnel management in local government was carried out for the 
purpose of enhancing the quality of government officials. According to Burns, public 
employees in China may be categorized into three groups: (1) “core” civil service; (2) 
public employees managed by the civil service regulations such as public 
organizations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), mass organizations, as well as 
the legislature and the democratic parties; and (3) other public employees including 
employees of service units/institutions (shiye danwei), State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs), and those who serve in the military who are not managed according to the 
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regulations.1 The “core” civil servants are those who get paid by the State, employees 
of the “administrative organs of the State.”2 Therefore, personnel reform in the local 
government “focused primarily on management reforms of the ‘core’ civil service and 
indirectly on other public employees managed under the civil service system.”3  
Similar to the Pendleton Act of 1883, which had initiated a shift from patronage to 
a merit-based civil service reform in the United States, China’s personnel reform 
responded mainly to the problems of inefficiency and corruption.4 As discussed in 
Chapter 3, personnel reform in the three municipalities was implemented to solve 
problems such as unsystematic recruitment, promotion, performance appraisal and 
training. Moreover, this reform was aimed to create a supportive personnel 
management to ensure the integrity of the government officials. 
Following the “Provisional Regulations on National Civil Servants” (guojia 
gongwuyuan zanxing tiaoli) promulgated by the State Council in 1993, the Qingdao 
and Jinan municipalities as experimental cities had implemented a civil service 
system in 1992 while the Linyi government only implemented this system in 1995, 
when Linyi municipality was established based on the restructuring of the Linyi 
region administrative office in Shandong province. 5  All three municipalities 
promulgated the “Programme of Implementing National Civil Service System” to 
                                                        
1 John P. Burns, “Governance and Civil Service Reform”, in Jude Howell (ed.), Governance in China (Lanham: 
Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), pp. 38-39. 
2 Article 2 of the Civil Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China, approved by the 15th Session of the 
Standing Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress on 27 April 2005. 
3 Burns, “Governance and Civil Service Reform”, p. 39. 
4 Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 183. 
5 See Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1993 [Jinan Yearbook 1993] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 1993), p. 63 and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1995 [Linyi 
Yearbook 1995] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1997), p. 104. 
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transform government officials to become civil servants from 1992 to 1995.6  
 
Recruitment 
In implementing the civil service system, the three municipalities had first replaced 
the old labour allocation system established in the planned economy with an open 
recruitment examination system in the early 1990s. This system required the newly 
recruited officials to pass qualifying examinations and hiring decisions must be based 
on their merit.7 The open recruitment examination system was further implemented 
since the 1999 reform for the purpose of creating a fair and transparent environment 
in recruiting government officials.  
Until 2002, the Linyi government had the most officials among the three 
municipalities whereas the Jinan government had fewer government officials than the 
Linyi government but more than the Qingdao government. The average government 
salary level in Qingdao city was the highest, at RMB 22,663 per person per year, 
which was a direct result of the advanced economic development level in Qingdao 
city. The average salary level in the Jinan government was lower than that of the 
Qingdao government but higher than the Linyi government (See Table 8). The 
different government salary levels reflected the different levels of economic 
development in the three municipalities. While Qingdao’s economy was ranked first 
and Jinan’s economy was ranked second, Linyi city was among the least developed 
                                                        
6 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1994 [Qingdao Yearbook 1994] 
(Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1994), p. 252; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), 
Jinan nianjian 1993 [Jinan Yearbook 1993], p. 63; and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi 
nianjian 1995 [Linyi Yearbook 1995], p. 104. 
7 See Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1996 [Linyi Yearbook 1996] (Jinan: Qilu 
shushe, 1998), p. 81 and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1998 [Linyi Yearbook 
1998] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 2000), p. 94. 
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areas in Shandong province. The different salary levels might have also affected the 
enthusiasm of the local government officials.8 In other words, the high government 
salary level in Qingdao and Jinan cities might have stimulated officials to work harder 
in delivering public services. 
 
Table 8: Basic Information on Government Officials in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Cities 
in 2002 
Item Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
Number of Government Officials 66,000 71,958 73,182 
Average Salary of Government Officials 
(per person per year) 
RMB 22,663 RMB 18,535 RMB 11,005 
Source: Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Statistical Yearbook 2003] 
(Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2003), pp. 37, 47, 51-54; Jinan Statistical Bureau, Jinan tongji 
nianjian 2003 [Jinan Statistical Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2003), pp. 34, 
106, 108 and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2003 [Linyi Yearbook 
2003] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003), pp. 41, 45. 
 
Not surprisingly, the high government salary level in Qingdao city attracted more 
people with higher educational level to work there. In 2002, the Qingdao government 
recruited three civil servants with a Ph.D. degree, 45 civil servants with a Master’s 
degree, and 265 civil servants with a Bachelor’s degree. All of these recruits were 
under 35 years of age. In comparison, the Jinan government had recruited fewer civil 
servants with Masters or higher degrees than in Qingdao city. However, the Jinan 
government had recruited 798 civil servants with Community College Diploma or 
higher degrees, which were more than those recruited by the Qingdao and Linyi 
governments. In contrast, most of the newly recruited officials in the Linyi 
government only held community college diplomas (See Table 9).  
 
                                                        
8 Interview with the Director and Deputy Director of Government Set-up Department of Jinan Personnel Bureau, 
14 June 2005. 
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Table 9: Background of Candidates Recruited by the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
Governments in 2002 
Level of Education Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
Ph.D. 3 1 0 
Masters 45 6 1 
Bachelor 265 293 75 
 Community College Diploma 0 498 154 
Total 313 798 230 
Source: Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao 
Yearbook 2003] (Qingdao: Qingdao shizhi bangongshi, 2003), p. 76; Jinan Local Chronicles 
Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 2003), p. 
95; and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2003] 
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003), p. 68. 
 
Promotion 
The three municipalities engaged in a heated competition in nominating cadres since 
the 1990s reform,9 which was aimed at providing a transparent environment in the 
process of the promotion. This measure was institutionalized in the three 
municipalities in the 1999 reform. From 2001 to 2004, there were 301 civil servants 
who were promoted to leading positions through the competition in the Qingdao 
government.10 What had made the Jinan government special was that the 1999 reform 
introduced a pre-appointment announcement system (renqian gongshi zhidu), which 
had made the appointment process more impartial and transparent to the public. In the 
Jinan government, 1,137 leading cadres who were in the division chief classification 
(chu ji) were involved in the pre-appointment announcement system and 1,075 cadres 
were promoted through the competition in 2001.11 Similarly, in the Linyi government, 
                                                        
9 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2000 [Qingdao Yearbook 2000] 
(Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2000), p. 269; Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), 
Qingdao nianjian 1999 [Qingdao Yearbook 1999] (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 1999), p. 254; and Linyi 
Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1997 [Linyi Yearbook 1997] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1999), 
p. 98. 
10 Interview with an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005. 
11 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2002 [Jinan Yearbook 2002] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 2002), p. 67. 
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109 civil servants among 198 competitors were promoted to the section level 
classification (ke ji) through this competition.12  
To some extent this system could ensure a formal channel for government officials 
to be promoted in a fairly open way. If they worked hard and served the citizens well, 
they would more likely to be promoted.13 Nevertheless, the politics of recruitment 
and promotion of officials through guanxi (personal connections) and houmen (back 
door practices) practices still existed in these three municipalities. Some government 
officials had bribed their superiors in order to be considered for a promotion.14 This 
kind of practice had eroded the principles of cadre selection that was based on 
openness and fair competition. 
More specifically, the phenomena of maiguan maiguan (buying and selling 
official positions) and paoguan yaoguan (seeking official positions) have become 
more serious in the recent years, especially in the county and the lower level 
governments.15 Sun indicated that office-for-sale cases have risen sharply in China 
because “personnel promotion and placement was a basic mechanism of control and 
advancement” and also “bring improvements in salaries and material comforts, in 
terms of job location, rank category, and residential and transportation amenities.”16 
The most serious case of maiguan maiguan in Shandong province was in Tai’an city. 
                                                        
12 Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 2003), p. 68. 
13 Interview with the Director of Civil Organizations Management Department of Jinan Civil Affairs Bureau, 16 
June 2005; an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005; and the 
Director and Deputy Director of Government Set-up Department of Jinan Personnel Bureau, 14 June 2005. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See Xiaobo Lü, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 178-179 and Yan Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary 
China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 145-146. 
16 Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China, pp. 145-146. 
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Hu Jianxue, the mayor (1990-1992) and party secretary (1992-1995) of Tai’an city, 
gained RMB 610,000 for selling official positions to interested buyers.17 Although 
there were not any serious cases of the sale and purchase of official positions evident 
in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments, paoguan yaoguan through bribing 
government superiors still existed in the three municipalities.18  
 
Performance Appraisal 
The three municipalities also implemented a performance appraisal system. In the 
1990s, the evaluation of officials was based on their economic performance according 
to 18 criteria suggested by the national guidelines. Only three of these criteria were 
not economy-related (population growth, forested area and nine-year compulsory 
education completion rate). The other criteria included GDP, the amount of foreign 
investment, the gross value of industrial output, the gross value of agricultural output, 
the national income per capita as well as taxes and profits remitted.19 However, the 
economic indicators were too narrow to evaluate the performance of local government 
leaders and might not be congruous with the actual achievements of the leaders.20 
Even if some foreign enterprises could cause serious damage to the city’s environment 
and affect the health of citizens, some local government leaders still invited the 
foreign investors to establish such enterprises in order to enhance their city’s 
                                                        
17 Ibid. , p. 147. 
18 Interview with the Director and Deputy Director of Government Set-up Department of Jinan Personnel Bureau, 
14 June 2005; an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005; and the 
Deputy Director of Linyi Personnel Bureau, 29 June 2005. 
19 John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in China,” in Governance in China (Paris: Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2005), p. 65. 
20 Interview with the Director of Finance Bureau of Laoshan District in Qingdao city, 24 June 2005. 
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economic performance.21  
The evaluation system focusing on economic performance has also brought about 
improper competition among the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments. For instance, 
in order to attract more foreign investment, the Jinan government reduced its land 
price to a lower level than that of the Qingdao government to appeal to foreign 
investors. This was because as an inland city Jinan was not as attractive an option as 
Qingdao city in drawing in foreign investment. Since Linyi city was located farther 
inland, it was not able to attract foreign investment as well as Jinan city because of its 
poor economic performance. In order to compete with Jinan city, the leaders of Linyi 
city initiated some improper measures to enhance their indicators on foreign 
investment by giving the total cost used in purchasing the land back to investors if 
they promised to build their factories in Linyi city. In other words, foreign investors 
did not have to pay anything to get the land they needed for building factories there.22 
This kind of improper competition led to a situation where the local farmers were 
forced to sell their land to the government at a very low price in order for the 
government to “resell” it to the investors. This practice adversely affected the interests 
of the peasants. 
Therefore, the evaluation system for local leaders needed to be restructured. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the Ministry of Personnel of China had in 2004 drawn up “a 
new yardstick for rating local governments” to appraise the local government leaders 
by using a set of 33 performance indicators. This new evaluation system focused on 




overall governance and improvement made in living standards and public service, 
rather than focusing only on the growth of GDP or creating more jobs.23 Qingdao city 
was the only experimental city in China to implement this new evaluation system. 
Among the three municipalities, only the Qingdao government incorporated the 
criteria of public service, citizen evaluation and environmental protection in 
appraising local leaders and officials. 24  This demonstrated that the leaders and 
officials in the Qingdao government were more open to accepting new ideas of 
government administration than those in the Jinan and Linyi governments. 
Apart from these criteria, “moral integrity” has also become an important criterion 
of performance appraisal. All government officials including superiors and 
subordinates were “requested to provide a 360-degree feedback on the performance 
and behaviour of the official concerned.”25 If officials were evaluated to be less 
qualified or unprofessional in doing their jobs, they would be dismissed or even 
prosecuted. This criterion also focused on “the extent to which the civil servant 
implemented the CCP policy.”26 
The performance appraisal system was closely linked to the individual rewards of 
government officials in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments. These 
governments issued the “Provisional Regulations for Administrative Awards” to 
                                                        
23 See Chua Chin Hon, “China Draws up New Yardstick for Rating Local Governments,” Straits Times, 3 August 
2004, p. A2 and Liu Shixin, “Zhongguo zhengfu jixiaopinggu tixi mianshi” [The Appearance of a New System of 
Appraising Local Government in China], Zhongguo qingnianbao [China Youth Daily], 2 August 2004, p. A1. 
24 Interview with an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005. 
25 Irene Hors et al., “Fighting Corruption in China,” in Governance in China (Paris: Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2005), p. 121. 
26 Burns, “Civil Service Reform in China,” p. 65. For more details, see Article 33 of the Civil Servant Law of the 
People’s Republic of China. 
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provide incentives and rewards for officials with high standards of professionalism.27 
For the purpose of curbing corruption, these three municipalities had raised the salary 
level and provided bonuses and other perks of civil servants several times since 1989. 
Yet, the bonus granted was different in the three municipalities. For instance, one 
county/department chief would receive a bonus of RMB 2,000 in Qingdao city, RMB 
1,500 in Jinan city and RMB 800 in Linyi city.28 Moreover, Qingdao and Jinan cities 
had also introduced extra special bonuses (from RMB 500 to 800) to reward officials 
who were evaluated as excellent. A reward of RMB 1,500 to 2,000 would be offered 
to officials who were evaluated as very excellent.29 Recognizing the importance of 
these incentives, the Qingdao government also offered additional sabbatical leave 
periods with covered health care for very excellent officials.30 Therefore, the use of 
bonus and increments were more common in Qingdao and Jinan cities but less 
common in Linyi city because it was a less developed city with very limited financial 
resources. Burns argued that “paying bonuses and increments is undoubtedly a real 
hardship” in poor areas since personnel costs in these places can amount to 70% or 




                                                        
27 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2001 [Qingdao Yearbook 2001] 
(Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2001), p. 6; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan 
nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 2003), p. 96; and Linyi Local Chronicles 
Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2003], p. 68. 
28 Interview with an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005; the 
Director and Deputy Director of Government Set-up Department of Jinan Personnel Bureau, 14 June 2005; and the 
Deputy Director of Linyi Personnel Bureau, 29 June 2005. 
29 Ibid. 
30 “Qingdaoshi jiangli guojia youxiu gongwuyuan: jiankang xiuyang” [Qingdao Government Offering Sabbatical 
Leave for Free Health Care for Very Excellent Civil Servants], see 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/19/20030405/963870.html, accessed on 13 September 2006. 
31 Burns, “Civil Service Reform in China,” p. 65. 
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Disciplinary Control 
Based on the results of the performance appraisal, these three municipalities also 
implemented a dismissal system for disqualified civil servants. The Qingdao 
government was the first city in Shandong province to issue the “Provisional 
Regulations on Dismissal and Resignation of Government Officials” in 1993.32 This 
document signalled the end of the situation where government officials could not be 
demoted or dismissed. In 1993, 29 incompetent government officials were dismissed 
by the Qingdao government.33 Borrowing from Qingdao’s experience, the Jinan and 
Linyi governments set up a preliminary system of selecting the competent officials 
and eliminating the poor performers or under-performers.34  
The system of performance appraisal was improved in the 1999 reform. The 
Qingdao government had set up a restraint mechanism emphasizing on a 
capability-based appraisal system for civil servants at all levels.35 Any government 
official who received “unsatisfactory” ratings in two consecutive years would be 
dismissed.36 From 1999 to 2002, the number of dismissed officials in the Qingdao 
government was 167 while the number of dismissals in the Linyi government was 40 
(See Table 10). This was because the Qingdao leaders had always taken a leading role 
                                                        
32 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1994 [Qingdao Yearbook 1994], p. 252. 
33 This experience of civil service reform in Qingdao government was praised by Hu Jintao, the Member of the 
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau in 1994, and Song Defu, the Minister of Personnel Department, who 
called for the local governments in China to popularize Qingdao’ experiences. For more details, see Qingdao Local 
Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1995 [Qingdao Yearbook 1995] (Jinan: Shandong youyi 
chubanshe, 1995), p. 270. 
34 See Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1994 [Jinan Yearbook 1994] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 1994), p. 61 and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1998 [Linyi 
Yearbook 1998], p. 94. 
35 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002] (Beijing: 
Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002), p. 345. 
36 Interview with an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005; the 
Director and Deputy Director of Government Set-up Department of Jinan Personnel Bureau, 14 June 2005; and the 
Deputy Director of Linyi Personnel Bureau, 29 June 2005. 
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in employing reform measures in Shandong province. 
 
Table 10: Number of Government Officials Dismissed in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
Municipal Governments from 1999 to 2002 
 Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
Dismissed Officials  167 68 40 
Total Number of Government Officials 66,000 71,958 73,182 
Dismissed Officials as A Percentage of  
Total Government Officials 
0.25% 0.09% 0.05% 
Source: Qianjiang wanbao [Qianjiang Evening News], “Qingdao citui buchenzhi gongwuyuan 167 
ming” [Qingdao Government Dismissed 167 Civil Servants Who are not Qualified to Their Jobs], 30 
October 2003, p. 1; Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Statistical 
Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2003), pp. 38, 47; Jinan Local Chronicles 
Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2000-2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2000-2003] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 2000-2003), p. 85, p. 120, p. 79 and p. 96; Jinan Statistical Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 
2003 [Jinan Statistical Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2003), pp. 34, 106; Linyi 
Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2001-2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2001-2003] 
(Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001-2003) (N.B. The 2001 Yearbook was published by Hong Kong New 
Times Press), p. 62, p. 70 and p. 68; and Linyi Statistical Bureau, Linyi tongji nianjian 2003 [Linyi 
Statistical Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2003), pp. 41, 45. 
 
Nevertheless, it was interesting that the civil servants who were dismissed were 
mainly the junior officials instead of their supervisors. This was the limitation of an 
internal performance appraisal at the current stage. In order to effectively implement 
this system, the integrity appraisal for supervisors should be emphasized and an 
external evaluation such as public evaluation should be included to this system. 
Moreover, the three municipalities also applied the methods of double-checking 
on these procedures, which were vulnerable to corruption. They strictly monitored the 
key areas where corruption could breed easily, areas such as land lease, bidding 
projects, property trade, and government procurements. All these measures were 
aimed at preventing corruption at its roots.37 Moreover, all these municipalities 
                                                        
37 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 
345; Bao Zhiqiang, “2004 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Jinan Government Work Report of 2004], in Jinan Local 
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implemented a job rotation system in the late 1990s for the purpose of reducing the 
opportunities for corruption.38  
 
Training 
The Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments all carried out civil servant training 
programmes to change the attitudes of government officials from a planned economy 
to a market economy. For instance, the Qingdao government issued the “Plan for 
Civil Service Training in Qingdao Government from 1997 to 2000” to ensure the level 
of professionalism among civil servants. This training plan provided various training 
courses such as junior public officials training, pre-work public officials training, 
senior department chief training, as well as specialty training courses such as public 
finance and international law.39  
Since 2000, the three municipalities had further strengthened their civil servant 
training programmes. The Qingdao and Jinan governments established the 
“Implementing Measures of Certificate System of Civil Service Training” in 2001. 
The outcome of the civil servant training programmes would be added to the system 
of evaluating administrative effectiveness.40 Moreover, the three municipalities added 
more sophisticated training content such as public administration, public finance, 
internet technology, state security, WTO knowledge and honesty in administration. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2004 [Jinan Yearbook 2004] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 2004), 
p. 11; and “Linyishi dali jiaqiang fanfu lidu” [Linyi Government Strengthened Anti-corruption Work], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 8 August 2005. 
38 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2001 [Qingdao Yearbook 2001], p. 
6; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2002 [Jinan Yearbook 2002], p. 67; and Linyi 
Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1997 [Linyi Yearbook 1997], p. 98. 
39 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1998 [Qingdao Yearbook 1998] (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 1998), p. 250. 
40 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 
242 and Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003], p. 95. 
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The public administration institutes and Party schools set up by the three 
municipalities were the main locales for providing these training programmes. For 
instance, the Qingdao government organized training classes in public administration 
and administration by law for 41,948 civil servants in 2002. 41  In the Jinan 
government, 26,000 civil servants signed up for the training course on WTO 
knowledge.42 In 2003, the Linyi government provided training for 543 civil servants 
in public finance and for 15,054 civil servants in honesty in administration.43  
In addition, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments also trained civil servants 
by sending them to inspect and study in the U.S., European countries or Singapore. 
The story of the Mayor of Linyi city, Li Qun44, can be used as an interesting example 
here. Li went to New Haven University in the U.S.A. where he studied the MPA 
(Master of Public Administration) course for 10 months. He worked as the assistant to 
the Mayor in New Haven for about three months. When he returned to China, Li Qun 
published a book titled I Worked as an Assistant to the Mayor in the U.S.A.45, in which 
he discussed the American local government functions dealing with social security, 
fiscal revenue and expenditure as well as hierarchy. This book also suggested how 
local government reform in China could borrow from the U.S. experiences.46  
Therefore, professional training in public administration and knowledge in the 
                                                        
41 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Yearbook 2003] 
(Qingdao: Qingdao shizhi bangongshi, 2003), p. 76. 
42 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003], p. 95. 
43 Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2004 [Linyi Yearbook 2004] (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 2004), p. 65. 
44 Li Qun was the Mayor of Linyi city from January 2001 to December 2002. He was the Secretary of the Linyi 
Municipal Committee of the CCP from December 2002 to present. 
45 This book was highly praised by Zeng Qinghong, Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China. Shandong 
provincial government also hoped all local government leaders to study this book. 
46 Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2003], pp. 1-6. 
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system of market economy have helped to change the way of thinking among 
government officials and make them more open to the new public administration 
methods that other countries employ. Yet, the overseas training experience would not 
necessarily cause any official to lean towards the Western style of politics. “We learnt 
only the superficial stuff in the past. We must now learn the significance behind the 
way things are done,” commented by Zhao Xiaodong, the deputy chief of the cadre 
training division of the CCP Sichuan committee’s organization department.47 Some 
critics also charged that the chance to be trained overseas in some government 
agencies had become a kind of “welfare.”48  
The intangible reward of participating in such training programmes was never 
doubted. A recent survey on opinions on the social situation in 2002, which was 
designed by some provincial departmental (ting) level cadres studying at the Central 
Party School, indicated that local government officials started to recognize the 
importance of political reform. According to this survey, more than 60% of these 
officials saw the “political structural reform” and the construction of a “healthy legal 
system” as the two most important factors that would influence economic and social 
development in the first decade of the 21st century.49 Further, when they were asked 
what were the decisive factors in attaining success in political structural reform, their 
first choice was to “increase inner-Party democracy,” and the second choice was to 
“further change the functions of government agencies,” and their third choice was to 
                                                        
47 Straits Times, “China Pursues Overseas Training,” 9 September 2006, p. S15. 
48 Ibid. , p. S15. 
49 Joseph Fewsmith, “Elite Responses to Social Change and Globalization,” in Howell (ed.), Governance in China, 
p. 31. 
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“manage relations between party and state” (See Table 11). 
 
Table 11: Decisive Factors in Attaining Success in Political Structural Reform in 2002 
Factor Percentage Rank 
1. Further Change Functions of Government Agencies 
2. Manage Well Relations between Party and State 
3. Increase Inner-Party Democracy 
4. Increase Supervision by Public Opinion 
5. Strengthen Campaign Against Corruption 
6. Reduce Size of Party Organs 
7. Strictly Promote Term System of Cadres 
8. Increase Role of Democratic Parties 
9. Raise Function of People’s Representative Congresses 





















Source: Cited from Joseph Fewsmith, “Elite Responses to Social Change and Globalization,” in Jude 
Howell (ed.), Governance in China (Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), p. 32. For more 
details, see Qing Lianbin, “Zhongguo dangzheng lingdao ganbu dui 2002-2003 nian shehui xingshi de 
jiben kanfa” [Opinions on Social Situation in 2002 by Some Officials], in Ru Xin, Lu Xueyi, and Li 
Peixin (eds.), 2003 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce [China’s Social Situation: Analysis 
and Forecast, 2003] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2003), p. 132. 
 
Thus, local government officials had gradually got rid of the thought of direct 
management and intervention in economic affairs and had moved to accept the 
concept of providing public services. In this respect, the attitude of government 
officials in Qingdao city might have changed faster than the officials in Jinan and 
Linyi cities. This was because, as a coastal city, Qingdao city was the first open city in 
Shandong province, which was more open to the practices of a market economy than 
Jinan and Linyi cities.50 Apart from civil servant training programmes, the three 
municipalities also made efforts in improving bureaucratic accountability and 
integrity to change the attitudes of local government officials by focusing on public 
service. 
                                                        
50 Interview with an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005 and 
the Director of Reform and Development Bureau of Laoshan District in Qingdao city, 24 June 2005. 
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Improving Bureaucratic Accountability in Public Service 
 
Accountability in this thesis refers to bureaucratic accountability.51 According to the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), bureaucratic accountability in China means that 
“public officials are accountable for the government’s behaviour and are responsible 
to the entity from which they derive their authority, such as people’s congress or the 
CCP.”52 Accountability implies that “measurable criteria are available to evaluate the 
performance of public officials and there are oversight mechanisms to ensure that 
standards are met.”53 
   According to the Civil Servant Law in China, civil servants must “faithfully obey 
the Constitution and laws and discharge their duties within limits of power” and 
“whole-heatedly serve people and be supervised by people.” Moreover, civil servants 
must “obey and implement the orders and decisions made by their supervisors 
according to law.” 54  Similar to the Provisional Regulations on Civil Servants 
implemented in 1993, the newly implemented civil service law reinforced the focus 
on bureaucratic accountability.  
Before discussing the improvement of bureaucratic accountability in the three 
municipalities, we must review the ideals of improving accountability among 
government officials. These ideals were put forth by the Chinese leadership during 
four different periods: Mao Zedong’s period, Deng Xiaoping’s period, Jiang Zemin’s 
                                                        
51 According to Burns, political and bureaucratic accountability are the two strongest forms of accountability in 
most political systems and they are largely the same in China. For more details, see Burns, “Governance and Civil 
Service Reform,” p. 40. 
52 Asian Development Bank, Development Management: Progress and Challenges in the People’s Republic of 
China (Manila: ADB, 2003), p. 62. 
53 Ibid. , p. 62. 
54 Article 12 of the Civil Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China. 
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period, and Hu Jintao’s period. During Mao’s era, “a cadre was always expected to 
have a perfect combination of both redness (a symbol of the CCP which means 
politically conscious) and expertise (professionally competent).”55 The slogan of 
quanxinquanyi wei renmin fuwu (serve people wholeheartedly), became a popular 
motto that represented the kind of value and attitude required for government officials. 
However, such slogans only existed in the special historical context in Mao’s era, 
when most of the cadres were easily called to serve people as a way of showing their 
loyalty to the CCP. 
In the era of Deng Xiaoping, this situation was greatly changed. As the market 
economy developed and China was opening up to the outside world, government 
officials in China became less fascinated with showing their loyalty to the CCP and 
the slogan of “serving people” was increasingly neglected. Under such circumstances, 
if the government expected government officials to serve people better, they should 
not use the same slogan as before. The coercive and concrete measures only seemed 
necessary in demanding government officials to serve people, whether they were 
willing to do so or not. These concrete measures, which were expressed in the form of 
civil service reform, were carried out by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. 
Deng Xiaoping had noticed the changes during his time and had adjusted some 
strategies in getting government officials to serve people. He proposed the principle 
of renmin manyi bu manyi (whether the government official’s work satisfies people) 
as the criterion for evaluating government officials. He also emphasized the “socialist 
                                                        
55 Meiru Liu, Administrative Reform in China and Its Impact on the Policy-Making Process and Economic 
Development after Mao (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), p. 98. 
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spiritual civilization” which inherited the moral traditions popular in Mao’s era. 
Nationwide efforts were made to publicize the “five stresses” (wu jiang: decorum, 
manners, hygiene, discipline, and morals), “four points of decency” (si mei: mind, 
language, behaviour, and environment), and “three loves” (san reai: motherland, 
socialism, and party). 56  These efforts were aimed at changing the attitudes of 
government officials and encouraging them to serve the public better. 
Inheriting Deng’s political legacy, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao57 respectively 
underscored the importance of government officials serving people. To achieve this 
goal, the reform of the cadre and personnel system became an important theme in 
post-reform China. In his report at the 14th National Congress of the CCP, Jiang 
Zemin stressed that the emphasis of current cadre and personnel reform was to set up 
the system of national civil service.58 In addition, facing the new international and 
national situations, Jiang proposed the “Three Representations” (sange daibiao), 
namely the CCP must always represent the most advanced productive forces in China; 
the most advanced cultural forces in China; and the fundamental interests of the 
majority in China.59 The “Three Representations” requested government officials to 
uphold the spirit of advancing with time and to enhance the abilities of administration 
and the art of leadership, resisting corruption, and warding off risks. 
To push civil service reform further, Hu Jintao signed the Order of the Chairman 
                                                        
56 Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], “Jiakuai cheng xiang gezhong wenming danwei jianshe” [Speed up the 
Establishment of “Civilized” Units in Urban and Rural Areas], 21 January 1984, p. 1. 
57 Hu Jintao was elected as the General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee at the 16th National Congress of 
the CCP on November 14, 2002. 
58 Jiang Zemin, Report at the 14th National Congress of the CCP, see 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5106/5278/20010430/456648.html, accessed on 12 September 
2005. 
59 Jiang Zemin, “Zai Guangdong shicha gongzuo shi de jianghua” [The Lectures of Jiang Zemin in Inspecting 
Guangdong Province], Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], 26 February 2000, p. 1. 
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of the People’s Republic of China in 2005 to announce the implementation of the 
Civil Service Law.60 It is also worth noting that Hu, as the new General Secretary of 
the CCP Central Committee, made it clear that the Chinese government should persist 
in the principle of “Putting People First” (yi min wei ben) in order to construct a 
harmonious society (hexie shehui) in 2004. 61  Following this concept, local 
governments in China started to focus on ways of improving the capability of public 
service and achieving smooth cooperation between the government and citizens. 
In this context, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments took concrete measures 
to improve the bureaucratic accountability of government officials. They paid a great 
deal of attention to removing bad habits of formalism and bureaucratism and to 
reorient the behaviour of government officials on the track of public service.62  
In the 1990s, the governments focused on tackling the problem of the piling of 
paperwork and endless meetings (wenshan huihai), which were the major forms of 
bureaucratism and formalism at that time. The Qingdao and Jinan governments were 
asked to minimise the number of meetings which had greatly reduced the volume of 
documents produced.63 The Linyi municipal government required that city-wide 
departments meetings should be held only once a year. These meetings were not open 
                                                        
60 Xinhua News Agency, “Hu Jintao Signed the Order of the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China (No. 35) 
to Announce the Implementation of the Civil Service Law,” 27 April 2005. 
61 Hu Jintao, Zai zhongyang renkou ziyuan huanjing gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua [The Lecture at the Meeting 
of Population, Resources and Environment of China], see 
http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/zwgk/ldjh2/t20040412_26920.htm, accessed on 18 October 2005. 
62 See Zhai Yongbo, “1990 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Jinan Government Work Report of 1990], in Jinan Local 
Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1991 [Jinan Yearbook 1991] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 1991), 
p. 9; Yu Zhengsheng, “Zai shiwei qijie sanci quanweihuiyi shang de jianghua” [The Lecture of the Third Plenary 
Session of the Seventh Congress of the Qingdao Municipal Committee of the CCP], in Qingdao Local Chronicles 
Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1996 [Qingdao Yearbook 1996] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996), pp. 1-6; 
and Qiao Yanchun, “1997 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Linyi Government Work Report of 1997], in Linyi Local 
Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1997 [Linyi Yearbook 1997], pp. 395-398. 
63 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 
345 and Bao, “2004 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Jinan Government Work Report of 2004], p. 11. 
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to the leaders of county and district governments unless they obtained approval from 
the municipal government.64  
After the 1999 reform, the three municipalities brought up the idea of reinventing 
a service-oriented government. In 2001, Qingdao city was the first city in Shandong 
province to propose this idea of making a “service-oriented government”.65 The Jinan 
government supported this idea in 2003, when Bao Zhiqiang, the Mayor of Jinan city, 
expressed clearly that the administrative reform should be in accordance with the 
requirements of a service-oriented government and should transfer government 
functions to the public service and social management sectors.66 Similarly, the Linyi 
government brought up this idea in 2003, when Lian Chengmin, the Mayor of Linyi 
city, indicated that it should focus on a “service-oriented government,” accelerate the 
change of government functions and encourage administrative innovations to enhance 
the quality of social management and public service.67 
Following this ideal, Zhang Huilai, the Secretary of the Qingdao municipal 
Committee of the CCP, indicated that government officials at all levels must 
enthusiastically help people to solve practical problems that they might face in their 
work and life.68 In 2003, the new Mayor of Jinan city, Bao Zhiqiang, indicated that 
governments at all levels should prevent and overcome formalism and bureaucratism 
as well as solve the living and production problems of unemployed urban workers and 
                                                        
64 Linyi Municipal Government, “Guanyu tigao xingzheng xiaolü youhua fazhan huanjing de yijian” [Suggestions 
on Enhancing Government Efficiency and Improving Development Environment], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 11 May 2005. 
65 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 345. 
66 Bao Zhiqiang, “2003 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Jinan Government Work Report of 2003], in Jinan Local 
Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003], p. 11. 
67  Lian Chengmin, “2003 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Linyi Government Work Report of 2003], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 22 August 2005. 
68 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 345. 
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poorer farmers.69 Similarly, the Mayor of Linyi city, Li Qun, also introduced working 
out a system to provide fixed reception days for leading cadres to meet grassroots 
visitors (jiedai qunzhong ri zhidu) to ensure that the power entrusted to the 
government was truly exercised for their benefit.70    
To reduce formalism, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments required 
governments at all levels not to build any “image projects” (xingxiang gongcheng) or 
“vanity projects” (zhengji gongcheng) that would waste both money and manpower.71 
These measures facilitated the process to remove bureaucratism and formalism 
and “helped [to] reshape the behaviour of bureaucrats from those of gate-keepers to 
become more service oriented.”72 Stress on the values of conduct such as “Three 
Representations” (sange daibiao) and “Putting People First” (yi min wei ben) was a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for creating a favourable public service 
culture. During the economic transition, it was difficult to increase officials’ 
accountability since the economic transition had created the potential for involving 
officials in doing business. In other words, government officials tended to seek profits 
for themselves at the expense of bureaucratic accountability.73  
To strengthen bureaucratic accountability, since the 1999 reform, the three 
                                                        
69 Bao, “2003 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Jinan Government Work Report of 2003], p. 11. 
70 Linyi Municipal Government, “Guanyu tigao xingzheng xiaolü youhua fazhan huanjing de yijian” [Suggestions 
on Enhancing Government Efficiency and Improving Development Environment], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 11 May 2005. 
71 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 
345; Jiang Daming, “Daxing qiuzhen wushi zhi feng zhuahao gexiang gongzuo luoshi” [Encouraging the 
Pragmatic Attitude of Government Officials to Perform Government Functions], in Jinan Local Chronicles 
Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2004 [Jinan Yearbook 2004], p. 4; and Linyi Municipal Government, 
“Guanyu tigao xingzheng xiaolü youhua fazhan huanjing de yijian” [Suggestions on Enhancing Government 
Efficiency and Improving Development Environment], see http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 11 
May 2005. 
72 Dali L. Yang, “Rationalizing the Chinese State: The Political Economy of Government Reform,” in Chien-min 
Chao and Bruce J. Dickson (eds.), Remaking the Chinese State: Strategies, Society, and Security (London: 
Routledge, 2001), p. 41. 
73 Hors et al., “Fighting Corruption in China,” p. 122. 
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municipalities implemented a system of performance pledges for public service in 
order to improve accountability. According to this system, all administrative agencies 
closely related to the people’s everyday life must make the work procedures, service 
standards, working time limits, working discipline and complaint channels open to the 
public.74 About 20 agencies, such as the Economic and Trade Commission, the 
Administration Bureau of Safety Production, the Quality and Technology Supervision 
Bureau, the Drug Administration, and the Education Bureau, implemented this system 
in each municipality. In line with this system, the three municipalities also carried out 
another system of “first encounter responsibility” (shou wen fuzezhi), which suggested 
that the first official who dealt with the matter raised by citizens should be responsible 
for providing sufficient information until a satisfactory answer is accepted by the 
enquirer. In this whole process, this official should not avoid his or her responsibility 
by transferring the enquirer to another officer or delaying the procedure.75 
Implementing the system of performance pledges for public service was the result 
of learning from the United Kingdom’s Citizens’ Charter. It “greatly enhanced public 
officials’ awareness of public sector efficiency, effectiveness, and quality and the 
meaning of customer orientation.”76 However, the smooth implementation of this 
system needed a high level of government transparency and public participation. 
Although the three municipalities made government information more accessible to 
                                                        
74 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 
345; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2002 [Jinan Yearbook 2002], p. 67; and 
Linyi Municipal Government, “Guanyu tigao xingzheng xiaolü youhua fazhan huanjing de yijian” [Suggestions on 
Enhancing Government Efficiency and Improving Development Environment], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 11 May 2005. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Asian Development Bank, Development Management, p. 57. 
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the public and widened the scope of public participation by organizing public hearings, 
the scale of government transparency and public participation was still at an initial 
stage. The system of performance pledges for public service required an effective 
complaint mechanism like an independent agency to monitor the officials’ 
performance according to their pledges to guarantee that citizens could lodge an 
appeal when government officials broke their promises. Yet, there was no such agency 
in China. Thus, such situation undermined the effectiveness of implementing the 
performance pledges for public service. 
Since the 1999 reform, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi municipalities also carried 
out the accountability assurance system to increase the awareness of bureaucratic 
accountability. This system specified that government officials who transgressed their 
administrative power, shifted responsibility to others (tuiwei chepi), distorted the law 
for personal gains by engaging in fraud (xunsiwubi), increased the administrative fees 
randomly, and accepted money, gifts or valuable information from applicants wishing 
to obtain administrative approval, would be subjected to disciplinary action.77 This 
system effectively limited the bureaucratic or illegal behaviour of officials and 
ensured that more government officials were acting responsibly. Thus, the 
implementation of this system improved public service delivery and reduced the 
number of complaints.78 However, the accountability assurance system was not 
institutionalized because guanxi (personal connections), renqing (favour) and mianzi 
                                                        
77 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 
345; Bao, “2003 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Jinan Government Work Report of 2003], p. 11; Linyi Municipal 
Government, “Guanyu tigao xingzheng xiaolü youhua fazhan huanjing de yijian” [Suggestions on Enhancing 
Government Efficiency and Improving Development Environment], see http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, 
accessed on 11 May 2005. 
78 Burns, “Governance and Civil Service Reform,” p. 41. 
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(face) at the local context in China would always hinder the government agencies 
from implementing this system. 
 
Improving Integrity in Public Service 
 
“Corruption has been openly recognized as an emerging challenge to China’s 
economic and social reform.”79 Economic reform has been associated with rampant 
corruption activities in local government. Corruption in China has a broader definition 
compared with its English counterpart, which usually refers to bribery.80 In the 
Chinese context, corruption does not only involve bribery but also embezzlement 
(tanwu), misappropriation of public funds (nuoyong gongkuan), abusing power in 
exchange for privileges (yiquan mousi), illegal profiteering (touji daoba) and 
smuggling (zousi).81 
Facing the problem of corruption, the Chinese government “has waged a vigorous 
campaign to maintain and improve the impartiality and integrity of public service.”82 
Following other countries, it has mainly applied two methods to combat corruption: 
criminal and disciplinary sanctions. The former is implemented by the People’s 
Procuratorate and courts at all levels of government, and the latter is implemented by 
the Supervision Bureau and the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline and 
Inspection at all levels of government.83   
The law and regulations in China stipulate that government officials are prohibited 
                                                        
79 Hors et al., “Fighting Corruption in China,” p. 105. 
80 Ibid. , p. 105. 
81 See Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China, pp. 26-33 and John P. Burns, “Reforming China’s 
Bureaucracy, 1979-82,” Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 6 (June 1983), pp. 703-704. 
82 Asian Development Bank, Development Management, p. 37. 
83 Hors et al., “Fighting Corruption in China,” p. 111. 
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from any engagement in corruption. According to the Criminal Law, citizens who take 
bribes or embezzle should receive a heavy sentence and even the death penalty if the 
amount involved in the bribe or embezzlement cases exceeds RMB 100, 000.84 The 
Civil Servant Law also prohibits government officials from offering and accepting 
bribes and gifts as well as engaging in trading or operating a business.85 Moreover, in 
order to reduce the opportunities for corruption, some specific laws and codes such as 
the Public Procurators Law and the Professional Code of Ethics of People’s Police 
also prohibit government officials from abusing their power in giving favour to their 
spouses, relatives and friends who are involved in business.86  
However, these laws and regulations have not curbed corruption effectively. Since 
the anti-corruption laws are draconian, why is corruption still so prevalent in China? 
According to Chan, corruption in China “was exacerbated by the simultaneous decline 
of [both the external and internal] control mechanisms.” Although the laws are 
draconian, “their effect was hampered by the lack of persistence in enforcement.”87 In 
addition, before the middle of the 1990s, the government in China mainly focused on 
criminalizing and investigating numerous forms of corruption or misconduct on the 
basis of a complex legal framework but paid less attention to the examination of the 
sources of corruption. Thus, the government could not develop effective preventive 
measures to combat corruption. 
                                                        
84 Article 383 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, amended in 1999. 
85 Article 53 of the Civil Servant Law of the People’s Republic of China. 
86 Article 18 of the Public Procurators Law of the People’s Republic of China, approved by the 12th Session of the 
Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on 28 February 1995 and Article 3 of the 
Professional Code of Ethics of People’s Police of the People’s Republic of China, adopted in 1994. 
87 Kin-Man Chan, “Corruption in China: A Principal-Agent Perspective,” in Hoi-Kwok Wong and Hon S. Chan 
(eds.), Handbook of Comparative Public Administration in the Asia-Pacific Basin (New York: Marcel Dekker Inc., 
1999), p. 311. 
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In practice, the three municipal governments introduced some measures to create 
supportive conditions for achieving integrity. First, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
governments enhanced accountability mechanisms such as internal controls and 
external review. Since 2001, they started to carry out the system of auditing the 
economic responsibility of leading cadres (lingdao ganbu jingji zeren shenji zhidu), 
which focused on checking the situation of financial management during the cadre’s 
tour of duty before his promotion or retirement.88 This system was also called the 
end-of term-audit (liren shenji), which was the new measure employed by the Chinese 
government in administrative reform for the purpose of strengthening the supervision 
of government leaders, fighting against illegal and criminal behaviour and controlling 
corruption. During the past five years, the Qingdao government audited 1,292 
government leaders who would be promoted or retired. One hundred and forty-nine 
leaders were punished because they had violated the accounting procedures (weifan 
caijing jilu). In comparison, the Jinan government audited 1,097 leaders and punished 
78 persons among them. The Linyi government also punished 25 leading cadres, who 
violated law and discipline in financial management (See Table 12). In this regard, the 
Qingdao and Jinan governments were more effective in implementing the system of 






                                                        
88 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 
136; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2002 [Jinan Yearbook 2002], p. 67; and 
Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2002 [Linyi Yearbook 2002] (Beijing: Zhonghua 
shuju, 2002), p. 127. 
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Table 12: Leaders Audited and Punished in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Governments, 
1999-2003 
 Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
Number of Leaders Audited 1,292 1,097 863 
Number of Leaders Punished  149 78 25 
Number of Leaders Punished as 
Percentage of Those Audited 
11.53% 7.11% 2.90% 
Source: Qingdao ribao [Qingdao Daily], “Qingdao jingjizeren shenji wunian huigu” [The Review of 
Five-year Economic Responsibility Auditing in Qingdao City], 6 December 2006, p. A1; Dazhong 
ribao [Dazhong Daily], “Jinan jingjizeren shenji chengwei ganbu renmian ‘ying gang gang’” [The 
Results of Auditing the Economic Responsibility of Leading Cadres Become the Important Criteria of 
Promotion and Dismissal of Officials], 12 May 2005, p. A1; and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation 
Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2001-2005 [Linyi Yearbook 2001-2005] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 
2001-2005) (N.B: The 2001 Yearbook was published by Hong Kong New Times Press), p. 45. 
 
In addition, the three municipalities have introduced the probity account 
(lianzheng zhanghu) to prevent corruption. Probity accounts encourage government 
officials who have accepted bribes to voluntarily hand in their bribes, cash and bank 
drafts, to the official accounts set up by the Supervision Bureau, the Commission for 
Discipline and Inspection and the branches of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China in the three municipalities.89 This measure gives corrupt officials a chance to 
hand in bribes before they are detected and prosecuted. For instance, by the end of 
2001, the “probity accounts” in Qingdao city received RMB 1,500,000 handed in by 
government officials; the “probity accounts” in Jinan city received RMB 879,000; and 
the “probity accounts” in Linyi city received RMB 248,000.90  
Yet the effectiveness of this measure is largely dependent on the honest 
conscience of officials. It is only applicable to those officials who voluntarily hand in 
                                                        
89 See ibid. , p. 345; Bao, “2003 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Jinan Government Work Report of 2003], p. 11; and 
Linyi Municipal Government, “Guanyu tigao xingzheng xiaolü youhua fazhan huanjing de yijian” [Suggestions on 
Enhancing Government Efficiency and Improving Development Environment], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 11 May 2005. 
90 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 
66; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2002 [Jinan Yearbook 2002], p. 67; and 
“Linyishi lianzheng jianshe shishi ‘wuxiangzhidu’ jian shixiao” [Linyi Government Carried out Five Systems for 
Anti-corruption], see http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 3 August 2005. 
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bribes. 
Second, the three municipalities also counselled officials to make them execute 
their duties in accordance with the law. Zhang Huilai, the Secretary of the Qingdao 
municipal Committee of the CCP, indicated that the government should work harder 
to make sure that the leading cadres were clean, honest and self-disciplined, and to 
ensure that major corruption cases were investigated and dealt with effectively.91 At 
the same time, the Jinan government also focused on improving the officials’ 
capabilities in accordance with the law. It required carrying out the “Regulations on 
the Responsibility System for Enforcement of Laws” (Jinanshi zhifa zerenzhi tiaoli) 
to stop overlapping jurisdiction and unfair practices in law enforcement.92 In addition, 
the Linyi government also issued a set of documents to enhance anti-corruption work, 
such as the “Regulations on Strictly Forbidding Using Government’s Cars by Leading 
Cadres”, the “Regulations on Strictly Carrying out Party Discipline” and the “Notice 
on Strictly Controlling Junket of Cadres Abroad or in China.”93 
To effectively curb corruption, the three governments initiated the probity talk 
(lianzheng tanhua) to improve the anti-corruption act.94 The probity talk means that 
the standing committee members of the Commission for Discipline and Inspection 
and the standing committee members of the CCP committee in government bureaus 
                                                        
91 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 345. 
92 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2000 [Jinan Yearbook 2000], (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 2000), p. 4. 
93 “Linyishi dangfeng lianzheng jianshe qude xin chengguo” [Linyi Government Achieved New Results of 
Anti-Corruption Work], see http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 19 August 2005. 
94 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002], p. 
345; Bao, “2003 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Jinan Government Work Report of 2003], p. 11; and Linyi Municipal 
Government, “Guanyu tigao xingzheng xiaolü youhua fazhan huanjing de yijian” [Suggestions on Enhancing 
Government Efficiency and Improving Development Environment], see http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, 
accessed on 11 May 2005. 
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are responsible for carrying out regular talks with the leading cadres at the division 
level (keji) or above. This measure aims to advise leading cadres to obey conduct 
codes and discipline of government leaders, to change their working styles to focus on 
public service, to honestly perform their duties and to avoid corruption. 
More specifically, unlike many leaders in Qingdao and Jinan cities, Qiao 
Yanchun95, the Secretary of the Linyi Municipal Committee of the CCP, and Li Qun, 
the Mayor of Linyi municipality, signed the probity responsibility guarantee 
(lianzheng zeren shu) with 12 leading cadres of county and district governments and 
32 leading cadres of the anti-corruption departments.96 These cadres also signed the 
probity responsibility guarantee with their subordinates. Based on these probity 
responsibility guarantees, the leading cadres at each level must take action to 
effectively curb corruption. If there is any ineffective implementation, they will be 
responsible for their dereliction of duty. Thus, leading cadres at each level of the 
government are responsible for the effective implementation in curbing corruption. 
   In addition on 31 August 2004, the new secretary of the Linyi Municipal 
Committee of the CCP, Li Qun and the new Mayor of Linyi Municipality, Lian 
Chengmin both made public promises to be honest and self-disciplined.97 They set a 
good example for Linyi government officials. The reason why the Linyi government 
implemented the probity responsibility guarantee was that the new local leaders of 
                                                        
95 In April 2003, Qiao Yanchun was appointed as the vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) of Shandong province. 
96 “Linyishi lianzheng jianshe shishi ‘wuxiangzhidu’ jian shixiao” [Linyi Government Carried out Five Systems 
for Anti-corruption], see http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 3 August 2005. 
97 See “Li Qun tongzhi guanyu lianjie zilü de yijian” [Suggestions on Being Honest and Self-disciplined of Li Qun] 
and “Lian Chengmin tongzhi guanyu lianjie zilü de gongkai chengnuo” [Promises of Being Honest and 
Self-disciplined of Lian Chengmin], see http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 31 August 2005. 
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Linyi city, such as Li Qun and Lian Chengmin, were good at learning overseas 
experiences in administration and had stronger determination and commitment for 
anti-corruption. 
   However, after implementing these mechanisms for curbing corruption, the results 
are not optimistic. Not only did the amount of money involved in corruption increased, 
the number of officials with higher ranking who were investigated and prosecuted for 
corruption also increased from 1994 to 2003 in the three municipalities. As Huang 
identified, the “Chinese characteristics” of corruption in recent years had shown that 
the amount of bribery money increased from thousands of RMB in the 1980s to 
millions of RMB in the 1990s. The number of high-level cadres involved in 
corruption also increased in China. Moreover, very large organized groups were 
involved in corruption or “collective corruption” and corruption of power was 
expanding to become “professional” corruption.98  
In the three municipalities, the amount of money involved in corruption increased 
to a great extent. For instance, in 2003, the director of the Finance Bureau of 
Tancheng county in Linyi city was prosecuted for embezzlement and bribery of RMB 
4.4 million, which was the most serious corruption case in Shandong province in that 
year.99 In a recent case, an assistant to the Mayor of Qingdao city was sentenced to 
death in 2005 for bribery of RMB 5 million in the process of helping bribers to obtain 
                                                        
98 Huang Weiding, “Fighting Corruption Amidst Economic Reform,” in Laurence J. Brahm (ed.), China’s Century: 
The Awakening of the Next Economic Powerhouse (Singapore: John Wiley and Sons (Asia), 2001), pp. 39-41. 
99 Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2004 [Linyi Yearbook 2004], p. 76. 
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approval in using state-owned land.100 
Moreover, the number of senior officials involved in corruption had also increased 
during the past 10 years. For instance, officials with county/department rank or above 
who had received disciplinary and administrative penalties in the Jinan government 
increased from 156 persons in 1994-1998 to 302 persons in 1999-2003. Similarly, the 
same trend can be found in Qingdao and Linyi cities (see appendix 24). This 
demonstrated that corruption had reached the senior officials in the three 
municipalities, which confirms Lü’s finding that “officials found guilty of corruption 
come from higher and higher ranks” in China.101 
Why would a number of senior officials in the three municipalities engage in 
corruption? This may resonate with Yan Sun’s views on the causes of corruption 
across localities in China in her book Corruption and Market in Contemporary China. 
Sun has identified three regional models of corruption. The first is the bottom-up 
model, which is suitable for explaining corruption in the more developed and coastal 
areas such as Qingdao city, where “societal and market forces are strong even while 
the central state may not be particularly weak or distant.” In these places, “the vibrant 
activities of societal groups can engulf local officials, or alternatively, offer enticing 
inducements for the latter.”102 According to Sun, there are two main factors which 
influence local officials to take bribes in developed areas. The first factor is the strong 
societal initiatives in these places, where “commercial and developmental 
                                                        
100 Beijing qingnianbao [Beijing Youth Daily], “Shouhui 496 wanyuan Qingdao yuan shizhang zhuli yishen 
beipan sihuan” [The Assistant to the Mayor of Qingdao City was Sentenced to Suspended Death for Bribery of 
RMB 4.96 Million], 12 January 2005, p. 1.  
101 Lü, Cadres and Corruption, p. 221. 
102 Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China, p. 24. 
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opportunities create intense incentives for business interests to compete for official 
advantages.” 103  The second factor is the rent-seeking pressures on individual 
officials. 
   Qingdao city is the most developed area in Shandong province. It is a 
centrally-planned city (jihua danlie shi) and a sub-provincial city (fushengji chengshi), 
and it has the authority over economic management at the provincial level. These 
privileges made some city officials vulnerable to the temptations of building 
contractors and land buyers. The case of an illegal land sale conducted by Wang Yan 
caused great sensation for a time in China, and is one of the five most notorious cases 
of illegal sale of land in China in recent years. Wang Yan was the former assistant 
Mayor of Qingdao city, the former secretary of the Laoshan district committee of the 
CCP as well as the former director of the Administrative Commission of the Qingdao 
High-Tech Industrial Park. These important positions enabled him to abuse his power 
in approving the use of state-owned land. From 1998 to 2002, he accepted RMB 5 
million for helping bribers to obtain approval in using state-owned land. He was 
sentenced to death in 2005. The other two officials, the former director of the Qingdao 
Urban Planning Bureau, Zhang Zhiguang, and the former director of the Land 
Resource Bureau of Laoshan district, Yu Zhijun, were also involved in this bribery 
scandal. They were respectively sentenced to death and sentenced to 15 years of 
imprisonment in 2005.104  
                                                        
103 Ibid., p. 124. 
104 “Yuan Qingdaoshi shizhangzhuli yishen bei pan sihuan” [The Former Assistant to the Mayor of Qingdao City 
was Sentenced to Suspended Death], see http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-01/11/content_2446412.htm, 
accessed on 2 September 2005. 
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   The other model of corruption across localities in China is the top-bottom 
interactive pattern. This model is suitable for analyzing corruption cases in provincial 
capitals and metropolitan centres such as Beijing and Jinan cities, where “the reach of 
the central state may be close, but the strength of local government and market forces 
can be just as strong.”105 Moreover, as the “local state and market forces are well 
matched, the corrupt activities of officials and societal groups tend to interact with 
and reinforce one another.”106 Jinan municipality is the capital of Shandong province 
and a sub-provincial city (fushengji chengshi). It is also the political and cultural 
centre of Shandong province. As such, the local authority and market force in Jinan 
city created an interactive environment for corruption. 
However, the interaction between government officials and societal groups in 
Jinan city was not as strong as Sun mentioned and the corruption situation was not as 
serious as the corruption cases in Beijing and Shenyang cities, the capital city of 
Liaoning province, as mentioned by Sun. Nevertheless, corruption at the department 
level existed in Jinan city. The most infamous case was the group embezzlement and 
bribery that happened in the Office of Academic Affairs of the Jinan Education 
Commission and the Jinan Press and Publishing House. Since 1997, both agencies 
jointly issued and published tuition materials for primary and secondary students. The 
Jinan Press and Publishing House paid not only the author’s remuneration to the 
Office of Academic Affairs, but also extra “expenditure for activities” (huodong 
jingfei) of a total RMB 1,240,000, by forging invoices to claim value-added tax (xukai 
                                                        
105 Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China, pp. 126-127. 
106 Ibid. , p. 126. 
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zengshishui fapiao). Several officials in the Jinan Education Commission used these 
funds and established a hidden cash reserve (xiao jin ku) for embezzlement. Song 
Lexing, the former dean of the Office of Academic Affairs of the Jinan Education 
Commission, stashed away RMB 49,900. Guo Huanqin, the former accountant of the 
Office of Academic Affairs stashed away RMB 95,900.107 The embezzlement list also 
included Liu Yuhua, the former deputy director of the Jinan Education Commission, 
Yu Jianzhong and Cao Shifeng, the former deputy deans of the Office of Academic 
Affairs of the Jinan Education Commission.108 
In addition, Luo Lie, the former director of the Jinan Press and Publishing House, 
and Liu Chonggang, the former deputy director of the Jinan Publishing House forged 
accounting records (wefan caijing jilu) and invoices for value-added tax to pay the 
“expenditure for activities” (huodong jingfei) to the Jinan Education Commission. 
Seven CCP members were prosecuted. Four officials among the seven were at the 
di-ting-ju (bureau) rank, two were at the xian-chu (county/department) rank and one 
was at the xiang-ke (town/section) rank.109 
The third model is the top-down model, which is more applicable to the less 
developed and more geographically remote counties, cities, or provinces.110 In these 
places, “the strength of the state and market opportunities are both meager” and 
“corruption starts from the top with ripple effects down the chain of the administrative 
                                                        
107 According to article 383 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, citizens who have engaged in 
graft with an amount of more than RMB 50,000 but less than RMB 100,000 are to be sentenced to more than 5 
years of fixed-term imprisonment and may, in addition, have their properties confiscated. In especially serious 
cases, those offenders are to be sentenced to life imprisonment and, in addition, have their properties confiscated. 
108 Dazhong ribao [Dazhong Daily], “Jinanshijiaowei jiaoxue yanjiushi tanwu shouhui woan chachu jishi” [The 
Case of Group Corruption in the Office of Academic Affairs of the Jinan Education Commission], 2 November 
2000, p. A2. 
109 Ibid. , p. A2. 
110 Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China, pp. 24-25. 
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command.”111 According to Sun, most of the corruption practices in these regions are 
“office-for-sale,” and related more “to the lack of alternative opportunities for 
profiteering.”112 Linyi city is an inland and relatively poor city in Shandong province 
and there are few large enterprises or companies to provide citizens with job 
opportunities. In this case, government positions are the best choice for the population. 
However, even if one works for the government, the salary is still relatively low 
compared with that in Qingdao and Jinan cities. The government’s salary level in 
Qingdao city is the highest at RMB 22,663 per person per year; following by Jinan 
city which is RMB 18,535 per person per year, and the lowest salary is RMB 11,005 
in the Linyi government in 2002.113 Therefore, officials in poor areas are more likely 
to accept money illegally. For them, corruption and bribery constitute an important 
source of income. The difference between this model and the bottom-up model is that 
local officials in Linyi city rely on the public coffer as the key source of extra income 
rather than the business sector like the Qingdao officials.114 
Although Linyi city is a less developed city, it is not geographically remote since 
it is situated in Shandong, the eastern coastal province in China. Therefore, its 
economic situation is better than other geographically remote cities in China. In this 
case, the situation of sale and purchase of positions in Linyi city is not as widespread 
as in other less developed and more geographically remote counties and cities 
                                                        
111 Ibid. , pp. 24-25. 
112 Ibid. , pp. 24-25. 
113 See Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Statistical Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2003), pp. 51-54; Jinan Statistical Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 2003 [Jinan 
Statistical Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2003), p. 108; and Linyi Local Chronicles 
Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2003], p. 45. 
114 Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China, p. 125. 
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reported by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the 
Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee, such as Cao Yongbao, the 
former deputy secretary of the Liangshan Municipal Committee of the CCP in 
Southwest China’s Sichuan Province and Zhang Gaiping, the member of the Standing 
Committee of the Shangluo Municipal Committee of the CCP in the province of 
Shaanxi.115  
The best known case in Linyi city involved Shi Yuting, the former deputy 
chairman of the National People’s Congress and the former head of the Finance 
Bureau of Tancheng County. He was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment for 
receiving the highest amount of bribery in Shandong province in 2003. Shi had 
accepted RMB 4.4 million and helped bribers to acquire loans and promotions 
through illegal channels. Shi’s case also exposed 40 subordinates in Tancheng County 
who engaged in bribery. Among them, 11 persons were at the xiang-ke (town/section) 
rank or above.116  
There were three other important cases in Linyi city: (1) the former deputy chief 
of Mengyin county, Yuan Fengjian, was convicted for bribery, which was the biggest 
bribery case in Linyi city until 2001; (2) the former deputy chief of Pingyi county, 
Gao Weiping, was convicted for bribery in 2000; and (3) the former president of the 
People’s Court in Yishui County, Wang Zhaojian, was convicted for bribery in 
2003.117  
                                                        
115 “The CCP Officials Punished for Selling and Buying Government’s Positions,” see 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-07/20/content_644978.htm, accessed on 20 July 2006. 
116 Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2004 [Linyi Yearbook 2004], p. 76. 
117 See Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2001 [Linyi Yearbook 2001] (Hong Kong: 




Civil service reform in the three municipalities has focused more on recruitment, 
selection, appraisal, rewards and punishment, training, improving accountability and 
anti-corruption efforts during the past 10 years. Replacing the old labour system with 
open recruitment examination and promotion has improved the capacity of officials. 
Yet, the phenomenon of recruitment and promotion of officials through guanxi 
(personal connections) still exists. To make things worse, the sale and purchase of 
official positions has become more serious in recent years, and erodes the principle of 
cadre selection with open and fair competition.  
Moreover, the capability-based performance appraisal system focuses on 
economic performance rather than performance in public service. This has resulted in 
an improper competition among the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments. Only the 
Qingdao government has incorporated the new criteria of public service and citizen 
evaluation in appraising local officials.  
Based on the results of performance appraisal, the reward and punishment system 
is implemented. Increased bonuses and rewards are the main incentives for civil 
servants. Nevertheless, because of a certain level of financial constraints, these 
incentive measures in Linyi city are difficult to push through. On the other hand, the 
dismissal system has brought about a situation where government officials cannot be 
demoted or dismissed uniformly. The majority of the dismissed personnel are junior 
officials instead of senior officials. Therefore, external evaluation should be 
                                                                                                                                                              
[Linyi Yearbook 2002], p. 82; and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2004 [Linyi 
Yearbook 2004], p. 76. 
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implemented to complement this system. In this regard, the Qingdao government has 
performed better than the Jinan and Linyi governments since it is the only city in 
Shandong province to carry out the process of external evaluation. In addition, 
training programmes are implemented to improve the quality of civil servants in 
learning knowledge of market economy and administrative skills. 
The economic transition has created much potential for officials to be involved in 
business. Government officials tend to seek profits for themselves and neglect their 
bureaucratic accountability. The system of performance pledges for public service has 
programmed the work procedure, service standards, working time limit, working 
discipline and complaint channel for the public. Yet, the insufficient level of 
government transparency and public participation has undermined effectiveness in 
implementing this system. 
The implementation of the accountability assurance system has limited the 
bureaucratic or illegal behaviour of officials. Obviously, this system is not 
institutionalized and the culture of guanxi (personal connections), renqing (personal 
favour) and mianzi (face) in China has also hindered government agencies from 
implementing this system.  
To combat corruption, several mechanisms have been adopted to create supportive 
conditions for government integrity including the implementation of an auditing 
system to check the economic responsibility of leading cadres and the training and 
counselling of officials to execute their duties in accordance with the law. However, 
the results of these mechanisms are not optimistic. The reason why a number of senior 
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officials in Qingdao city are engaged in corruption is that societal and market forces 
are strong there and the vibrant activities of societal groups can engulf local officials, 
or offer enticing inducements for them. Similarly, in Jinan city, the corruption cases 
mainly occur in situations where the local state and market forces are both strong and 
the corrupt officials and social groups interact with and reinforce one another. The 
Linyi government has also faced the serious situation of corruption because of the 
poor economic conditions in Linyi city. 
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CHAPTER SIX 





The previous chapters have analyzed the policy context and problems of local 
government (Chapter 3) and the contents of reform in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi cities 
(Chapter 4 and 5). Since we have not yet examined the effectiveness of local 
government reform, this chapter aims to evaluate the overall effectiveness of local 
government reform in the three municipalities. The purpose of this chapter is to 
evaluate the extent to which the three municipalities have attained their goals in the 
process of their reform.  
To evaluate the effectiveness of local government reform in the three 
municipalities, this chapter employs the indicator systems used by some organizations 
such as the World Bank and International Institute for Management Development 
(IMD) and scholars such as Burns and Porta et al. First, this chapter chooses 10 
indicators to evaluate the goal of achieving an efficient government. In the evaluation, 
I argue that the Qingdao government is the most efficient government among the three, 
followed by the Jinan government which is more efficient than the Linyi government. 
Second, this chapter uses 11 indicators to assess the goal of achieving a 
service-oriented government. The Qingdao and Jinan governments are both first in the 
areas of education, health care and social security, while the Linyi government is third 
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in all three areas. Third, in terms of achieving a transparent government, this chapter 
employs five indicators to evaluate the effectiveness of local government reform in 
the three municipalities. In this case, the Qingdao government has performed the best 
in all five aspects of transparent government; and the Jinan government has performed 
better than the Linyi government. Fourth, in terms of achieving a clean government, 
this chapter uses 12 indicators to assess the effectiveness of local government reform 
in the three municipalities. The Qingdao government has performed the best in this 
regard, followed by the Jinan government was second and the Linyi government. 
 
Indicators of Effectiveness of Local Government Reform 
 
As discussed in the literature review, according to Price, effectiveness can be defined 
as the degree of goal attainment. In this case, the evaluation of effectiveness of reform 
is based on the evaluation of the degree to which the goals of local government 
reform are achieved. The objectives identified by the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
governments are the important indicators for assessing local government reform in the 
three municipalities. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there are four main reform objectives, 
viz.: efficient government, service-oriented government, transparent government and 
clean government. This chapter will assess the effectiveness of administrative reform 
based on these four objectives.  
In addition, this chapter will select the relevant indicators from the indicators used 
by the World Bank, the IMD, Porta et al., and the Ministry of Personnel of China. 
Apart from these indicators, this chapter also utilizes some indicators from the 
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), and scholars such as Burns as these indicators can be used 
as important criteria for evaluating government reform in China. 
This chapter will focus on administrative reform during 1994 to 1998 and 1999 to 
2003, with special emphasis on the latter as it is the period for the most 




The goal of establishing an efficient government includes two objectives. The first 
objective is to streamline government by removing redundant government officials, 
reducing excessive administrative expenditure through administrative approval reform 
and rationalizing government functions through the curtailing of micro-economic 
functions of the government. The second objective is to improve the quality of civil 
servants.  
First, for streamlining local government, the “new yardstick for rating local 
governments” drawn up by the Ministry of Personnel of China utilizes the “proportion 
of government officials of the total population” and the “percentage of administrative 
expense of the total financial expenditure” as the indicators to evaluate local 
administrative efficiency.2 Similarly, when evaluating the quality of government, 
Porta et al. also use the indicator of “public sector employment as a percentage of 
                                                        
1 Liu Zhifeng, Diqici geming: 1998-2003 zhongguo zhengfu jigougaige wenti baogao [The Seventh Revolution: 
1998-2003 Report on the Problems of Chinese Government Organizational Reform] (Beijing: China Social 
Sciences Press, 2003), p. 1. 
2 See Chua Chin Hon, “China Draws up New Yardstick for Rating Local Governments,” Straits Times, 3 August 
2004, p. A2 and Liu Shixin, “Zhongguo zhengfu jixiaopinggu tixi mianshi” [The Appearance of a New System of 
Appraising Local Government in China], Zhongguo qingnianbao [China Youth Daily], 2 August 2004, p. A1. 
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population” and “government consumption as a percentage of GDP” to measure the 
size of the public sector in a country.3 Therefore, this chapter will utilize the 
“proportion of government officials of the total population” and the “percentage of 
administrative expense of the total financial expenditure” as the indicators for 
assessing whether local government reform has resulted in enhanced efficiency. 
In this regard, table 13 shows that the proportion of government officials of the 
total population of the three cities has increased from 1994-1998 to 1999-2003. This 
finding indicates that all three municipalities have failed to achieve the goal of 
downsizing government through removing the redundant government officials. 
Moreover, the percentage of administrative expense of the total local government 
expenditure also increased after the reform in Qingdao and Jinan municipalities. 
Although the percentage in Linyi city decreased from 14.02% (1994-1998) to 12.32% 
(1999-2003), these two percentages are still the highest among the three 
municipalities. This means that the Qingdao and Jinan governments, especially the 
Qingdao government, are more efficient than the Linyi government since the 
percentage of administrative expense of the total local government expenditure is 





                                                        
3 Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998), p. 
22 and appendix table 1. 
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Table 13: Indicators for the Goal of Efficient Government in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
Municipalities 
Qingdao Jinan Linyi Indicatorsa 
1994-1998 1999-2003 1994-1998 1999-2003 1994-1998 1999-2003 
Average Proportion of 
Officials of Total Population 
0.85% 0.91% 1.17% 1.28% 0.62% 0.73% 
Average Percentage of 
Administrative Expense of 
Total Local Government 
Expenditure 
7.88% 9.43% 8.21% 9.50% 14.02% 12.32% 
Curtailing Micro-economic 













Number of Items of 
Administrative Approval 
1,263 371 1,113 385 1,088 459 
Simplifying the Procedure 






Increasing the Educational 




























Appraisal System Based on 
Public Service 
No Yes No No No No 
Motivating Officials 
through Increasing Salary 















No Improved No Improved 
a Since this thesis compares the effectiveness of reform during two periods: 1994-1998 and 1999-2003, 
the data calculated will be averaged in each period. For details of the calculation of these indicators, see 
Appendices 8-10. 
 
Second, for curtailing the micro-economic functions of government, the three 
municipalities gradually changed the functions of government to suit the needs of a 
market economy, as mentioned in Chapter 4. Local government functions now focus 
on economic regulation and market supervision by removing the functions of 
enterprise management from the local government and transferring them over to 
enterprises and replacing some government agencies with associations or councils. 
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Third, the reduced overlapping administrative approval items and simplified 
administrative procedures reflect the changing level of efficiency in local government. 
This is consistent with the indicator of “bureaucratic delays (red tape)” designed by 
Porta et al., which is employed to evaluate the efficiency of government.4 According 
to them, low ratings indicate low levels of red tape in the bureaucracy of the country.5 
The IMD has employed an indicator to assess state efficiency by determining whether 
bureaucracy hinders business development or not.6  Fewer items of administrative 
approval and simplified administrative procedure often indicate a higher level of 
government efficiency. 
Table 13 shows that after the administrative approval reform, the number of 
administrative approval items in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments has been 
reduced. The Qingdao government has reduced the most items (from 1,263 items to 
371 items), while the Linyi government has reduced the least. Moreover, the Qingdao 
and Jinan governments have rationalized administrative procedures since they set up 
one-stop shops, which are established to enhance efficiency and customer satisfaction. 
Therefore, the Qingdao government is the most efficient in this regard; the Jinan 
government is ranked second; and the Linyi government is ranked third. This ranking 
can be attributed to the fact that foreign investors prefer to establish factories in 
Qingdao city. 
Apart from the above mentioned aspects, the second objective of enhancing 
                                                        
4 Porta et al., The Quality of Government, p. 22 and appendix table 1. 
5 Ibid. , p. 22 and appendix table 1. 
6  IMD, The World Competitiveness Yearbook 1999 (Lausanne: International Institute for Management 
Development, 1999), p. 408. 
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government efficiency is to improve the quality of civil servants through civil service 
reform. Thus, whether civil service reform in the local government is efficient and 
effective can be used as a criterion for evaluating government efficiency. Burns has 
examined the efficiency and effectiveness of civil service reform in China in instilling 
competition in personnel selection, increasing the educational level of the cadre corps, 
encouraging officials to retire and motivating officials through increasing salary and 
rewards based on performance.7 These aspects are also consistent with the objectives 
of civil service reform in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments. Therefore, the 
changing level of efficiency of civil servant groups could be evaluated by ascertaining 
whether the local government carries out competition in personnel selection, increases 
the educational level of the cadre corps, establishes a dismissal and resignation system, 
encourages officials to retire and motivates officials through increased salary and 
rewards based on their performance. In addition, the level of efficiency of civil 
servant is also evaluated by whether the government operates its performance 
appraisal system based on public service performance or their economic 
performance.8 
From 1994-1998 to 1999-2003, the educational level of the cadre corps has 
increased since the three municipalities recruited more well-educated civil servants 
through the open recruitment examination. The percentage of officials with university 
or community college degrees of the total number of civil servants all increased in the 
                                                        
7 John P. Burns, “Governance and Civil Service Reform”, in Jude Howell (ed.), Governance in China (Lanham: 
Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), pp. 51-53. 
8 John P. Burns, “Civil Service Reform in China,” in Governance in China (Paris: Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2005), p. 65. 
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three municipalities. Among them, this percentage in Jinan city is the highest, from 
28% in 1998 to 42% in 2002.9 The percentage in Qingdao city has increased from 
27% to 40%.10 The percentage in Linyi city has also increased from 20% in 1998 to 
31% in 2003.11 
   Moreover, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments have carried out 
competition in nominating cadres, which has been institutionalized since the 1999 
reform. Conducting competition in the process of promotion has improved its 
transparency. In addition, among the three municipalities, only the Qingdao 
government operates a performance appraisal system for officials on the basis of 
public service performance after 1999. Whereas the Jinan and Linyi governments still 
operate the evaluation system by concentrating on economic performance (See Table 
13). 
The three municipalities have also endeavoured to improve the motivational 
system since 1999. Understandably, the bonuses and increments for officials are 
higher in the Qingdao and Jinan governments and lower in the Linyi government as 
the latter lacks the same kind of financial support from the central government. 
Qingdao city was the first city in Shandong province and one of the earliest cities in 
China to issue the “Provisional Regulations on Dismissal and Resignation of 
Government Officials” in 1993. This document has changed the original situation in 
the local government of China where government officials could only be promoted 
                                                        
9 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 2003), p. 95. 
10 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Yearbook 2003] 
(Qingdao: Qingdao shizhi bangongshi, 2003), p. 76. 
11 Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 2003), p. 68. 
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and not be reduced to a lower rank or dismissed. In 2002, the Jinan and Linyi 
governments implemented the dismissal and resignation system and eliminated those 
civil servants who were not qualified according to the criteria of the annual 
performance appraisal. 
Therefore, based on these indicators, the Qingdao government is the most efficient 
government among the three; while the Jinan government is more efficient than the 
Linyi government. All three governments have improved government functions by 
curtailing the micro-economic functions of government and simplifying 
administrative procedures through the administrative approval reform. However, they 
have not achieved the goal of downsizing government. 
Regarding personnel management, the three municipalities have improved the 
quality of civil servants by recruiting well-educated officials and instilling 
competition in promoting government officials. Although the three municipalities 
have administered performance appraisal systems and motivation and dismissal 





The second goal of constructing a service-oriented government is to reform 
government functions and deliver better services to citizens in terms of education, 
health and social welfare. The goal is to change the government’s role to be 
service-oriented, which seems to meet the new trend of the new public service theory 
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and administrative practices worldwide. Robert and Janet Denhardt argued that 
 
New ways of steering society will require us to consider new standards of 
assessing administrative performance, including not only the traditional legal and 
political standards we associate with the Old Public Administration, but also 
market and economic criteria associated with the New Public Management, and 
democratic and social criteria associated with the New Public Service.12 
 
They further indicated that “the most important criteria for assessing administrative 
performance would be to ask how effectively our work has advanced the public 
interest.”13  
The indicators utilized by the World Bank, IMD and Porta et al. include many 
indicators for assessing government performance in delivering public services and 
goods. These indicators can be generally divided into three categories, namely 
education, health and social security. 
 
Education 
In evaluating government functions in terms of education development, the World 
Bank uses three indicators of the “percentage of public expenditure on education of 
total government expenditure,” the “secondary net enrolment ratio” and the “tertiary 
gross enrolment ratio.”14 Likewise, the IMD also utilizes the “public expenditure on 
education per capita,” the “secondary enrolment ratio” and the “tertiary net enrolment 
ratio” as the indicators for evaluating government competitiveness in the area of 
educational structures.15 Similarly, when evaluating the quality of government, Porta 
                                                        
12 Robert B. Denhardt and Janet V. Denhardt, “The New Public Service: An Approach to Reform,” International 
Review of Public Administration, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2003), p. 9. 
13 Ibid. , p. 9. 
14 World Bank, 2003 World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C. : World Bank, 2003), pp. 72, 76, 80, 88. 
15 IMD, The World Competitiveness Yearbook 1999, pp. 499, 502. 
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et al. also utilize the “rate of school attainment” as an indicator for assessing public 
goods provision in education.16 According to the World Bank, IMD and Porta et al., a 
government with a higher percentage of public expenditure on education, a higher 
ratio of secondary net enrolment and a higher ratio of tertiary gross enrolment may 
provide good public services and goods in education.17 
Since these indicators are designed for evaluating the educational development of 
a country, some indicators should be adapted for evaluating local government. The 
“percentage of public expenditure on education of total government expenditure” is 
changed to “percentage of public expenditure on education of total local government 
expenditure.” The other two indicators: “secondary net enrolment ratio” and “tertiary 
gross enrolment ratio” also should be revised to “student enrolment of secondary 
education per 10,000 persons” and “student enrolment of tertiary education per 
10,000 persons”18 based on the data provided by local statistical yearbooks. 
For the first indicator, only the percentage of public expenditure on education of 
the total government expenditure in Qingdao city has increased from 12.84 percent to 
15.92 percent after the reform. However, this percentage in Jinan and Linyi cities has 
both declined (See Table 14). This suggests that the Qingdao government has not only 
                                                        
16 The public goods provision was utilized to evaluate government functions in public service, which included 
four indicators: the rate of infant mortality (higher value means worse performance), rate of school attainment 
(higher values refers to better performance), illiteracy rate (higher value means worse performance) and 
infrastructure quality assessing the facilities for and ease of communication between headquarters and the 
operation, and within the country as well as the quality of the transportation. For more details, see Porta et al., The 
Quality of Government, pp. 2, 22. 
17 See World Bank, 2003 World Development Indicators, pp. 75, 79, 83, 91; IMD, The World Competitiveness 
Yearbook 1999, pp. 499, 502; and Porta et al., The Quality of Government, pp. 23-24. 
18 According to the World Bank, secondary education refers to “completes the provision of basic education that 
began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human development, by 
offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more specialized teachers; tertiary education means that 
“whether or not leading to an advanced research qualification, normally requires, as a minimum condition of 
admission, the successful completion of education at the secondary level. For details, refer to World Bank, 2003 
World Development Indicators, p. 83. 
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added investment in education but has also increased the percentage of education 
expenditure to enhance government services in education. The Jinan and Linyi 
governments, on the other hand, have reduced this percentage although they have 
increased investment in education every year. This reflects the situation whereby 
through the privatization of education, the local government has reduced its 
investment in compulsory education which in turn has forced individuals to bear more 
financial burden for their own education. This result indicates that this reform of 
education has not been particularly successful. 
It seems that the Qingdao government has invested the most money in education 
among the three municipalities after the reform. This is partly because the Qingdao 
government has more local revenue than the Jinan and Linyi governments. Qingdao 
city is the business centre of Shandong province and the revenue generated is much 
higher than the revenue generated in Jinan and Linyi cities. Such strong financial 
capabilities have assisted the Qingdao government in improving public services. This 
may be an important reason why the Jinan and Linyi governments, especially the 
Linyi government, have lagged behind the Qingdao government in investing in 
education and city infrastructure. 
In comparing other cities in China, the percentage of public expenditure on 
education of the total government expenditure was 13.6% in Beijing, 13.8% in 
Shanghai and 10.5% in Guangzhou in 2000. Therefore, the Qingdao and Jinan 
governments have performed better because their percentages exceeded 13.80% in 
2000.  
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Although the percentage of public expenditure on education of total government 
expenditure in Linyi city is the highest among these three municipalities, it does not 
mean that the Linyi government has done very well in providing public service in 
terms of education. Since Linyi city is a relatively poor city with a very large rural 
area, most of the compulsory education institutions are located in rural areas, which 
are financed by the township governments. However, the township governments lack 
enough funds to invest in compulsory education so they usually collect the 
unauthorized fees, taxes and even fines from the farmers to invest in education.19 
Thus, most of the expenditure on education is unfairly afforded by the farmers of 
Linyi city. The proportion of unauthorized fees even constitutes 60 percent of the 
public expenditure on education in Linyi city.20 Compared with Linyi city, Qingdao 
and Jinan cities have larger urban areas in which the compulsory education 
institutions are financed by municipal governments, which have more funds than 
township governments. In this case, the public expenditure on education is mainly 
afforded by government instead of the individuals like Linyi’s farmers. In this case, 
the educational investment in Linyi city has become a serious issue. Although the 
central government has also provided special funds for developing education in 
poorer areas like Linyi city, the insufficient educational investment provided by the 
local government, especially in counties and towns, has resulted in serious 
consequences in recent years.21  
 
                                                        
19 Zhu Mingxi, “Nongcun yiwu jiaoyu daodi you shui lai maidan?” [Who will Pay the Bill for Compulsory 
Education in Rural Area?], Caijing kexue [Finance and Economics], Vol. 5 (2005), pp. 176-181. 
20 Interview with the Official of Linyi Education Bureau, 30 June 2005. 
21 Interview with the Secretary of the Party Committee of Linyi Education Bureau, 30 June 2005. 
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Table 14: Educational Indicators for the Goal of Service-oriented Government in 
Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Municipalities 













Percentage of public 
expenditure on education 
of total government 
expenditure 
12.84% 15.92% 16.38% 13.83% 24.23% 23.58% 
Number of student 
enrolment of secondary 
education per 10,000 
persons 
650.8 747.8  643 728.8 573.4 
 
768.5  
Number of student 
enrolment of tertiary 
education per 10,000 
persons 
38.5 109 107.8 345.6 8.2 14.7 
a For details of the calculation of these indicators, see Appendices 11-12. 
 
Second, table 14 shows that the average number of secondary students enrolled 
per 10,000 persons in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi cities has increased from the period of 
1994-1998 to 1999-2003. This suggests that the privatization of secondary schools in 
the three cities has provided more opportunities for students to receive secondary 
education. 
Third, the average number of tertiary students enrolled per 10,000 persons in the 
three municipalities has increased from 1994-1998 to 1999-2003. As in the case for 
secondary education, this is the result of the privatization of universities, which has 
lowered the admission criteria and provided more opportunities for students to receive 
higher education. Among the three municipalities, the average number of tertiary 
students enrolled per 10,000 persons in Jinan city is the highest, 107.8 persons in 
1994-1998 and 345.6 persons in 1999-2003. In contrast, the number in Linyi city is 
the smallest among the three cities, 8.2 persons in 1994-1998 and 14.7 persons in 
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1999-2003, which is well behind the average number of 53 persons in China in 1999 
(See Table 14).22 
Thus, the Jinan government has exceeded the Qingdao and Linyi governments in 
increasing the enrolment rate in higher education. We may find a link between Jinan’s 
success and its status. Jinan municipality has the advantages of performing the best in 
education as the political and cultural centre of Shandong province. Presently there 
are 70 full-time universities and colleges in Jinan city whereas Linyi city has only two 
universities.23 Thus, it is not surprising why the Jinan government has performed the 
best and the Linyi government has performed the worst in providing higher education. 
Qingdao city is ranked second among the three. Even though the Qingdao government 
has paid more attention to the building of universities and to attracting 
well-established professors in recent years, it still cannot catch up with the standard of 
higher education in Jinan city. 
In comparison, the Qingdao government has performed better in investing in 
public education while the Jinan government has performed better in increasing 
enrolment in higher education. The Linyi government is ranked third on both respects 
and it should further increase investment in public education as a percentage of total 
local government expenditure. 
 
Health 
The second aspect—health—is also an important indicator. Porta et al. have employed 
                                                        
22 Du Lianyi, “Qiang zhi xu xian gu ben” [Strengthening the Education First], Zhongguo gaigebao [China Reform 
News], 10 August 2000, p. 1. 
23 See Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003], p. 371 and 
Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2003], p. 242. 
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“infant mortality” as an indicator for evaluating the quality of government service in 
the provision of public goods. They state that low infant mortality is an indicator 
which can show that a government has provided better public goods.24  
Multiple indicators are employed by the World Bank for evaluating the health 
situation in a country. These indicators include the “infant mortality rate,” the 
“percentage of public expenditure on health in GDP,” the “number of physicians per 
1,000 people,” the “number of hospital beds per 1,000 people,” the “percentage of 
access to an improved water source in population” and the “percentage of access to 
improved sanitation facilities in population.”25 According to the World Bank, lower 
infant mortality, a higher percentage of public expenditure on health in GDP, more 
physicians and hospital beds per 1,000 people, and a higher percentage of access to an 
improved water source and sanitation facilities indicate that a government provides 
better services in public health.26 In the case of local government, the indicator of 
“percentage of public expenditure on health in GDP” should be revised to the 
“percentage of public expenditure on health of total local government expenditure.” 
Given the situation that the data for people’s accessibility to improved sanitation 
facilities cannot be found in local statistical books and other public documents, this 
chapter relies on five indicators, namely the percentage of public expenditure on 
health of total local government expenditure, number of physicians per 1,000 people, 
number of hospital beds per 1,000 people, infant mortality rate and the percentage of 
people with access to an improved water source.  
                                                        
24 Porta et al., The Quality of Government, pp. 23-24. 
25 World Bank, 2003 World Development Indicators, pp. 62, 72, 92, 96. 
26 Ibid., pp. 63, 75, 95, 99. 
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Table 15 shows that in terms of the average percentage of public expenditure on 
health, only the Qingdao government has increased this percentage marginally from 
4.14 percent (1994-1998) to 4.67 percent (1999-2003) while the Jinan and Linyi 
governments have gradually reduced this percentage in the reform period. This 
finding reflects the situation that by introducing a responsibility sharing system in the 
health sector, the government, employers, and employees all make their contribution 
to the employees’ medical insurance. A distribution model has yet to be established to 
determine to what extent employers, employees and the government should share the 
insurance premium. However, the only confirmed fact in this reform is that employees 
are paying the major part of the insurance premium as local government reduces its 
expenditure on health. 
According to the World Bank, a higher percentage of public expenditure on health 
indicates that the government provides better public health services. Evidently, during 
the period from 1999 to 2003, the Jinan government has performed the best because 
the average percentage of public expenditure on health is the highest (4.76 percent) 
(See Table 15). In 2003, the Jinan government has expanded its investment in public 
health up to RMB 485.78 million for a total population of 5,825,600. Thus, the 
financial expenditure on public health per capita is RMB 83.39 in Jinan city, giving it 
the first rank in this respect in Shandong province. In the same year, the financial 
expenditure on public health per capita in Qingdao city is RMB 53.14, making it third 
in Shandong province. In contrast, the financial expenditure on public health per 
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capita in Linyi city is only RMB 22.84, or 10th in rank in Shandong province.27  
After administrative reform, the average percentages of public expenditure on 
health of total local government expenditure in all three municipalities are not very 
high: 4.67% (Qingdao city), 4.76% (Jinan city), and 4.69% (Linyi city). These 
percentages are much lower than the standard of 8.0 percent, the minimum percentage 
of “Health for All” stipulated by the Chinese central government,28 even though the 
average percentage across China in general is only 1.6 percent.29 Therefore, local 
government does not effectively provide sufficient funds in the public health sector. 
The reason could be that the Chinese central government has purposefully reduced 
public health expenditure during recent years to compel citizens to increase their own 
expenditure on health. In China, the percentage of health expenses of citizens of the 














                                                        
27  “Government Expenditure in 17 Municipalities of Shandong Province in 2003,” see 
http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000003245, accessed on 16 February 2006. 
28 Li Junpeng, Gonggong fuwuxing zhengfu [Public Service Oriented Government] (Beijing: Peking University 
Press, 2004), p. 74. 
29  “Quanmian shenshi shouru he shouru chaju wenti” [Judging the Income and Income Gap], see 
http://www.qingdaonews.com/gb/content/2006-01/21/content_5928819.htm, accessed on 21 January 2006. 
30 See Li, Gonggong fuwuxing zhengfu [Public Service Oriented Government], p. 75 and Li Tianshu and Lin 
Zhaohui, “Zhongguo chengshi yigai de qishi” [The Lessons of Medical Reform in Chinese Municipalities], see 
http://moh.haoyisheng.com/narticle2.php?id=507, accessed on 19 January 2006. 
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Table 15: Health Indicators for the Goal of Service-oriented Government in Qingdao, 
Jinan and Linyi Municipalities 













Percentage of Public Expenditure 
on Health of Total Government 
Expenditure 
4.14% 4.67% 5.67% 4.76% 5.85% 4.69% 
Number of Physicians per 1,000 
People 
2.02 2.02 2.82 2.68 0.78 0.90 
Number of Hospital Beds per 
1,000 People 
3.61 3.33 3.82 3.85 1.51 1.69 
Infant Mortality Rate 10.51‰  6.55‰ 14.89‰ 11.76‰ 21.77‰ 15.54‰ 
Percentage of People with Access 
to an Improved Water Source 
99.4% 100% 100% 99.6% 92.48% 97.56% 
a For details of the calculation of these indicators, see Appendices 13-16. 
 
With regard to the second indicator of health, the number of physicians per 1,000 
people, none of the three municipalities experienced an increase in the number of 
physicians in 1999-2003. The number in Qingdao city remained unchanged while that 
in Jinan city declined. This number in Linyi city only increased marginally from 0.78 
physicians to 0.90 physicians (See Table 15). This result reflects the privatization of 
the health sector. The decline of public expenditure on health in the three governments 
has affected the recruitment of physicians in hospitals. Since the reform, hospitals are 
very careful in recruiting new physicians because they are now run as enterprises 
which have to calculate costs and profits. In comparison, the actual number of 
physicians per 1,000 people in Jinan city is the highest after the reform. This outcome 
could also be attributed to Jinan’s capital status as it is able to attract many 
professional medical personnel. 
In addition, among the three municipalities, only the number of physicians per 
1,000 people in Jinan city, which is 2.68 physicians, has exceeded the average number 
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of 1.7 physicians in China from 1995 to 2000.31 The number in Qingdao city is 2.02 
physicians, and 0.90 physicians in Linyi city. In contrast, this number in developed 
countries is higher. For instance, there were on average 3.0 physicians per 1,000 
people in France and 3.9 physicians per 1,000 people in Belgium in 2000.32  
The third indicator is the number of hospital beds per 1,000 people. As in the case 
of physicians, none of the three municipalities have effectively provided more 
hospital beds in the reform period. The number of hospital beds per 1,000 people in 
Jinan and Linyi cities has increased slightly but this number in Qingdao city has 
declined. In comparison, after the reform the actual number of hospital beds per 1,000 
people in Jinan city is the highest, 3.85 beds, and that in Qingdao city is 3.33 beds, 
which is more than that the 1.69 beds of Linyi city. In this regard, the Jinan and 
Qingdao governments have been able to provide more than the average of 2.4 beds in 
China from 1995 to 2002. Putting this number in broader scope, there were on 
average 3.9 beds per 1,000 people in Canada and 7.5 beds per 1,000 people in Finland 
in 2000.33 Therefore, in all three municipalities, especially in Linyi city, further 
improvements are needed in upgrading the facilities of local hospitals to meet the 
demand for hospital beds by the citizens. 
For the fourth indicator, table 15 shows that the infant mortality rates in all three 
municipalities have decreased from 1994 to 2003, which indicates that the Qingdao, 
Jinan and Linyi governments have made great efforts in reducing the infant mortality 
rate and improving the quality of life during the past ten years. Among the three 
                                                        
31 World Bank, 2003 World Development Indicators, p. 92. 
32 Ibid. , p. 92. 
33 Ibid. , p. 92. 
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municipalities, the Qingdao government has performed the best since its infant 
mortality rate is the lowest. It has also experienced a sharp decrease from 10.51‰ 
(1994-1998) to 6.55‰ (1999-2003). The Jinan government is ranked second. 
Although the infant mortality rate in Linyi city has decreased greatly from 21.77‰ 
(1994-1998) to 15.54‰ (1999-2003), this rate is still the highest among the three 
cities. 
For the last indicator, the percentages of people in accessing an improved water 
source in Qingdao and Jinan cities are almost 100 percent, and higher than that of 
Linyi city. However, in this respect, the difference between the urban and rural areas 
is prominent since the public health situation in rural areas in China is still very much 
underdeveloped. In 2003, the percentage of population with access to tap water in 
rural China was only 58.2%.34 In Shandong province, cities such as Qingdao, Zibo 
and Yantai are located in the Jiaodong peninsula where the local economy is more 
developed. The percentage of population with access to tap water in the rural areas in 
these cities all exceeded the average level in China and reached above 60.0%. As for 
cities located in the middle region of Shandong province such as Jinan, Weifang and 
Tai’an, their percentages of population with access to tap water in rural areas have all 
exceeded 40.0%. The most serious situation occurs in the areas in the north and 
southwest part of Shandong, and the mountainous areas of Linyi city, where the 
percentage is only 27.6%.35 These areas are also the developing areas in Shandong 
                                                        
34  “National Development of Health Institutions in 2003,” see 
http://www.moh.gov.cn/public/open.aspx?n_id=7999, accessed on 15 February 2006. 
35  “The Project of Every Village with Access to Tap Water Commenced in Shandong Province,” see 
http://qlwb.dzwww.com/qlwbxw/msxw/t20040729_744802.htm, accessed on 9 February 2006. 
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province. 
Generally speaking, the Jinan government has performed the best in the area of 
investing in public health and this city has the most physicians per 1,000 people and 
hospital beds per 1,000 people among the three municipalities. The Qingdao 
government has performed the best in reducing the infant mortality rate and 
improving people’s access to an improved water source. In general, the Linyi 
government’s performance is the weakest in all these five aspects of public health 
even though it has made more efforts in improving hospital facilities and the quality 
of water supply in recent years. Its poor local economy may have hindered the Linyi 
government’s pace in furthering development in the public health sector. 
All three municipalities need to improve their investment in the public health 
sector and to reduce the burden of health expenses on the citizens. The medical 
insurance system in China should be reformed to provide better public health services 
and goods.  
 
Social Security 
The World Bank uses the “unemployment rate of the total labour force,” the 
“percentage of pension contributors among the labour force” and the “public 
expenditure on pension as a percentage of GDP” as indicators to evaluate world 
development in areas of social security.36 According to the World Bank, a low level 
of unemployment, a greater share of the labour force covered by a social security 
scheme and a higher percentage of public expenditure on pension in GDP, indicates 
                                                        
36 World Bank, 2003 World Development Indicators, pp. 50, 64, 68, 72. 
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that the government provides better services in social security.37  
As the indicator of “public expenditure on pension as a percentage of GDP” is 
used for evaluating the degree of social security at the national level, it is modified to 
the “public expenditure for pensions and relief funds for social welfare as a 
percentage of total local government expenditure.” In addition, the data on pension 
contributors provided by the local government are collected among urban employees. 
In this case, the “percentage of pension contributors among the labour force” is 
changed to the “percentage of pension contributors among total urban employees.” 
Thus, this chapter relies on three indicators, namely, the “public expenditure for 
pensions and relief funds for social welfare as a percentage of total local government 
expenditure,” the “percentage of pension contributors among total urban employees” 
and the “unemployment rate of the total labour force” to assess the local government’s 
performance in social security.  
Table 16 shows that among the three cities, the public expenditure for pensions 
and relief funds for social welfare38 as a percentage of total local government 
expenditure in the Jinan and Qingdao governments has increased marginally from 
2.65% to 2.67% and 2.20% to 2.41% respectively during the reform periods. However, 
this percentage has decreased from 3.47% to 3.44% in the Linyi government (See 
Table 16). In this regard, the public expenditure for pensions and relief funds for 
social welfare as a percentage of total local government expenditure in Jinan city is 
                                                        
37 Ibid. , pp. 53, 71, 75. 
38 Public expenditure for pensions and relief funds included regular pension to the revolutionary disabled, 
subsidies for permanent disability of various kinds, subsidies to the military martyrs’ dependents and the 
demobilized servicemen, subsistence allowances for the urban and rural residents. 
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slightly higher than that of Qingdao city. 
As in the case of education, even though the percentage of public expenditure for 
pensions and relief funds for social welfare in Linyi city is relatively higher, it does 
not mean the Linyi government has done the best in terms of providing the service of 
social welfare among these three cities. As Linyi city has a very large rural area, the 
township governments are the main investors in pensions and relief funds for social 
welfare in rural area. However, the financial stress of township governments forces 
them to collect unauthorized fees from the farmers to raise the funds for social welfare. 
Compared with Linyi city, Qingdao and Jinan cities have larger urban areas and the 
resource of funds mostly comes from the municipal governments. In this case, the 
public expenditure on social welfare is mainly afforded by government instead of the 
individuals. 
 
Table 16: Social Security Indicators for the Goal of Service-oriented Government in 
Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Municipalities 













Average Public Expenditure for 
Pensions and Relief Funds for 
Social Welfare as Percentage of  
Total Government Expenditure 
2.20% 2.41% 2.65% 2.67% 3.47% 3.44% 
Average Percentage of Pension 
Contributors among Total Urban 
Employees 
61.31% 87.46% 60.86% 86.29% 68.73% 75.45% 
Average Unemployment Rate of 
Total Labour Force 
2.07% 3.42% 2.83% 3.78% 3.42% 3.36% 
a For details of the calculation of these indicators, see Appendices 17-19. 
 
The second indicator is the percentage of pension contributors among the total 
urban employees. Table 16 shows that after administrative reform, all three 
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municipalities increased the percentage of pension contributors among total urban 
employees, which exceeded 62.51%, the average level of China in 2002.39 The 
percentage in Qingdao city is the highest at 87.46%, and that in Linyi city is the 
lowest at 75.45%. Moreover, Qingdao city is also ranked first in terms of the coverage 
of medical and unemployment insurance in the three cities. In 2002, the percentages 
of contributors to basic medical insurance and unemployment insurance of the total 
urban employees in Qingdao city were 81.12% and 46.79% respectively. The 
percentages of contributors to basic medical insurance and unemployment insurance 
of the total urban employees in Jinan city were 78.22% and 66.56% respectively also 
in 2002.40 The percentages in Linyi city were only 45.42% and 47.20% respectively 
in the same year.41 Therefore, it is not surprising that Qingdao city is considered one 
of the top five most liveable Chinese cities in 2006 because of its “good social 
security coverage and access to leisure and culture activities.”42 
However, even the percentage in Qingdao city is lower than that of other 
developed countries. For instance, the percentage of pension contributors among the 
total urban employees in Canada, Australia and France had reached about 90% in the 
1990s.43  
The social security system does not provide total coverage for urban employees in 
                                                        
39 Li, Gonggong fuwuxing zhengfu [Public Service Oriented Government], p. 71. 
40 See “Total Urban Employees in 17 Municipalities of Shandong Province in 2001,” see 
http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000001450; “Total Contributors of Basic Insurances in 17 
Municipalities of Shandong Province in 2001,” see http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000001466; 
“Total Urban Employees in 17 Municipalities of Shandong Province in 2002,” see 
http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000000267; and “Total Contributors of Basic Insurances in 17 
Municipalities of Shandong Province in 2002,” see http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000000284, 
accessed on 15 March 2006. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Straits Times, “Beijing Blues,” October 3, 2006, p. 6. 
43 World Bank, 2003 World Development Indicators, p. 68. 
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the three municipalities because some employees in foreign invested enterprises, 
private enterprises and public institutions (shiye danwei) do not contribute to the two 
types of insurance.44 This problem has aggravated the poverty problem of the urban 
residents. 
With regard to the unemployment rate, none of the three municipalities could 
control the increasing trend of unemployment from 1994 to 2003. Table 16 shows that 
the unemployment rate in Qingdao and Jinan cities both has increased from 2.07% to 
3.42% and 2.83% to 3.78% respectively. The reason may be that the population of 
Qingdao and Jinan cities have more opportunities to work in State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) or other private enterprises, and more people are unemployed after the reform 
of the SOEs. In contrast, fewer SOEs and a larger number of farmers may both 
contribute to the lower unemployment rate in Linyi city. Nonetheless, the 
unemployment rate in Linyi city has always been above 3.00% during both two 
periods of reform (See Table 16).  
The increased unemployment rate in the three municipalities has contributed to 
the increased number of poor people in the urban areas, which has also increased the 
demand for pensions and relief funds for social welfare accordingly. Moreover, the 
high unemployment rate has forced the local governments to provide more public 
expenditure on subsidies to social security programmes to expand the coverage of 
basic pension insurance, basic medical insurance and unemployment insurance for 
those who are unemployed. 
                                                        
44 Interview with an official of Qingdao Labour and Social Security Bureau, 22 June 2005; the Director of Civil 
Organizations Management Department of Jinan Civil Affairs Bureau, 16 June 2005; and an official of Linyi Civil 
Affairs Bureau, 28 June 2005. 
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In sum, the Qingdao government has performed the best in expanding the 
coverage of social security. The Jinan government has performed best in providing 
public expenditure for pensions and relief funds for social welfare and its 
unemployment rate is the highest among the three cities. In contrast, the Linyi 
government has performed the best in reducing the unemployment rate while it is 
ranked third on both areas of providing public expenditure for pensions and relief 
funds for social welfare and expanding the coverage of social security.  
However, the social security system needs to be improved further in the local 
governments of Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi, whose officials should use the concept of 
public finance and strengthen management in the public service sectors. The central 
government should also establish the system of “conditional aid” for solving the 
problem of urban poverty. The issues of poverty in the urban areas and high 
unemployment do not only involve the central and local governments but also involve 
the industrial structure of a city and its transition economy. Thus, the central 
government should distribute some revenue to the local governments to ensure that 





The third goal of local government reform is to improve the provision of public 
information and strengthen the citizens’ participation in local government affairs. For 
the criteria of assessing whether a government is transparent, some scholars have 
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indicated that whether the Chinese government has instituted formal regulations for 
open access to government information could be an indicator of the level of 
transparency of a government.45 Qiu et al. have indicated that “a key move that may 
lay the cornerstone for a more transparent government is the Open Governance Act” 
in China.46 Thus, the institution of a “formal regulation for openness of government 
information” in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi municipalities could be an indicator for 
evaluating local government reform in terms of improving government transparency.  
Before 1999, none of the three municipalities had introduced formal regulations 
for open access to government information. The Qingdao government introduced two 
regulations, namely “Decisions on Making Government Affairs Public” and 
“Suggestions on Further Intensifying Government Transparency” in 1999 and 2001 
respectively for implementing government transparency. 47  The “Provisional 
Regulations on Making Government Affairs Public” was instituted by the Jinan 
government in October 2004. 48  The Linyi government also instituted the 
“Suggestions on Further Intensifying Government Transparency” in 2002.49 Thus, 
after the 1999 reform, the three municipalities have introduced formal regulations for 
providing open access to government information which indicates that the three 
municipalities have begun to pursue a higher level of government transparency. 
                                                        
45 See Jack Linchuan Qiu et al., “E-government in China,” in Governance in China, p. 160 and Burns, 
“Governance and Civil Service Reform,” p. 50. 
46 Qiu et al., “E-government in China,” p. 160. 
47 See Qingdao Municipal Government, Guanyu quanmian tuixing zhengwu gongkai zhidu de jueding [Decisions 
on Carrying out Government Affairs Public], 1999 and Qingdao Municipal Government, Guanyu jinyibu tuixing 
zhengwu gongkai de yijian [Suggestions on Further Intensifying Government Transparency], 2001. 
48 Jinan Municipal Government, Zhengwu xinxi gongkai zanxing banfa [Provisional Regulations on Making 
Government Affairs Public in Jinan City], 2004. 
49 Linyi Municipal Government, Guanyu jinyibu tuixing zhengwu gongkai gongzuo de shishi yijian [Suggestions 
on Further Intensifying Government Transparency], 2002. 
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Moreover, the IMD has used the extent to which “the government communicates 
its policy intentions clearly” as an indicator of the degree of government transparency 
in a state.50 Similarly, the “new yardstick for rating local governments” drawn up by 
the Ministry of Personnel of China uses the “extent to make government information 
known to the public” as an important indicator of the level of government 
transparency in China.51 Burns has argued that “more transparent rules, regulations, 
and procedures also may increase legitimacy.”52 In other words, the scope and extent 
of making government affairs known to the public reflects the status of government 
transparency. The question now is how many government affairs and documents are 
accessible to the public?  
The problem is how to measure the scope and extent of making government 
affairs public. Since 1999, municipal governments in China have started to construct 
local government websites which have become the main channel for making local 
government affairs public. The government officials I interviewed have suggested that 
the “scope and content of information provided by the local government website” 
indicates a government’s effectiveness in making itself more transparent.53 Except for 
confidential affairs of state and government, better accessibility to government affairs 
would improve the level of government transparency. Some scholars have utilized the 
                                                        
50 IMD, The World Competitiveness Yearbook 1999, p. 406. 
51 See Chua Chin Hon, “China Draws up New Yardstick for Rating Local Governments,” p. A2 and Liu Shixin, 
“Zhongguo zhengfu jixiaopinggu tixi mianshi” [The Appearance of a New System of Appraising Local 
Government in China], p. A1. 
52 Burns, “Governance and Civil Service Reform,” p. 50. 
53 Interview with the Director of Civil Organizations Management Department of Jinan Civil Affairs Bureau, 16 
June 2005; the Deputy Dean of Public Service Centre of Jinan Urban Public Utility Administrative Bureau, 17 
June 2005; the Director and Section Chiefs of Social Relief Department of Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau, 20 June 
2005; the Dean of General Office of Qingdao Health Bureau, 21 June 2005; an official of Qingdao Labour and 
Social Security Bureau, 22 June 2005; an official of Linyi Civil Affairs Bureau, 28 June 2005; and the Deputy 
Director of Linyi Personnel Bureau, 29 June 2005. 
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content of information provided by the local government websites to evaluate 
e-government development in China, although some of the information provided by 
some government websites is insufficient and often outdated.54 Therefore, the content 
of information provided by the local government websites generally reflects whether 
e-government has actually improved government transparency. 
In 2005, the State Council Informatization Office of China issued the “Result of 
Effectiveness of Municipal Government Websites” to evaluate the effectiveness of 
making government affairs public, making online service work and online public 
involvement more active. 55  In providing public information, the Qingdao 
government’s website is ranked first, the Jinan government’s website is ranked 18th 
and the Linyi government’ website is ranked 128th among 333 municipalities in 
China.56  
The Qingdao government has the highest ranking because its government website 
provides the most comprehensive, detailed and prompt government information to the 
public, which has established its reputation for being transparent, efficient and close 
to its people.57 This government website not only provides general information such 
as government documents, regulations, statistical data, department information and 
government news, but also such important information as personnel appointment and 
removal, government procurement, and financial revenue and expenditure. 
Furthermore, the Qingdao government website updates the content of government 
                                                        
54 Qiu et al., “E-government in China,” pp. 154-155. 
55 State Council Informatization Office of China, “2005 Dishiji zhengfu wangzhan jixiao pinggu jieguo” [Report 
of the Effectiveness of Municipal Government Websites in 2005], see 




information frequently so that the public can receive government information on a 
regular basis.58 More specifically, the level of openness of government information 
on the Qingdao government website is the highest among 333 Chinese municipal 
governments. For example, regarding government bidding, the Qingdao government’s 
website provides very detailed information including bid proposals, the name of 
enterprise which has won a bid and the date when the bid was won. 
The Jinan government’s website is ranked 18th among 333 municipalities in China 
and second among the 17 municipalities in Shandong province.59 Compared with the 
Qingdao government, the Jinan government has provided less comprehensive 
information as it has only provided general information to the citizens, namely, 
government documents, regulations and statistical data. However, the Jinan 
government has not provided updated information on personnel appointment and 
removal, government procurement, and financial revenue and expenditure.60 
In contrast, the Linyi government’s website is ranked 128th among 333 
municipalities in China and 12th among the 17 municipalities in Shandong province in 
providing public information.61 In other words, the extent of openness of government 
information in the Linyi municipality is much lower than in the other two 
municipalities. The Linyi government’s website does not provide sufficient and 
prompt government information to its citizens. Important information such as 
personnel appointments and removal, government procurement and financial revenue 






and expenditure are not provided on this website and statistical data are not updated. 
 
Table 17: Indicators for Transparent Government in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
Municipalities 

















NA 2 regulations NA 1 regulation NA 1 regulation 




NA Ranked 1st 
among 333 
municipalities 
NA Ranked 18th 
among 333 
municipalities 
NA Ranked 128th 
among 333 
municipalities 
Extent of Online 
Public Involvement 
NA Ranked 1st  
among 333 
municipalities 
NA Ranked 56th 
among 333 
municipalities 
NA Ranked 48th 
among 333 
municipalities 
Number of Issues 
Discussed at Public 
Hearing 
NA 6 issues NA 6 issues NA 2 issues 
Open Recruitment 
and Appointment 

























Note: NA means not applicable. 
 
Furthermore, as some scholars maintained, China’s initiatives in achieving 
transparent government are largely designed to increase public participation.62 Some 
scholars have relied on public opinion polls and online feedback on policy proposals 
in local government as indicators for evaluating public participation.63 In this respect, 
according to the “Result of Effectiveness of Municipal Government Websites” in 
                                                        
62 See Qiu et al., “E-government in China,” p. 161 and R. Kluver, “E-Government in China: Empowering Citizens 
or Establishing Control?” (Paper presented at the conference “The Internet and Governance: The Global Context,” 
Oxford Internet Institute, 8-10 January 2004). 
63 Qiu et al., “E-government in China,” p. 157. 
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2005, the Qingdao government is ranked first, the Linyi government is ranked 48th 
and the Jinan government is ranked 56th on online public supervision among 333 
municipalities in China.64  
The extent of online public involvement on the Qingdao government’s website is 
the highest because it has various columns for public involvement, in which 
suggestions made by citizens could receive timely feedback from the relevant 
government agencies.65 The Qingdao government also holds the activity of “Giving 
Suggestions for Qingdao’s Development” every July since 2003, in which citizens 
could give their suggestions on issues such as community construction, housing and 
health insurance. In 2005, the Qingdao government received 12,000 suggestions, 95% 
of which were gathered from the online public involvement. The Qingdao government 
classifies these suggestions and sends them to the relevant government agencies. The 
responses by these agencies to the suggestions are announced on the government 
website. The Qingdao government’s website has set up a very comprehensive mayor’s 
email box, government agency’s email box and government open telephones. In order 
to deal with online letters in a more timely manner, the Qingdao government website 
has set up a specific system covering 30 government agencies for processing online 
letters. Usually, government agencies must reply to online letters within one week.66 
It is interesting that the Linyi government’s website is more responsive than the 
                                                        
64 State Council Informatization Office of China. “2005 Dishiji zhengfu wangzhan jixiao pinggu jieguo” [Report 
of the Effectiveness of Municipal Government Websites in 2005], see 
http://www.ccidconsulting.com/2005govtop/default.shtml, accessed on 27 March 2006. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Interview with the Director and Section Chiefs of Social Relief Department of Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau, 20 
June 2005; the Dean of General Office of Qingdao Health Bureau, 21 June 2005; an official of Qingdao Labour 
and Social Security Bureau, 22 June 2005; and an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao 
Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005. 
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Jinan’s government website in terms of online public involvement. As indicated 
earlier, Linyi city is ranked 48th in China and ranked third in Shandong province and 
Jinan city is ranked 56th in China and ranked fifth in Shandong province.67 Both the 
Linyi and Jinan governments are ranked among the top 60 municipalities in China as 
their websites provide an improved channel for public involvement including 
announcing the mayors’ email addresses on their websites, carrying out online surveys 
and organizing public forums. Citizens are invited to give suggestions to the 
government. However, the Jinan and Linyi governments need to improve their 
interaction with citizens as their response to online complaints and letters sent to 
mayors’ email boxes is inadequate.68 The Jinan government lags behind the Linyi 
government in replying to citizens’ suggestions and complaints. As mentioned in 
Chapter 5, in some cases public complaints are ignored or even manipulated by 
political leaders. 
Apart from online public involvement, the most important measure of increasing 
citizen engagement is public hearings on important issues in the three municipalities. 
The number of issues discussed in public hearing meetings in the Qingdao, Jinan and 
Linyi municipalities is another indicator of evaluating local government reform in 
terms of improving public participation. Obviously, if more issues are discussed in 
public hearings, a more transparent government will result. 
Since 1999, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments have encouraged 
                                                        
67 State Council Informatization Office of China, “2005 Dishiji zhengfu wangzhan jixiao pinggu jieguo” [Report 
of the Effectiveness of Municipal Government Websites in 2005], see 
http://www.ccidconsulting.com/2005govtop/default.shtml, accessed on 27 March 2006. 
68 Ibid. 
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government agencies to discuss important issues with citizens in public meetings.69 
The Qingdao and Jinan governments have encouraged citizens to be involved in six 
issues: legislation, government decisions, public utilities, education, court and 
procuratorate affairs, and administrative law enforcement. In contrast, only public 
utilities and education are the two issues discussed in Linyi city. However, public 
hearings at the current stage are often controlled by the local government and do not 
represent the consensus of citizens. 
In addition to these aspects, a transparent government also means transparency in 
the civil service system. In evaluating to what extent China’s civil service reform has 
moved the county closer to one of the elements of “good governance”, namely, 
transparency, Burns has utilized the open recruitment and appointment processes for 
government officials in China as an indicator of the government’s level of 
transparency.70  
As mentioned in Chapter 5, with the promulgation of the “Provisional Regulations 
on National Civil Servants” (guojia gongwuyuan zanxing tiaoli) in 1993, the Qingdao, 
Jinan and Linyi governments have implemented the open recruitment examination 
system by requiring all newly recruited civil servants to pass an examination and 
announcing their names on the local government websites. The Jinan government has 
enlarged the scope of recruitment of civil servants so that peasants in China can apply 
for civil service vacancies. Applicants with a master’s degree or above can apply for 
                                                        
69 See Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2003 [Qingdao Yearbook 2003], pp. 
101-102, 197-200, 212-213, 227; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan 
Yearbook 2003], pp. 106-107, 138-139; 206, 209-212, 214, 218-219, 228; and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation 
Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2003], pp. 204-208, 239-240. 
70 Burns, “Governance and Civil Service Reform”, p. 50. 
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the positions in the Jinan government without any territorial restriction imposed on 
them. The three municipalities have also initiated a competition mechanism in 
personnel selection since 1999. The Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments have 
carried out the cadre selection process with an open and fair competition (gongkai 
xuanba lingdao ganbu). The system of pre-appointment announcement (renqian 
gongshi zhidu) is also popular in cadre appointment in recent years.  
However, guanxi (personal connections) and houmen (back door practices) 
practices have hindered the implementation of these systems and the sale and 
purchase of official positions has further eroded the principle of cadre selection 
through an open and fair competition in the three municipalities. 71  Therefore, 
achieving government transparency is a long-term goal of local government reform in 
China. 
Generally speaking, through administrative reform the three municipalities have 
made great efforts in constructing transparent government. The formal regulation for 
the openness of government information was issued after 1998 in Qingdao, Jinan and 
Linyi cities. The local government’s website, online public involvement and public 
hearings on important issues were introduced in 1999. It seems that the Qingdao 
government has performed the best for the five indicators of transparency and public 
participation. The Jinan government has performed better than the Linyi government 
in providing government information on the local government’s website and public 
hearings on important issues. However, the Linyi government has performed better 
                                                        
71 Interview with the Director and Deputy Director of Government Set-up Department of Jinan Personnel Bureau, 
14 June 2005; an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005; and the 
Deputy Director of Linyi Personnel Bureau, 29 June 2005. 
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than the Jinan government in giving feedback to online public involvement but has 
not performed as well in other aspects. Nevertheless, all three governments should 
further improve the level of government transparency in the process of open 




The fourth goal is to ensure a clean government through improving bureaucratic 
accountability in public service and putting more effort into curbing corruption. It 
demands that government officials at all levels should not only perform their duties 
but also be firm in their actions so as to get support and trust from the public.72 
 
Bureaucratic Accountability 
To evaluate bureaucratic accountability, Burns has cited the articles of “Interim 
Regulations on National Public Servants” (guojia gongwuyuan zanxing tiaoli) to 
evaluate the civil service reform of China in terms of bureaucratic accountability.73 
According to him, the implementation of the auditing system and the system of 
performance pledges for public services by the local governments in China 
demonstrate that these local governments have achieved the goal of bureaucratic 
accountability to some extent in civil service reform.74  
Therefore, regarding bureaucratic accountability, the goal of a clean government 
                                                        
72 See Wang Hongyuan, “Qing quanli dazao chengxin zhengfu” [To construct a ‘Trustworthy Government’], see 
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/n/2003-02-26/26/276546.html, accessed on 25 February 2006; Bao Zhiqiang, “2004 
Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Jinan Government Work Report of 2004], in Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation 
Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2004 [Jinan Yearbook 2004] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 2004), p. 11; Lian Chengmin, 
2004 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao [Linyi Government Work Report of 2004], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 26 July 2005. 
73 Burns, “Governance and Civil Service Reform,” p. 40. 
74 Ibid. , pp. 40-41. 
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can be evaluated by whether the three municipalities have introduced administrative 
licensing regulations and implemented systems of performance pledges for public 
services, external supervision, the accountability assurance system and auditing. 
In the first aspect, Jinan city was the earliest city in Shandong province to issue 
the “Programme of Reforming the System of Administrative Approval” in 1998.75 In 
2000, the “Notice on Clearing up the Items Subject to Administrative Examination 
and Approval” was also promulgated by the Jinan government.76 Compared with the 
Jinan government, the Qingdao and Linyi governments were behind in issuing 
administrative approval regulations. The Qingdao government issued the “Provisional 
Regulations on Administrative Examination and Approval” in 200177 and the Linyi 
government promulgated the “Suggestions on Enhancing Government Efficiency and 
Improving the Development of Environment” in 2002.78 Therefore, these regulations 
of administrative licensing show that the Jinan, Qingdao and Linyi governments have 












                                                        
75 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2000 [Jinan Yearbook 2000], (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 2000), p. 62. 
76 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2001 [Jinan Yearbook 2001] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 2001), p. 107. 
77 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002] (Beijing: 
Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002), p. 243. 
78 Linyi Municipal Government, “Guanyu tigao xingzheng xiaolü youhua fazhan huanjing de yijian” [Suggestions 
on Enhancing Government Efficiency and Improving Development Environment], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, accessed on 11 May 2005. 
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Table 18: Indicators for Bureaucratic Accountability in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
Municipalities 













Administrative Licensing Regulations No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Accountability Assurance System No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Performance Pledges for Public Services No Yes No Yes No Yes 
External Supervision System No Yes No No No No 
Percentage of Punished Leaders of Total 
Audited Leadersa 
No 11.53% No 7.11% No 2.90% 
a The data before 2000 is not available because local governments implemented the economic 
responsibility auditing system of cadres in 2000. For details of the calculation of this indicator, see 
Table 12. 
 
Moreover, the three municipalities have implemented the accountability assurance 
system since the 1999 reform. According to this system, government officials with 
malpractices will be subject to disciplinary action. However, the accountability 
assurance system is not fully institutionalized.  
The Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments have also implemented the system of 
performance pledges for public services since 1999 in order to respond to the reform 
objective of improving the government officials’ accountability. However, the absence 
of independent agencies for supervising officials’ performance and a lack of 
transparency and public participation have undermined the effectiveness of the three 
governments in implementing this system. 
For external supervisory systems, only the Qingdao government has set up the 
external evaluation system to assess the effectiveness of government officials after 
1999, which has also offered the power to evaluate general public and independent 
intermediate bodies or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The evaluation 
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results are important components of the performance appraisal of officials. In this 
regard, the Jinan and Linyi governments have implemented the internal evaluation 
system administered by the same officials themselves who are being evaluated, and 
this does not guarantee the objectivity of the evaluation. 
In addition, since 1999, the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments have begun to 
carry out the economic responsibility auditing system of cadres, which focuses on 
checking the financial management during a cadre’s tour of duty before his promotion 
or retirement. Table 18 shows that from 1999 to 2003, the percentage of punished 
leaders of the total audited leaders in the Qingdao government is the highest, 11.53% 
and Linyi’s percentage is the lowest, 2.90%. The percentage in the Jinan government 
is 7.11%. This result means that the Qingdao and Jinan governments have 
implemented the system of auditing economic responsibility of leading cadres. 
   The three municipalities have attempted to ensure a clean government by 
improving bureaucratic accountability. They have introduced administrative licensing 
regulations and implemented the performance pledges for public service, the 
accountability assurance system and the auditing system. Among them, the Qingdao 
government has performed better than the Jinan and Linyi governments since it has 
established the external supervision system and has effectively implemented the 
economic responsibility auditing system of cadres. Moreover, the Jinan government 
has performed better than the Linyi government in initiating administrative licensing 
regulations and implementing the economic responsibility auditing system of cadres. 
The Linyi government is ranked third on the aspects of administrative licensing 
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The goal of clean government requires curbing corruption in the three municipalities. 
According to Porta et al., corruption itself is an indicator for evaluating the quality of 
government. 79  Similarly, the IMD has employed the existence of bribery and 
corruption as an indicator for assessing the level of government competitiveness in a 
country.80  
More specifically, in his book, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational 
Involution of the Chinese Communist Party, Lü has employed the following three 
indicators to explain the current corruption situation in China: the citizen reports on 
corruption received by the CCP’s Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI), the 
cases brought up by it, and cadres who received disciplinary and administrative 
actions.81 Similarly, Sun also employs the total number of cases investigated by the 
monitoring agencies and the number of officials penalized as two indicators for the 
nationwide situation of corrupt officials in China.82 Therefore, this chapter will use 
three indicators at the municipal level, namely, the citizen reports of corruption 
received by the CCP’s CDI, the total number of cases investigated by the CCP’s CDI 
and the number of officials receiving disciplinary and administrative penalties. 
Lü and Sun have also used the number of corrupt officials at xian-chu 
                                                        
79 Porta et al., The Quality of Government, p. 22 and appendix table 1. 
80 IMD, The World Competitiveness Yearbook 1999, p. 409. 
81 Xiaobo Lü, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 222.  
82 Yan Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 47. 
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(county/department) rank as an indicator for corruption. 83  Thus, the “officials 
disciplined at xian-chu (county/department) rank or above” also reflects how many 
government officials at the higher level of municipal government are involved in 
corruption. 
   Table 19 shows that anti-corruption work has not been effectively implemented 
among the three municipalities since the percentage of investigated and closed cases 
of the total citizen reports for corruption is very low, even though the percentage has 
increased from 1994-1998 to 1999-2003 in the three municipalities. In comparison, 
this percentage in the Qingdao government is the highest, 9.27% and Jinan’s 
percentage ranks second at 7.73%. In the Linyi government, the percentage is lowest 
at 7.18%. 
 
Table 19: Indicators for Clean Government in Anti-corruption in Qingdao, Jinan 
and Linyi Municipalities 













Number of Citizen Reports of 








Number of Investigated and Closed 
Cases  
3,381 4,070 3,351 2,926 2,301 2,484 
Percentage of Investigated Cases of 
Citizen Reports of Corruption  
5.79% 9.27% 7.11% 7.73% 5.89% 7.18% 
Number of Officials Disciplined 3,058 3,815 2,681 3,183 2,380 3,001 
Officials Disciplined as Percentage 
of Total Number of Officials 
1.04% 1.18% 0.82% 0.87% 0.79% 0.82% 
Number of Officials Disciplined at 
xian-chu (county/department) Rank 
or Above 
155 249 156 302 36 54 
a For the details of the calculation of these indicators, see Appendices 20-24. 
 
                                                        
83 See Lü, Cadres and Corruption, p. 222 and Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China, p. 47. 
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A similar situation also exists in the number of officials disciplined as a 
percentage of the total number of officials. In comparison, the percentage of 
government officials disciplined of the total number of officials in the Qingdao 
government is the highest at 1.18%; Jinan’s percentage is 0.87% and the Linyi 
government’s percentage is the lowest (0.82%). 
   In addition, the number of officials disciplined at xian-chu (county/department) 
rank or above has increased from 1994-1998 to 1999-2003 (See Table 19). This means 
that more and more leaders at the higher levels are involved in corruption. Among the 
three municipalities, the number of officials disciplined at xian-chu 
(county/department) rank or above in the Jinan government is the highest at 302 
persons in 1999-2003 and the number in the Qingdao government is 249 persons. In 
contrast, this number in the Linyi government is the lowest at 54 persons in 
1999-2003. This finding suggests that Jinan and Qingdao governments, especially the 
Jinan government, are more effective than the Linyi government in investigating the 
senior officials involved in corruption. 
The number of citizen reports of corruption received by the CCP’s CDI in the 
three cities has decreased during the past 10 years (See Table 19). For instance, this 
number in the Qingdao government has decreased from 58,349 to 43,888 and the 
number has also decreased in the Jinan government from 47,127 to 37, 871. At first 
glance, the decreased number of citizen reports of corruption seems to suggest that the 
three municipal governments have effectively curbed corruption. However, an official 
I interviewed said that one of the reasons for the decreased number was that citizens 
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became indifferent to reporting corruption cases to the CDI of the CCP municipal 
committee because they thought the efforts made in curbing corruption were not very 
effective and their reports would be useless in this situation.84  
Thus, according to the result of the evaluation, the three municipalities have not 
effectively curbed corruption, even though they have adopted several measures to 
create supportive conditions for government integrity. Zou has analyzed that the 
reason why corruption in China could not be completely eliminated and even becomes 
more severe is that the power of the CCP is not effectively checked and supervised.85 
In comparison, the Qingdao and Jinan governments are more effective in 
implementing anti-corruption work than the Linyi government. The Qingdao 
government has performed better in terms of investigating corruption cases and the 
number of disciplined government officials involved in corruption. The Jinan 
government has performed better in investigating senior officials involved in 





To become efficient, all three governments have improved government functions by 
curtailing the micro-economic functions of government and reducing red tape through 
the administrative approval reform. However, they have not achieved the goal of 
                                                        
84 Interview with the Director of Civil Organizations Management Department of Jinan Civil Affairs Bureau, 16 
June 2005. 
85 Zou Keyuan, “Why China’s Rampant Corruption Cannot be Checked by Laws Alone,” in Wang Gungwu and 
Zheng Yongnian (eds.), Damage Control: The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era (Singapore: 
Eastern Universities Press, 2003), p. 84. 
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downsizing government. They have improved the quality of civil servants through 
recruiting well-educated officials and instilling competition in promoting government 
officials. Nevertheless, the performance appraisal system and motivation and 
dismissal systems are not institutionalized. After reviewing the indicators, the 
Qingdao government is judged as the most efficient government and the Jinan 
government is judged to be more efficient than the Linyi government.  
   The second goal is to achieve a service-oriented government. In regard to 
education, all three municipalities have increased the enrolment rate in secondary and 
tertiary education. Nevertheless, they should further increase investment in public 
education as part of the total local government expenditure. In comparison, the 
Qingdao and Jinan governments have performed better than the Linyi government in 
this regard. 
In the health sector, the three municipalities still need to improve their investment 
in public health and to reduce the burden of health expenses imposed on citizens. 
Generally speaking, both the Jinan and Qingdao governments have performed better 
than the Linyi government in improving the conditions of health care. 
The social security system also needs to be improved further in the local 
governments of Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi. Yet, the issues of poverty in the urban areas 
and the high unemployment rate are not only problems that are relevant for the central 
and local governments but also relevant to the industrial structure of a city and its 
transition economy. Thus, the central government should redistribute some revenue to 
the local governments to ensure that they have enough money to develop their 
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economies and to provide more opportunities for employment. In comparison, both 
the Qingdao and Jinan governments have performed well in improving social security 
services. 
The three municipalities have made great efforts in constructing transparent 
government. The formal regulation for openness in accessing government information 
was issued after 1998 in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi cities. The local government’s 
website, online public involvement and public hearings on important issues were 
introduced in 1999. Nevertheless, all three governments should further improve 
government transparency in terms of implementing open recruitment and appointment 
processes for official and increasing the interaction with citizens. It seems that the 
Qingdao government has performed the best for all five aspects of transparent 
government. The Jinan government has performed better than the Linyi government. 
   In terms of achieving a clean government, the three municipalities have attempted 
to improve bureaucratic accountability. They have introduced administrative licensing 
regulations and implemented the performance pledges for public service, the 
accountability assurance system and the auditing system. Among them, the Qingdao 
government has performed the best in this regard and the Jinan government has 
performed better than the Linyi government. 
  In addition, in the case of anti-corruption, the three municipalities have not 
effectively curbed corruption, even though they have adopted several measures to 
create supportive conditions for integrity. In comparison, the Qingdao and Jinan 
governments are more effective in implementing anti-corruption work than the Linyi 
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government.  
In sum, after evaluating the effectiveness of local government reform in Qingdao, 
Jinan and Linyi cities, we can draw a conclusion based on the final result of the level 
of effectiveness in the three municipalities (See Table 19). The Qingdao government 
is ranked first on all four aspects of evaluation: efficient government, service-oriented 
government, transparent government and clean government. The Jinan government is 
ranked second on the three aspects of efficient government, transparent government 
and clean government and it is also ranked first on service-oriented government. The 
Linyi government is ranked third on all four aspects. 
 
Table 20: Effectiveness of Local Government Reform in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
Municipalities 
Ranking of Effectiveness Reform Objectives 
Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
Efficient Government 1 2 3 
Service-oriented Government 1 1 3 
Transparent Government 1 2 3 
Clean Government 1 2 3 
 
However, why do the three municipal governments have different levels of 
effectiveness? What are the reasons for their similarities and differences? In other 
words, what factors have contributed to Qingdao’s high level of effectiveness and 
what factors have hindered the Jinan and Linyi governments from being more 
effective in administrative reform? Chapter 7 will answer these questions. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 





The purpose of this chapter is to identify the factors affecting the effectiveness of 
local government reform in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi municipalities. It first discusses 
the impact of the relationship between the central and local governments on local 
government reform in terms of decentralization of economic management, taxation 
sharing with local government, political control and delegation of law-making. It then 
analyzes how the central and local leadership affect local government reform. 
This chapter argues that the special authority in economic management for the 
centrally-planned city and sub-provincial city has encouraged Qingdao and Jinan 
cities to promote administrative reform and discouraged the initiatives taken by the 
local governments in prefecture-level cities such as Linyi city. Moreover, 
administrative reform in Qingdao city has also benefited from its financial autonomy 
at the provincial level. However, the shortage of financial revenue further hampers the 
Jinan and Linyi governments from improving the public service system. Through 
political control over the sub-provincial cities, the Qingdao and Jinan governments 
have acquired more support from the central government for their administrative 
reform, which has encouraged them to carry out innovative reform measures. In 
comparison, the Linyi government has less support from the central government and it 
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has not introduced innovative reform measures. In addition, delegating law-making 
responsibilities to the Qingdao and Jinan governments has also speeded up the process 
of administrative reform in the two cities. 
This chapter also argues that the good performance of the Qingdao government 
can be credited to its municipal leaders, who are well-known for their 
open-mindedness and their effective reform measures. In comparison, the leaders in 
the Jinan and Linyi governments are not as open-minded as their counterparts in the 
Qingdao government. 
 
The Relationship between the Central and Local Governments 
 
Decentralization of Economic Management  
After the third Session of the 11th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in 1978, the central government of China started to follow a new 
policy—“fangquan rangli” (decentralization and profit-sharing)—to refashion the 
economic interest relations between the local government and private enterprises.1 
Wang argued that decentralization in Mao Zedong’s era aimed to replace the Soviet 
model with a centralized planning system while decentralization in Deng Xiaoping’s 
era was an important means to move from a planned economic system to a market 
economic system in China.2  
The central government gradually extended its economic management authority 
                                                        
1 Jin Taijun and Zhao Hui, Zhongyang yu difang zhengfu guanxi jiangou yu tiaoxie [Relationship between the 
Central and Local Governments: Construction and Adaptations] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 
2005), pp. 170-171. 
2 Wang Shaoguang and Hu An-gang, Fenquan de dixian [The Lowest Limit of the Division of Power] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo jihua chubanshe, 1997), p. 40. 
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over the municipal government for the purpose of establishing the management 
system of a national economy centred on the city. In 1983, the State Council approved 
14 cities3 as centrally-planned cities (jihua danlie shi) because of their important 
economic status. A prefecture of China must meet the following four criteria to 
become a centrally-planned city: (1) an urban centre with a non-rural population over 
1,000,000; (2) an Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of over 15 billion RMB; (3) 
a well-established foundation for industry and business reinforced by strong 
technology power; and (4) playing a significant role in economic development and 
reform in China.4 The 14 cities enjoyed both economic management and fiscal 
management autonomy5  at the provincial level. 6  Qingdao city is the only city 
approved as a centrally-planned city in Shandong province. Thus, it enjoys more 
decision-making authority on the management and organization of economic 
activities than the other municipalities in Shandong province. 
However, the institution of a centrally-planned city caused confusion and 
disagreement on the boundaries of authority between the province and the 
centrally-planned cities. For the purpose of strengthening the status and functions of 
the provincial government in overall planning and coordination, the central 
government decided in 1994 to change the 14 centrally-planned cities to 
                                                        
3 These 14 centrally-planned cities are Chongqing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Shenyang, Nanjing, Wuhan, Ha’erbin, 
Xi’an, Dalian, Qingdao, Xiamen, Ningbo, Chengdu, and Changchun. 
4 For the definition of a centrally-planned city, see 
http://www.dilizx.com/powereasy/news/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=45, accessed on 1 October 2006. 
5  The management autonomy includes industry and agriculture production, transportation, post and 
telecommunications, investment in fixed assets, sales, purchases and the distribution of main commodities, the 
distribution of energy and raw materials, import and export in foreign trade, labour salary, technological 
development planning, foreign exchange allocation and financial credit. 
6 See Xie Qingkui et al., Zhongguo difang zhengfu tizhi gailun [The Generality of Chinese Local Government 
System] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbodianshi chubanshe, 1998), p. 71 and Fu Dayou, Yuan Yongzhi and Rui 
Guoqiang, Xingzheng gaige he zhidu chuangxin [Administrative Reform and Institutional Innovation] (Shanghai: 
Shanghai sanlian chubanshe, 2004), p. 223. 
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sub-provincial cities (fushengji chengshi). A sub-provincial city in China is a 
prefecture-level city ruled by a province, but it is administered independently in terms 
of economy and law.7 Its status is above the other regular prefecture-level cities, 
which are completely ruled by their provinces. These sub-provincial cities are often 
the capitals and business centres of the provinces in which they are located. Compared 
with the centrally-planned city, a sub-provincial city only enjoys economic 
management autonomy rather than fiscal management autonomy at the provincial 
level.  
Among the 14 sub-provincial cities, six cities including Chongqing,8 Shenzhen, 
Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo, and Xiamen have a dual identity as centrally-planned cities 
and sub-provincial cities. In this case, Qingdao city still enjoys both the economic and 
fiscal management autonomy at the provincial level. In addition, Jinan and Hangzhou 
cities were also promoted as sub-provincial cities in 1994.9 Currently, there are five 
centrally-planned cities and 15 sub-provincial cities in China (See Figure 3). As a 
sub-provincial city, Jinan city enjoys economic management autonomy at the 
provincial level. 
   Linyi city enjoys neither the economic nor fiscal management autonomy at the 
provincial level since it is an average prefecture-level city (diji shi). A prefecture-level 
city is an administrative division in China, ranking below a province and above a 
county in China’s administrative structure. There are a total of 333 prefecture-level 
                                                        
7 For the definition of a sub-provincial city, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sub-provincial_city, accessed on 1 
October 2006. 
8 Chongqing city was promoted as a municipality directly under the jurisdiction of the central Government in 
March 1997. 
9 Fu, Yuan and Rui, Xingzheng gaige he zhidu chuangxin [Administrative Reform and Institutional Innovation], 
pp. 223-224. 
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cities in China today.10 A prefecture-level city in China must meet the following 
criteria: (1) an urban centre with a non-rural population over 250,000; (2) a GDP over 
2.5 billion RMB; and (3) the output of tertiary industries supersedes that of primary 
industries by over 35% of the GDP. 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of Three Types of Cities in China 
 
Note: Qingdao city is one of the five Centrally-planned Cities (CC), located in the core of the diagram; 
Jinan city is one of the 15 Sub-provincial Cities (SC), located in the middle circle of the diagram; and 
Linyi city is one of the 333 Prefecture-level Cities (PC) in China, located in the external circle of the 
diagram. 
 
The Qingdao and Jinan governments have enjoyed economic management 
                                                        






authority at the provincial level in areas such as granting approval in investment and 
collecting taxes. According to the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China 
for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, 
 
The income tax on enterprises with foreign investment and the income tax which 
shall be paid by foreign enterprises on the income of their establishments or places 
set up in China to engage in production or business operations shall be computed 
on the taxable income at the rate of thirty percent, and local income tax shall be 
computed on the taxable income at the rate of three percent.11 
 
However, for the income tax on enterprises with foreign investment of a 
production nature established in the coastal economic open zones, where the Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) or the Economic and Technological Development Zones 
(ETDZs) are located, shall be levied at a reduced rate of 24%.12 Thus, foreign 
enterprises in the SEZs or ETDZs such as Qingdao and Jinan cities are eligible for 
privileged tax policies. Since Linyi city does not have the same level of authority over 
economic management, foreign enterprises cannot enjoy these preferential policies. 
Consequently, most of these enterprises have congregated in the coastal and open 
cities, such as Qingdao and Jinan cities, instead of inland cities, such as Linyi city. In 
addition, the limit in examining and granting approval to foreign investment has been 
increased to US$100 million in Qingdao and Jinan cities after they are promoted as 
sub-provincial cities whereas the Linyi government still has to struggle within these 
limitations.13 Thus, Qingdao and Jinan cities have experienced faster development 
                                                        
11 Article 5 of the “Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment 
and Foreign Enterprises,” adopted at the Fourth Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 9 April 
1991. 
12 Article 7 of “Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and 
Foreign Enterprises.” 
13 Shandong Provincial Government, Guanyu zhichi jinanshi jiakuai fazhan de ruogan shixiang de tongzhi [Notice 
on Support for Accelerating Jinan’s Development], 2005. 
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than Linyi city. Their strong economic foundation has contributed to the improvement 
of public service delivery in the education, health, and social security sectors. 
   Moreover, the establishment of the sub-provincial city on the basis of the 
centrally-planned city has changed the status of 15 sub-provincial cities in the 
administrative system and the relationship between the central and municipal 
governments. Before the establishment of the sub-provincial cities, there were only 
two kinds of relationship between the central and municipal governments. One was 
the direct relationship between the central government and four centrally administered 
municipalities (zhixiashi), namely, Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing.14 This 
is similar to the relationship between the central and provincial governments since the 
centrally administered municipality (zhixiashi) is at the same administrative rank as 
the provincial government.15 The other was an indirect relationship between the 
central government and prefecture-level cities in China such as Linyi city, which were 
under the jurisdiction of the provincial government. Their relationship with the central 
government was mainly handled through the provincial government.16  
Nevertheless, after establishing the sub-provincial city, there is the third type of 
relationship between the central government and the 15 sub-provincial level cities 
such as Qingdao and Jinan which have both direct and indirect relations with the 
central government. They have direct relationship with the central government in 
                                                        
14 Chongqing city was approved as a centrally-planned city (jihua danlie shi) in 1983 and as a sub-provincial city 
(fushengji chengshi) in 1994. In March 1997, Chongqing city was promoted as a zhixiashi (municipality directly 
under the jurisdiction of the central government). 
15 Fu, Yuan and Rui, Xingzheng gaige he zhidu chuangxin [Administrative Reform and Institutional Innovation], p. 
224. 
16 Xie Qingkui, Zhengzhi gaige yu zhengfu chuangxin [Political Reform and Governmental Innovation] (Beijing: 
China Citic Press, 2003), p. 231. 
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economic management because the sub-provincial level cities have similar economic 
management rights with the provincial government. At the same time, they also have 
indirect relationship with the central government in terms of administrative direction 
and supervision like the prefecture-level city because they are still under the 
jurisdiction of the provincial government.17  
Thus, the Qingdao and Jinan governments have direct relationship with the central 
government in economic management, which has encouraged the Qingdao and Jinan 
governments to promote administrative reform. The preferential policies and special 
authority for the centrally-planned cities and sub-provincial cities have seriously 
discouraged cities such as Linyi, which has led to a brain-drain as human resources 
are attracted to the coastal and capital cities such as Qingdao and Jinan. The 
decentralization of economic management brings about a regional income disparity 
between the coastal and inland cities and keen competition among the different 
cities.18 This may be the biggest challenge for the future administrative reform if the 
central government does not decentralize more economic management authority to 
prefecture-level cities. The outcome will be less optimistic as the process of 
administrative reform in most prefecture-level cities will be still slow.  
 
Taxation Sharing with the Local Government 
For the taxation system, the central government first carried out a “ligaishui” system 
(replacement of appropriating profits with taxing profits) in 1983 for the purpose of 
                                                        
17 Fu, Yuan and Rui, Xingzheng gaige he zhidu chuangxin [Administrative Reform and Institutional Innovation], p. 
224. 
18 Jin and Zhao, Zhongyang yu difang zhengfu guanxi jiangou yu tiaoxie [Relationship between the Central and 
Local Governments: Construction and Adaptations], pp. 213-215. 
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increasing the profits of enterprises after tax. In addition, the central government has 
also initiated measures to decentralize and to share profits with the local government 
(fangquan rangli). In this respect, the central government has implemented a caizheng 
baogan tizhi (the contractual fiscal system) in the 1980s and a negotiable fiscal 
contractual system with each province. Many of these fiscal contracts have allowed 
the provincial governments to retain a substantial portion of any new economic 
growth generated.19 
Although the taxation sharing has different forms, the significant characteristic of 
this system is fenzao chifan (delimitation of fiscal responsibilities), which focuses on 
providing more fiscal power to the local government.20 The fenzao chifan and 
caizheng baogan tizhi have strengthened the local governments’ interests in economic 
development. Therefore, administrative reforms at the municipal government level in 
the 1980s and the early 1990s have all responded to fangquan rangli (decentralization 
and profit-sharing), pushed through a separation of government functions from the 
management of enterprises (zhengqi fenkai), and changed many government functions 
to meet the requirements of the market economy. In addition, local governments at 
various levels have passed down power to lower level governments. However, these 
fiscal measures have weakened the macro-control ability of the central government 
and the self-centred departmentalism of local governments is derailed from the initial 
idea of fangquan rangli because the systems of fenzao chifan and caizheng baogan 
                                                        
19 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 
2004), p. 253. 
20 Jin and Zhao, Zhongyang yu difang zhengfu guanxi jiangou yu tiaoxie [Relationship between the Central and 
Local Governments: Construction and Adaptations], p. 172. 
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tizhi are not regularized.21 
To make the tax system more regularized in 1994, the central government has 
initiated the fenshuizhi (division of the tax-collection system) for the purpose of 
establishing separate systems for collecting local taxes and national taxes. This 
two-tier tax collection system focuses on decentralization and separation in tax 
collection, which categorizes taxes into three types: central tax, local tax, and shared 
tax by the central and local governments (gongxiang shui). At the same time, the 
central government also determines which types of taxes will go to the central coffers 
by law. The central government collects both central tax and shared tax by the central 
and local governments and the local governments only collects the local tax that will 
be used exclusively by them. In addition, the central government also stipulates the 
rates of value-added tax of which 75% goes to the central government and 25% goes 
to the provincial governments. 22  The fenshuizhi system has strengthened the 
dominating position of the central government in managing fiscal power for 
macro-control. It also gives the local governments certain space to take initiatives. 
The percentage of shared tax revenue in the total GDP of China has increased from 
11.6% in 1997 to 18% in 2002.23 More specifically, the shared budgetary revenue of 
the central government in its total budgetary revenue has risen from 22.3% in 1993 to 
56% in 1994.24 As Lieberthal analyzed: 
 
                                                        
21 Xie et al., Zhongguo difang zhengfu tizhi gailun [The Generality of Chinese Local Government System], p. 77. 
22 See Lieberthal, Governing China, p. 253 and Jin and Zhao, Zhongyang yu difang zhengfu guanxi jiangou yu 
tiaoxie [Relationship between the Central and Local Governments: Construction and Adaptations], p. 174. 
23 Jin and Zhao, Zhongyang yu difang zhengfu guanxi jiangou yu tiaoxie [Relationship between the Central and 
Local Governments: Construction and Adaptations], p. 325. 
24 Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 73. 
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This new system gives the Centre a surer fiscal base and provides it a somewhat 
larger role in determining where public funds are allocated throughout the country. 
It also allows provinces very considerable flexibility on how to spend tax revenues 
in their own locales.25 
 
While fenshuizhi has introduced elements of fiscal federalism, the central government 
has actually focused on tax collection.26  
The new fiscal system has helped the central government to regularize the local 
fiscal system. Before implementing fenshuizhi, some local governments had collected 
the local taxes from investors and then refunded them in order to attract more foreign 
investors. To curb rampant tax evasion and remission practices, the central 
government has stated that the “authority to grant tax rebates is centralized in the 
State Council; [and] local authorities are only permitted to manage the slaughter, 
banquet, and animal husbandry taxes,” which is also the important content of the 
macro-economic stabilization programme adopted by Zhu Rongji.27 Therefore, the 
new fiscal system has regularized some illegal practices carried out by the local 
government, and also promoted administrative reform in the local governments.  
Interviewees in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments have admitted that the 
fiscal reform since 1994 has contributed to the rationalization in local government 
functions by reducing debt defaults and excessive overseas debts and regularizing 
rampant tax reductions and remission practices in local government.28 
On the other hand, the new fiscal system has also reduced the amount of tax 
                                                        
25 Lieberthal, Governing China, p. 253. 
26 Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan, p. 78. 
27 Ibid. , p. 79. 
28 Interview with an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005; the 
Director and Deputy Director of Government Set-up Department of Jinan Personnel Bureau, 14 June 2005; and the 
Deputy Director of Linyi Personnel Bureau, 29 June 2005. 
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revenue for the local governments. In the late 1990s, the central government started to 
convert some fees and levies into formal taxes by stating that “tax administration will 
take over the collection from other government departments and agencies.”29 In 
addition, the central government added personal and corporate income taxes as shared 
taxes (gongxiang shui) by the central and provincial governments, which were 
previously collected by the local governments and are now collected by the central 
government.30 
As a result of the shortage of taxation revenue in local governments, the allocation 
of financial expenditure in the new fiscal system has changed since local governments 
will mainly invest in some profitable enterprises and not in the education, technology, 
agriculture, health, social security and environmental protection sectors. The shortage 
of local revenue coupled with the unbalanced allocation of local financial expenditure 
explains why the amount of investment in public service delivery has been 
significantly reduced in the three municipalities. 
In the meantime, the central government has also carried out chuizhi guanli 
(hierarchical control through vertical administration) in the taxation system from the 
central to county level after 1998. Before implementing this measure, the taxation law 
has stated that the local governments at various levels should strengthen their 
leadership in the administration of tax collection within their jurisdictions and support 
the tax authorities in carrying out their duties in tax collection.31 Chuizhi guanli 
                                                        
29 Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan, p. 79. 
30 Ibid. , p. 80. 
31 Article 5 of “The Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Administration of Tax Collection,” 
implemented on 1 January 1993. 
 232 
means that the Taxation Bureau at every level should be under the jurisdiction of a 
higher level Taxation Bureau in all the aspects of the organizational structuring, staff 
recruitment, appointment of leaders, and budgeting. 
At the state level, the State Taxation Bureau in the provincial government is under 
the jurisdiction of the State Administration of Taxation instead of the provincial 
government. Similarly, the State Taxation Bureau in the municipal government is 
under the jurisdiction of provincial state taxation bureau rather than the municipal 
government (See Figure 4). 
 




State Administration of Taxation 
↓ 
Provincial State Taxation Bureau <┅ Provincial Government 
↓ 
Municipal State Taxation Bureau <┅ Municipal Government 
↓ 
County State Taxation Bureau <┅ County Government 
↓ -- direct relationship 
<┅ -- indirect relationship 
 
In the local taxation system, the Local Taxation Bureau in municipal government 
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is under the jurisdiction of the Provincial Local Taxation Bureau instead of the 
municipal government. Similarly, the Local Taxation Bureau at the county-level 
government is under the jurisdiction of Municipal Local Taxation Bureau rather than 
the county government. The Local Taxation Bureau in the provincial government is 
under the jurisdiction of the provincial government in terms of staff recruitment, 
appointment of leaders, and budgeting. It is related to the State Administration of 
Taxation only in terms of professional guidance (See Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Local Taxation System in China 
 
                          Central Government 
                                   ↓ 
State Administration of Taxation  
  
Provincial Local Taxation Bureau ← Provincial Government 
  ↓ 
         Municipal Local Taxation Bureau <┅ Municipal Government 
  ↓ 
      County Local Taxation Bureau <┅ County Government 
↓ ← -- direct relation 
<┅ -- indirect relation 
 
Therefore, the central government directly manages the collection of state tax and 
shared tax. It manages the local taxation collection under the jurisdiction of the 
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provincial government indirectly. The provincial government also manages the 
Provincial State Taxation Bureau indirectly but controls the Provincial Local Taxation 
Bureau directly. In contrast, the municipal government cannot manage both the 
Municipal State Taxation Bureau and the Municipal Local Taxation Bureau directly. 
Similarly, the county or district government cannot control both the County/District 
State Taxation Bureau and County/District Local Taxation Bureau.  
According to the chuizhi guanli system, the Qingdao State Taxation Bureau is 
directly under the jurisdiction of the State Administration of Taxation rather than the 
Provincial State Taxation Bureau since Qingdao city as a centrally-planned city has 
fiscal management authority at the provincial level (See Figure 4). The Qingdao Local 
Taxation Bureau is directly under the jurisdiction of the municipal government instead 
of the provincial government (See Figure 5). In contrast, the Jinan and Linyi 
governments do not have the fiscal management authority at the provincial level since 
they are not centrally-planned cities. According to the chuizhi guanli system, the State 
Taxation Bureaus in Jinan and Linyi municipalities are under the jurisdiction of the 
Provincial State Taxation Bureau and the Local Taxation Bureaus are also under the 
jurisdiction of the Provincial Local Taxation Bureau. Therefore, the Qingdao 
government enjoys much more autonomy in the management of fiscal revenue and 
expenditure than the Jinan and Linyi governments. Consequently, more financial 
revenue has been transferred to the municipal coffers in Qingdao city whereas in Jinan 
and Linyi cities, most of the local financial revenue is transferred to the provincial and 
central coffers. 
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In fact, the total financial revenue in Jinan city is ranked the top among all 15 
sub-provincial cities in China every year since many wealthy and influential 
industries are located in Jinan, the capital city of Shandong province. These influential 
industries include the electrical, power and telecommunications industries, which turn 
in considerable profit tax every year. However, only about 30% of the financial 
revenue is returned to the Jinan municipality since most of the revenue is transferred 
to the provincial and central coffers.32 In contrast, the Qingdao government enjoys 
fiscal management authority at the provincial level so that its revenue and expenditure 
are directly under the jurisdiction of the central government. Therefore, about half of 
the financial revenue of Qingdao city is transferred to the municipal coffer and the 
other half is returned to the central government. This explains why the annual 
government revenue of the Jinan government is less than that of the Qingdao 
government. More specifically, the financial revenue of the Qingdao government 
exceeds that of the Jinan government by RMB 22.05 billion during 1994 to 2003 (See 
Table 21). Qingdao government’s ability to generate financial revenue has enabled it 
to improve the construction of city infrastructure and public service during the past 
years. On the other hand, it also explains why the Jinan government has lagged behind 
the Qingdao government in city construction, social security and other functions of 
the public service. 
 
 
                                                        
32 Interview with the Director and Deputy Director of Government Set-up Department of Jinan Personnel Bureau, 
14 June 2005. 
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Table 21: Financial Revenue of the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Governments from 
1994 to 2003 
Financial Revenue Year 
Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994 RMB 2.27 billion RMB 1.28 billion RMB 1.32 billion 
1995 RMB 2.95 billion RMB 1.70 billion RMB 1.58 billion 
1996 RMB 3.80 billion RMB 2.43 billion RMB 2.02 billion 
1997 RMB 4.77 billion RMB 3.16 billion RMB 2.45 billion 
1998 RMB 5.80 billion RMB 3.84 billion RMB 2.82 billion 
1999 RMB 6.80 billion RMB 4.66 billion RMB 3.14 billion 
2000 RMB 8.00 billion RMB 5.33 billion RMB 3.39 billion 
2001 RMB 9.87 billion RMB 6.47 billion RMB 4.08 billion 
2002 RMB 11.09 billion RMB 7.88 billion RMB 4.65 billion 
2003 RMB12.01 billion RMB 8.56 billion RMB 5.55 billion 
Total RMB 67.36 billion RMB 45.31 billion RMB 31.00 billion 
Source: Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 2003-2004 [Qingdao Statistical Yearbook 
2003-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2003-2004), p. 91, p. 123; Jinan Statistical Bureau, 
Jinan tongji nianjian 2003-2004 [Jinan Statistical Yearbook 2003-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji 
chubanshe, 2003-2004), p. 174; Linyi Statistical Bureau, Linyi tongji nianjian 2003 [Linyi Statistical 
Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2003), p. 345; and Linyi Statistical Bureau, 
“2003 tongji xinxi” [Statistical Information in 2003], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/tjxx/tjxx.asp?page=sjcx, accessed on 3 March 2006. 
 
The financial revenue of the Linyi government is the smallest among the three 
municipalities. It is only RMB 31.00 billion during 1994 to 2003 (See Table 21). Due 
to the lack of financial revenue in the Linyi government, the public service 
expenditure as a percentage of the total municipal expenditure is much lower than 
those of the Qingdao and Jinan governments. Thus, the Linyi government has placed 





                                                        
33 Interviews with an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005; the 
Secretary of the Party Committee of Linyi Education Bureau, 30 June, 2005; the Deputy Director of Linyi 
Personnel Bureau, 29 June 2005; and the Director and Deputy Director of Government Set-up Department of Jinan 
Personnel Bureau, 14 June 2005. 
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Political Control 
Apart from economic decentralization, the central government has also strengthened 
its political control over the local government through the nomenklatura system. 
Before discussing the nomenklatura system in detail, it is useful to analyze the 
relationship between the CCP and local government in China.  
The CCP is the ruling party and “retains the power to decide all major political, 
social, and economic policy issues and to appoint the leaders to all public sector 
bodies (including government offices, public institutions, and State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs)). 34  The hierarchy of authority of the central and local 
governments is an integrative structure of power and functions commanded by the 
CCP. Therefore, the CCP committee at every level of the government has the 
authority to appoint and manage the leaders and cadres of the government (dang guan 
ganbu). This phenomenon is termed nomenklatura as discussed in the literature 
review.  
The 1990 nomenklatura had given the central authority control over 
sub-provincial level chiefs, “adding the positions of prefectural bureau chief and 
deputy chief to the central Organization Department’s scope of management.”35 The 
Organization Department has strengthened its supervision of appointment and 
removal of heads and deputy heads of prefectures and prefecture-level cities.36 More 
specifically, the nomenklatura has extended the CCP’s personnel authority to China’s 
                                                        
34 Lieberthal, Governing China, p. 234. 
35 John P. Burns, “Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: the 1990 Nomenklatura,” The 
China Quarterly, No. 138 (June 1994), pp. 468-469. 
36 Ibid., p. 469. 
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five centrally planned cities including Qingdao and 15 sub-provincial level cities 
including Jinan. According to Burns: 
 
This move can be seen as a further limited re-centralization of nomenklatura 
authority. The change may have been prompted by appeals from city officials who 
sought to reduce the influence of provincial leaders in municipal affairs. As a 
result of the change, city officials had direct access to Beijing.37  
 
As discussed before, Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi cities are three different types of 
cities in China. The mayor of a centrally-planned city or a sub-provincial city such as 
Qingdao and Jinan is equal in political status to a vice-governor of a province, who is 
appointed by the central authority directly. In contrast, the mayor of a prefecture-level 
city like Linyi is equal in status to a bureau chief in a province or a vice-mayor in a 
sub-provincial level city, who is appointed by the provincial authority. In this case, 
leaders in the Qingdao and Jinan governments are more acquainted with the central 
government than the ones in the Linyi government since they are directly appointed 
by the central government.  
Burns has observed that in the relationship between the provincial and central 
governments, “top Party leaders select provincial (and military) officials, [and] they in 
turn, through their membership of the CCP Central Committee, select the top Party 
leaders. Central and provincial leaders are therefore caught in a relationship of 
interdependence.”38 Burns has also pointed out that “Deng Xiaoping’s early 1980s 
strategy of ‘playing to the provinces’ to build a coalition of support for reform and 
create a political counterweight to the central bureaucracy strengthened the hand of 
                                                        
37 Ibid., p. 469. 
38 Ibid., p. 470. 
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[the] provincial leaders vis-à-vis the Centre.” 39  The relationship between a 
sub-provincial city and the central government is quite similar to the relationship 
between a provincial government and the central government. Through the political 
control over the sub-provincial cities and with increased trust between the central and 
sub-provincial governments, the central government has given more support to the 
Qingdao and Jinan governments for their administrative reforms. With the central 
government’s support, the Qingdao government has been encouraged to implement 
innovative reform measures like the “Sunshine Aid Project.” In contrast, the Linyi 
government has received less support from the central government and has only 
implemented the reform measures recommended by it. 
 
Delegation of Law-making 
According to the Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s 
Governments of the People’s Republic of China, local governments at the levels of 
province, autonomous region and centrally administered municipalities (zhixiashi) can 
establish regulations based on various laws such as the administrative laws and the 
local laws. The municipalities, which are the bases of the provincial and autonomous 
region governments, and larger municipalities (jiaoda de shi) approved by the State 
Council such as the sub-provincial level city, can establish regulations according to 
the administrative laws and local laws.40 Local governments at the township level, 
however, do not have the authority to establish these regulations.  
                                                        
39 Ibid., p. 470. 
40 Article 60 of The Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s Governments of the 
People’s Republic of China, amended in 2004 and approved by the 12th Session of the Standing Committee of the 
10th National People’s Congress. 
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The legislative system in China has four tiers. The first tier is the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) and the second tier is the State Council and its subordinate 
units. The third tier is the People’s Congress and government at the provincial level 
and the fourth tier is the People’s Congress and government of the sub-provincial 
city.41 
According to these four categories of the legislative system, the People’s Congress 
and government at the Jinan and Qingdao municipalities have the authority to 
establish local laws and regulations based on their local contexts. In contrast, the 
People’s Congress and government at the Linyi municipality, as an average 
prefecture-level city, have little authority to formulate local laws and regulations. 
Indeed, the absence of specific local laws to meet the needs of local economic and 
administrative management in prefecture-level cities has caused much confusion on 
some issues in local government reform and has delayed the process of solving 
problems, which has in return hindered the development of their local economy. 
For instance, social insurance is a relatively new matter for farmers in the process 
of local government reform. Until now, there are only general rules rather than 
specific laws on this matter in China. This lack of detailed regulations has caused 
many problems, such as the evaluation on the amount of insurance premium to be 
collected by the local government in the process of providing social insurance for 
farmers. In this case, it is urgent for local governments to issue relevant laws by 
themselves. The Qingdao government has issued the “Provisional Regulations on 
                                                        
41 Xie et al., Zhongguo difang zhengfu tizhi gailun [The Generality of Chinese Local Government System], p. 88. 
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Basic Pension for Farmers” in 2005 and many farmers have benefited from this 
regulation. For instance, in the villages of the Laoshan district in Qingdao city, almost 
90% of the farmers have bought pension insurance by paying 70% of the premium 
themselves with the remaining 30% being paid by the villages and Laoshan district. 
When these farmers reach 60 years of age for men or 55 for women, they will receive 
RMB 352 each per month as pension and RMB 1,000 as an additional subsidy.  
However, there is no definite criterion in Linyi city for determining how much 
insurance premium should be collected by the local government and the amount to be 
paid by individuals because of a lack of local regulations on social insurance for 
farmers. Although the Linyi government has issued provisional measures on basic 
pension for farmers, these measures are not as effective as the local laws or 
regulations in the process of implementation. Thus, the coverage of pension insurance 
in the villages of Linyi city is very low. Indeed, the lack of authority in formulating 
local laws and regulations in Linyi city has hindered the process of administrative 
reform. On the other hand, the authority in formulating local laws in Qingdao city has 
facilitated its administrative reform since its government can formulate new local 
laws to satisfy the need for local economic and administrative management. 
   In sum, through the decentralization of economic management, tax profit sharing 
with the local government, political control and the delegation of law-making, the 
Qingdao and Jinan governments, especially the former, are favoured by the central 
government. However, the Linyi government has been neglected in the process of its 
administrative reform. This different relationship between the central government and 
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the local governments has promoted the reform carried out by the Qingdao 
government but hindered that of the Linyi government. Apart from these factors, the 
effectiveness of local government reform is also closely related to the leadership at the 





In China, administrative reform was initiated and supported by Deng Xiaoping. In 
August 1980, Deng Xiaoping delivered a speech entitled “The Reform of the 
Leadership System of the Party and the State” at the extended Politburo meeting. This 
speech symbolised the start of administrative reform in China and “recognized an 
urgent need for reforming the Party and State leadership system.”42 Deng criticized 
the “poor governance on over-concentration of power, arbitrary and patriarchal 
personal rule, life tenure and special privileges, overstaffing, and the lack of 
distinction of roles and functions between Party leadership and government 
administration.”43  
Jiang Zemin was elected as the General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee 
in 1989 as the successor to Deng Xiaoping. Jiang reaffirmed the reform policies and 
continued the opening-up of the economy initiated by Deng Xiaoping.  
In addition to economic reform, Jiang sharply criticized the phenomenon of 
unwieldy organization and bureaucratism that existed in government. He also 
                                                        
42 Meiru Liu, Administrative Reform in China and Its Impact on the Policy-Making Process and Economic 
Development after Mao (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), p. 64. 
43 Ibid., p. 65. 
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emphasized the indispensability of reforming the structure of government institutions 
at the 15th National Congress of the CCP in 1997. These reform measures were 
changing the political structure, strengthening democracy and the legal system.44  
Jiang’s report at the 15th National Congress of the CCP signalled the beginning of 
the most comprehensive administrative reform in China, which Liu considered to be 
the seventh administration reform since the People’s Republic of China was founded 
in 1949.45 This reform was carried out from the central to the local government 
during 1998-2002. 
It should be noted that the person in charge of the 1998 administrative reform was 
Zhu Rongji,46 the Premier of the State Council of China, who was famous for his 
ambition in promoting economic and administrative reforms as well as curbing 
corruption. In 1998, this newly elected Premier expressed his determination in 
implementing economic and administrative reforms in a well-known passage during a 
press conference.47 
The domestic and international changes have compelled the Chinese government 
to further improve its functions and to change the attitudes of government officials.  
Following this guideline, the new generation of leadership, Hu Jintao48 and Wen 
Jiabao49 have further carried out administrative reform in 2003. 
                                                        
44 Jiang Zemin, Report at the 15th National Congress of the CCP, see 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2002-10-22/1404777724.html, accessed on 6 November 2005. 
45 Liu Zhifeng, Diqici geming: 1998-2003 zhongguo zhengfu jigougaige wenti baogao [The Seventh Revolution: 
1998-2003 Report on the Problems of Chinese Government Organizational Reform] (Beijing: China Social 
Sciences Press], 2003), p. 10. 
46 Zhu Rongji left the Politburo Standing Committee in November 2002 and stepped from his premiership since 
the first session of the 10th National People’s Congress on March 5, 2003. 
47 This passage was excerpted from Premier Zhu Rongji’s speech in the Press Conference held after the First 
Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on 19 March 1998. 
48 Hu Jintao was elected as the General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee at the 16th National Congress of 
the CCP on November 14, 2002. 
49 Wen Jiabao was elected Premier at the first session of the 10th National People’s Congress on March 5, 2003. 
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Hu and Wen have clearly recognized that the aim of administrative reform is to 
“form an administrative system featuring standardized behaviour, coordinated 
operation, fairness and transparency, honesty and high efficiency.”50 Moreover, they 
have also recognized the importance of the standardization of the relationship 
between the central and local government.51  
Moreover, Hu and Wen have further implemented personnel reform and solved the 
problem of “overstaffing, divorce between powers and responsibilities and duplicate 
law enforcement.”52 To improve the quality of civil servants, Hu signed the Order of 
the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China (No. 35) to announce the 
implementation of the Civil Service Law on 27 April 2005, which is the first law of 
the civil service in China.53 In addition, he puts forward the principles of “Putting 
People First” (yi min wei ben) and constructing a harmonious society (hexie shehui) in 
2004,54 which aims to achieve the ideal of cooperation between the government and 
citizens. As Wen indicated in the 2004 Government Work Report, the government 
functions should focus on economic regulation, market supervision, social 
management and public service.55 
 
Local Leadership 
In order to examine the local leadership in Shandong province, it is necessary to 
                                                        
50  Jiang Zemin, Report at the 16th National Congress of the CCP, see 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-11/17/content_635147.htm, accessed on 20 October 2004. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Xinhua News Agency, “Hu Jintao signed the Order of the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China (No. 35) 
to Announce the Implementation of the Civil Service Law,” 27 April 2005.  
54 Hu Jintao, Zai zhongyang renkou ziyuan huanjing gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua [The Lecture at the Meeting 
of Population, Resources and Environment of China], see 
http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/zwgk/ldjh2/t20040412_26920.htm, accessed on 18 October 2005. 
55 Wen Jiabao, 2004 Government Work Report, at the Second Session of the 10th National People’s Congress on 5 
March 2004. 
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review the work of Zhang Gaoli, the new governor and secretary of the Shandong 
provincial committee of the CCP. In November 2001, Zhang, who was the former 
vice governor of Guangdong province and the secretary of the Shenzhen municipal 
committee of the CCP, was appointed as the governor of Shandong province. One 
year later, he was promoted to be the secretary of the Shandong provincial committee 
of the CCP. Both Guangdong province and Shenzhen city are pilot reform areas in 
China. Zhang is famous for his open and aggressive reform measures by injecting a 
“reformist spirit” into the conservative province of Shandong. It is also worth 
mentioning that Zhang launches a Government Acceleration Project (zhengfu tisu 
gongcheng) for the purpose of cutting down the number of administrative approvals 
and shortening the procedure in dealing with requests for administrative examination 
and approval.56 This measure has greatly enhanced the efficiency of the Shandong 
government and has received much attention from the central and other local 
governments. Under the leadership of Zhang, the pace of reform has accelerated in the 
municipalities in Shandong province. 
With regard to the local leadership in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi cities, the leaders 
in Qingdao city are the most famous for their creative and dynamic reform measures. 
One of the famous leaders is Yu Zhengsheng. Even now, Qingdao people have 
praised the work of Yu, the former mayor and former secretary of the Qingdao 
municipal committee of the CCP57 and attributed the achievements in economic and 
                                                        
56 Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan, p. 159. 
57 In October 1997, Yu Zhengsheng was promoted to become the Vice Minister, Vice Party Secretary of Ministry 
of Construction of China. In March 1998, he was promoted to be the Minister and Party Secretary of Ministry of 
Construction of China. In November 2001, Yu Zhengsheng was appointed as the Secretary of Hubei Provincial 
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administrative reform to him.58 Before becoming the mayor of Qingdao city, Yu was 
the mayor and vice secretary of the Yantai municipal committee of the CCP in 
Shandong province from November 1985 to March 1989. During that period, he was 
the first mayor in China to implement the housing system reform in Yantai city. Thus, 
Yu’s previous experience has contributed to his later achievements in Qingdao city. 
From 1989 to 1994, Yu was the mayor of Qingdao city and from 1992 to 1997, he 
was the secretary of the Qingdao municipal committee of the CCP (See Table 22). 
During his rule, he claimed that Qingdao government officials should liberate their 
minds and change their attitudes to embrace a market economic system.59 At that 
time, it was imperative for Qingdao city to develop its economy although its 
government did not have funds for development. Yu prevailed over all opposing views 
and decided to move the centre of the city to the eastern side of the city60 through 
setting up a new government building by selling the old government building, and 
through auctioning pieces of land61 to foreign and domestic investors to develop the 
business area of the east. This measure was aimed at promoting the development of 
the eastern part of Qingdao city, which became the new centre of the city, and was 
more modern and international in contrast to its old area. This move has further 
                                                                                                                                                              
Committee of the CCP and in November 2002, he was promoted to become a member of the Political Bureau of 
the CCP Central Committee. 
58 Interview with an official of Government Set-up Department of Qingdao Personnel Bureau, 23 June 2005; the 
Director and Section Chiefs of Social Relief Department of Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau, 20 June 2005; an 
official of Qingdao Labour and Social Security Bureau, 22 June 2005; the Dean of General Office of Qingdao 
Health Bureau, 21 June 2005; and the Dean of General Office of Qingdao Urban Public Utility Administrative 
Bureau, 21 June 2005. 
59 Yu Zhengsheng, “Zai shiwei qijie sanci quanweihuiyi shang de jianghua” [The Lecture of the Third Plenary 
Session of the Seventh Congress of the Qingdao Municipal Committee of the CCP], in Qingdao Local Chronicles 
Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1996 [Qingdao Yearbook 1996] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996), pp. 1-6. 
60 In history, the east side of Qingdao city was the suburb of Qingdao city and was an undeveloped area. 
61 The piece of land between the east of Shandong Road and the south of Hong Kong Middle Road in Qingdao 
city was auctioned to foreign and domestic businessmen and investors. 
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promoted Qingdao’s economy as more and more foreign investors started to build 
factories in Qingdao city.62   
Apart from Yu’s innovative measures in constructing a modern and cosmopolitan 
city, his pragmatic working style was also well acclaimed. He actively directed 
administrative reform to separate government functions away from enterprises and to 
transfer some of the government functions to serve these enterprises. In the “1993 
Qingdao Government Work Report,” Yu indicated that the Qingdao government at all 
levels should concentrate on performing overall planning, coordinating, providing 
services, and supervising functions so as to provide better services for the enterprises 
and the public.63 In December 1994, 14 bureaus of the Qingdao government, which 
administered the economic affairs and administrative companies specifically, were 
converted into state-owned assets operation companies or group corporations.64 
Therefore, Qingdao’s enterprises obtained a certain level of decision-making power 
and management power from the municipal government, which facilitated the process 
of self-development of these enterprises. Thanks to Yu’s efforts, the Qingdao 
government established a large number of effective and profit-generating enterprises, 
such as the Haier Group, Tsingtao Beer Co., Ltd, and the Hisense Group, which are 
well-known in China and in the world. In 2004, the World Brand Lab, one of the most 
influential institutes in evaluating global brands, selected the Haier Group as one of 
                                                        
62 Gao Shengli, Dongbu retu [The East of Qingdao City: the Hopeful Land] (Qingdao: Qingdao chubanshe, 1996), 
pp. 53-57. 
63 Yu Zhengsheng, “1993 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Qingdao Government Work Report of 1993], in Qingdao 
Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1993 [Qingdao Yearbook 1993] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
youyi chuban gongsi, 1994), p. 10. 
64 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1993 [Qingdao Yearbook 1993], p. 270. 
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the world’s 100 most influential brands.65 During his reign, Yu won the good name of 
“brand mayor.”66  
In addition, during his term of office, Yu also actively carried out reforms on 
government restructuring, public service delivery and civil service. In 1993, Qingdao 
city was the first city in completing government restructuring at the county and 
county-level city in Shandong province.67 Moreover, because of Yu’s efforts, the 
Qingdao government was chosen as an experimental city to conduct the national civil 
service system in Shandong province in 1993.68 Qingdao city was the first city in 
China to carry out the dismissal and resignation system for civil servants, which 
changed the status quo in local government where all government officials can only 
be promoted but not demoted or dismissed. Qingdao’s experience was praised by Hu 
Jintao, the Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau in 1994, and 
Song Defu,69 the Minister of Personnel Department, who had encouraged various 










                                                        
65 “Haier Group Was Selected as One of the World’s 100 Most Influential Brands,” see 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1039/2319349.html, accessed on 20 December 2005. 
66  Shidai renwu zhoubao [People in Focus Weekly], “Yu Zhengsheng mailuo” [The Experience of Yu 
Zhengsheng], 4 November 2004. 
67 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1994 [Qingdao Yearbook 1994] 
(Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1994), p. 251. 
68 Ibid. , p. 252. 
69 In December 2000, Song Defu was appointed as the Secretary of Fujian Provincial Committee of the CCP. 
70 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1995 [Qingdao Yearbook 1995] (Jinan: 
Shandong youyi chubanshe, 1995), p. 270. 
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Table 22: Top Leaders of Qingdao Municipal Committee of the CCP and Government 
(1990-present) 
Secretaries of Qingdao Municipal Committee of the CCP 
Yu Zhengsheng March 1992-October 1997 
Zhang Huilai October 1997-January 2003 
Du Shicheng January 2003-December 2006 
Mayors of Qingdao Municipal Government 
Yu Zhengsheng September 1989-November 1994 
Qin Jiahao November 1994-February 1998 
Wang Jiarui February 1998-October 2000 
Du Shicheng October 2000-January 2003 
Xia Geng January 2003-present 
Source: Party History Research Centre of Qingdao Municipal Committee of the CCP, “Shiji dangzuzhi 
yangebiao (1923-2003)” [The Table of Past History of Qingdao Municipal Party Organizations] and 
“Jianguohou Qingdaoshi zhengquan zuzhijigou yange ji lingdaoren gengti qingkuang” [The Situation 
of Past History of Qingdao Municipal Government and the Changes of Leaders after 1949], see 
http://dsyj.qingdao.gov.cn/department/dangshi.nsf/10fef5c0adfffa9948256cd10041f1cb/42a43832be65
1fdb48256b2c000a45ed?OpenDocument;http://dsyj.qingdao.gov.cn/department/dangshi.nsf/10fef5c0a
dfffa9948256cd10041f1cb/9b0d7d79b1a2023248256b2c000ab985?OpenDocument, accessed on 27 
December 2005. 
 
Because of Yu’s work, Qingdao city has developed quickly since 1998. His 
successor, Zhang Huilai,71 was appointed as the first party secretary of the Qingdao 
municipality in 1997. Wang Jiarui,72 was appointed to be the mayor of Qingdao 
municipality in 1998 (See Table 22). Since then, administrative reform in Qingdao 
municipality has been further accelerated. 
Wang receives his Ph.D. in economics from Fudan University and he is called the 
“doctor mayor.” As a researcher himself, Wang understands that the main problem in 
establishing a modern enterprise system in China is the lack of a clear boundary 
between the functions of government and enterprises (zhengqi bufen). Therefore, he 
has made efforts in reforming the SOEs in Qingdao city and indicated that the 
                                                        
71 Zhang Huilai was the Secretary of the Qingdao Municipal Committee of the CCP from October 1997 to January 
2003. 
72 Wang Jiarui was promoted as the Vice Head of International Department of Central Committee CCP in 2001 
and was appointed as the Head of International Department of Central Committee CCP in 2003. 
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government functions should catch up with the SOE reform.73 More specifically, 
Wang has stressed the importance of education being a scholar himself. During his 
administrative period, Wang has claimed that a modern and international city should 
not only include a good city infrastructure and a developed economy, but also the 
morality of its citizens, which represents the real core of a city. For this purpose, he 
has requested the Qingdao Education Bureau to initiate the programme of moral 
education in elementary schools, middle schools and universities.74  
Zhang is another effective secretary of Qingdao city after Yu. Like Yu, before 
taking the position as the mayor of Qingdao city, Zhang was the secretary of the 
Dezhou municipal committee of the CCP in Shandong province from December 1992 
to August 1995 and he was the secretary of Shandong Provincial Political and 
Legislative Affairs Committee of the CCP from August 1995 to January 1996. In 
October 1997, Zhang was appointed as the secretary of the Qingdao municipal 
committee.75  
In 2002, Jiang Zemin stepped down from his position and Hu Jintao was 
appointed as the General Secretary of the CCP. Hu suggests the new idea of “Putting 
People First” (yi min wei ben) for the government administration.76 Following Hu’s 
idea, Zhang is the first municipal leader in Shandong province to introduce the idea of 
                                                        
73 Wang Jiarui, “2000 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Qingdao Government Work Report of 2000], in Qingdao Local 
Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2000 [Qingdao Yearbook 2000] (Beijing: Wuzhou 
chuanbo chubanshe, 2000), pp. 11-12. 
74 Wang, “2000 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Qingdao Government Work Report of 2000], p. 12. 
75 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2000 [Qingdao Yearbook 2000], p. 309. 
76 Hu Jintao, Zai zhongyang renkou ziyuan huanjing gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua [The Lecture at the Meeting 
of Population, Resources and Environment of China], see 
http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/zwgk/ldjh2/t20040412_26920.htm, accessed on 18 October 2005. 
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“service-oriented government” for administrative reform.77 During Zhang’s term of 
office, the Qingdao government has carried out “five projects” (wuxiang gongcheng) 
in the government management system to change the government officials’ attitudes 
to public service and enhance the overall effectiveness of the government departments. 
The Qingdao government leaders have responded faster in accepting and applying 
new administrative concepts than the Jinan and Linyi cities, and this explains why the 
Qingdao government has excelled in public service delivery sector. 
Moreover, Zhang has recognized the weaknesses of government officials in 
Qingdao city. He has criticised the Qingdao government officials for being 
complacent about their economic achievements and neglecting the rapid development 
of some cities in other provinces such as Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Suzhou. Therefore, 
they should continue implementing more economic and administrative reforms. He 
has proposed to carry out the system of performance pledges for public service and 
accountability assurance to enhance the effectiveness of government.78 In addition, 
Zhang has indicated that the government should work harder to make sure that the 
leading cadres are clean, honest and self-disciplined, and to ensure that the major 
corruption cases are investigated and dealt with. 79  Compared with the 2,777 
corruption cases investigated in 1995-1998, 3,242 corruption cases are investigated 
during Zhang’s term of office from 1999 to 2002.80 
From Wang to Zhang, the Qingdao government has actively promoted the level of 
                                                        
77 Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 2002] (Beijing: 
Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002), p. 345. 
78 Ibid. , p. 345. 
79 Ibid. , p. 345. 
80 Refer to Appendix 21. 
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government transparency. Wang is the first mayor in China to establish the Mayor 
email box to handle complaints and consultations, which has helped citizens out of 
difficulties and strengthened the connection between them. Zhang has also 
encouraged citizens to be involved in the decision-making process in important public 
affairs. Therefore, during Wang and Zhang’s administrative periods, the number of 
cases in public hearings is increased as well as the level of transparency within the 
government. 
In the case of Jinan city, in June 1992, Xie Yutang81 was appointed as the mayor 
of Jinan. In 1995, Sun Shuyi was appointed as the secretary of the Jinan municipal 
committee of the CCP (See Table 23). Both leaders had worked in the Jinan 
government for 10 years. Therefore, Jinan’s administrative reforms since 1990 have 
been mainly affected by these two leaders. Nevertheless, Xie and Sun are 
conservative in carrying out economic and administrative reforms compared with the 
leaders of Qingdao city during the corresponding period of Yu Zhengsheng, Wang 
Jiarui and Zhang Huilai.82  
The range of experience of Xie and Sun is limited because of their level of 
education and experience. Before becoming the mayor and secretary of the Jinan 
municipal committee of the CCP, both leaders had the same experience as the 
secretary of the township committee of the CCP and the secretary of the county 
committee of the CCP. Xie had worked in the township and county for 24 years.83 
                                                        
81 Xie Yutang was appointed as the vice governor of Shandong province in January 2003. 
82 Interview with the Director and Deputy Director of Government Set-up Department of Jinan Personnel Bureau, 
14 June 2005. 
83 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1999 [Jinan Yearbook 1999] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 1999), p. 307. 
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Moreover, as the leaders of a capital city, they have emphasized stability (qiuwen) and 
the prevention of disorder (paluan) in carrying out reforms since the Jinan 
government is viewed as a model of administrative reform for other cities. For this 
reason, Jinan government leaders are less inclined to initiate creative measures in 
administrative reform which are untested. Thus, Xie and Sun have tended to be more 
conservative and prudent in implementing administrative reform. Apparently, the 
longer these local leaders hold on to such conservative attitudes, the more severely 
would the reform suffer.84 
 
Table 23: Top Leaders of Jinan Municipal Committee of the CCP and Government 
(1990-present) 
Secretaries of Jinan Municipal Committee of the CCP 
Zhai Yongbo April 1991-December 1992 
Wang Huaiyuan December 1992-September 1993 
Xie Yutang September 1993-May 1995 
Sun Shuyi May 1995-January 2004 
Jiang Daming January 2004-present 
Mayors of Jinan Municipal Government 
Zhai Yongbo March 1986-June 1992 
Xie Yutang June 1992-January 2003 
Bao Zhiqiang January 2003-present 
Source: Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1989, 1993-1994, 1996, 1999, 
2003-2004 [Jinan Yearbook 1989, 1993-1994, 1996, 1999, 2003-2004] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 1989, 
1993-1994, 1996, 1999, 2003-2004, p. 373, p. 262, p. 261, p. 302, p. 307, p. 311, p. 325. 
 
Fortunately, the Shandong provincial government has placed great importance on 
Jinan leaders’ conservative characteristics. After Zhang Gaoli was appointed as the 
governor of Shandong, he has requested that Jinan city, as the capital city with rich 
economic and cultural resources, should develop faster than other cities in Shandong 
                                                        
84 Jae Ho Chung, “Shandong: The Political Economy of Development and Inequality,” in David S. G. Goodman 
(ed.), China's Provinces in Reform: Class, Community, and Political Culture (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 132. 
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province. The Jinan government leaders should aim to transform Jinan city into an 
international city. In order to achieve this goal, Zhang has processed official business 
on-the-spot in Jinan city to attract more foreign investors.85 
In the meantime, the central and provincial governments removed Xie Yutang 
from his position as mayor in January 2003 and Sun Shuyi from his position as party 
secretary in January 2004. To change the conservative characteristics of Jinan’s 
leaders, the central and provincial governments have decided to transfer leaders from 
other cities to Jinan city. In January 2003, Bao Zhiqiang was appointed as the mayor 
of the Jinan government (See Table 23). Bao was the former party secretary of 
Liaoyang city in Liaoning province and the party secretary of Tai’an city in Shandong 
province. 86  Unlike the previous leaders, Bao has introduced new ideas in 
administration: a service-oriented government following the principle of “Putting 
People First” (yi min wei ben) and constructing a harmonious society (hexie shehui) 
proposed by Hu Jintao. Bao has emphasized that government officials should have the 
spirit of truth-seeking and pioneering in solving problems of urban unemployment 
and poverty.87  
In January 2004, Jiang Daming was appointed as the secretary of the Jinan 
municipal committee of the CCP (See Table 23), to bring new ideas of administration 
to Jinan city. Unlike his predecessors, Jiang graduates from the Heilongjiang 
University with a master’s degree in technological economics. Before taking the 
                                                        
85 Qilu wanbao [Qilu Evening News], 18 January 2002. 
86 Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2004 [Jinan Yearbook 2004] (Jinan: Jinan 
chubanshe, 2004), p. 325. 
87 Ibid. , p. 11. 
 255 
position of the party secretary of Jinan city, he was the secretary of secretariat of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China and the vice secretary 
of the Shandong provincial committee of the CCP. Thus, Jinan’s administrative and 
economic reform in the future is expected to be more successful. 
Compared with Qingdao and Jinan cities, the Linyi municipality was established 
in February 1995 when the Linyi region administrative office was dissolved and the 
Linyi county-city was upgraded to the Linyi municipality. Therefore, 1995 was a 
transitional year when Wang Jiugu and Zhang Shouye became the party secretary and 
mayor of Linyi government respectively (See Table 24). After 1995, the main leaders 
of the Linyi government are Zhang Shouye,88 Qiao Yanchun89 and Li Yumei.90  
Although these leaders have implemented administrative and economic reforms 
and ensured Linyi city’s steady progress, the government’s functions in education, 
health and social security are still weak because its economic foundation is poor and 
its leaders’ determination in reform is weak. Like the leaders in the Jinan government, 
the conservative characteristics of the Linyi government leaders have hindered Linyi 
city from developing quickly. In addition, the common characteristics of the three 
leaders (Zhang, Qiao and Li) are that they do not have the experience of being a 




                                                        
88 In April 1998, Zhang Shouye was appointed as the vice dean of the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee of 
Shandong People’s Congress. 
89 In April 2003, Qiao Yanchun was appointed as the vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) of Shandong province. 
90 Li Yumei was a female mayor. In January 2001, Li Yumei was promoted to become the Secretary of Laiwu 
Municipal Committee of the CCP in Shandong province. 
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Table 24: Top Leaders of Linyi Municipal Committee of the CCP and Government 
(1995-present) 
Secretaries of Linyi Municipal Committee of the CCP 
Wang Jiugu February 1995-September1995 
Zhang Shouye September 1995-December 1997 
Qiao Yanchun December 1997-December 2002 
Li Qun December 2002-present  
Mayors of Linyi Municipal Government 
Zhang Shouye April 1995-September 1995 
Qiao Yanchun September 1995-December 1997 
Li Yumei December 1997-January 2001  
Li Qun January 2001—December 2002 
Lian Chengmin December 2002—present 
Source: Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1995-1999, 2001-2004 [Linyi 
Yearbook 1995-1999, 2001-2004] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1997-2001) (N.B: The 2001 Yearbook was 
published by Hong Kong New Times Press and the 2002-2004 Yearbooks were published by Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 2002-2004), pp. 24, 400, 401, pp. 27, 42, 417, pp. 25, 37, p. 16, 28, p. 25, pp. 15, 17, 
p. 26, pp. 24-25, pp. 29-30. 
 
Unlike the previous leaders, Lian Chengmin and Li Qun have the experience of 
working in other cities. Lian was the vice party secretary of Wei Hai city, a coastal 
city in Shandong province. Li was the secretary of the Weifang Municipal Committee 
of the Communist Youth League of China and the mayor of Shouguang county-city. 
Both leaders, especially Li, are very active in assimilating the experience of 
administrative reform in other areas and countries. 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, Li Qun went to the United States for 10 months for 
his Master of Public Administration (MPA) degree at the University of New Haven 
and was the assistant to the mayor of New Haven for three months. In New Haven, Li 
observed that the mayor was only engaged in the affairs of education, environmental 
protection, communication, housing, public security and did not directly manage the 
economy of the city.  
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When he returned to China, Li asked government officials to focus on public 
service in education, social security and environmental protection instead of directly 
managing enterprises and privately-owned business. Linyi city is a commercial city 
that attracts many businessmen, who have been discouraged by the poor public 
security conditions in Linyi city during the past years. Therefore, Li sets aside 
appropriate funds for the Public Security Bureau to improve the technology in 
processing cases and enhance its efficiency in resolving criminal cases. With the 
implementation of these measures, the local environment of public security has 
improved greatly. As a result, in 2001, the number of enterprises and privately-owned 
businesses increased and was ranked second in Shandong province.91 
Li has also encouraged government officials to follow the example of the New 
Haven government officials to separate public from private interests. In Linyi city, 
some government officials are not meticulous in separating public from private 
interests and approve applications by foreign investors to build their factories in Linyi 
city, and return the total amount of land price to the investors. This results in 
considerable loss in economy and land in Linyi city. Li has stopped these unethical 
practices conducted by some government officials. In 2001, the total revenue for 
selling land in Linyi city increased to RMB 710 million while the total revenue of 
selling land during the past 50 years was only RMB 600 million.92 Moreover, to 
prevent corruption, he has signed the probity responsibility guarantee (lianzheng zeren 
shu) with the 12 leading cadres of the county and district governments and 32 leading 
                                                        
91 Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2003] (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 2003), pp. 1-3. 
92 Ibid. , pp. 3-4. 
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cadres of the anti-corruption departments. Based on his experience in the United 
States, Li has also indicated that the portion of social security expenditure in total 
government expenditure should be increased. 
Li’s ideas and actions are highly praised by Zeng Qinghong, the Vice-President of 
the People’s Republic of China. The Shandong provincial government also hopes that 
all local government leaders would study his book.93 With the support of local leaders 
and experience borrowed from other areas and countries, Linyi city has developed 
quickly in recent years and its GDP in 2004 increased to RMB 101.20 billion, which 




The relationship between the central and local governments and the leadership of the 
central and local governments make an impact on local government reform. The 
relationship between the central and local governments plays an important role in 
influencing the effectiveness of local government reform in the three municipalities.  
First, the central government has extended economic management authority to the 
municipal government. Qingdao city is approved as both a centrally-planned city and 
a sub-provincial city, and enjoys both provincial fiscal management autonomy and 
economic management autonomy. Jinan city is approved as a sub-provincial city and 
only enjoys provincial economic management autonomy. In contrast, Linyi city is 
neither a centrally-planned city nor a sub-provincial city, and does not enjoy any fiscal 
                                                        
93 Ibid. , pp. 3-6. 
94 Linyi Statistical Bureau, “Linyi gaikuang” [The General Situation of Linyi City], see 
http://www.linyi.gov.cn/lygk/lygk.htm, accessed on 9 November 2005. 
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or economic management autonomy at the provincial level. Thus, both the Qingdao 
and Jinan governments have a direct relationship with the central government in 
economic management and the Linyi government has an indirect relationship with the 
central government in this regard. The preferential policies and special authority for 
the centrally-planned city and sub-provincial city have encouraged Qingdao and Jinan 
cities to promote administrative reform. In contrast, the lack of such preferential 
policies and special authority has discouraged prefecture-level cities such as Linyi 
city from implementing reforms, which results in the flow of talent and resources to 
the coastal and capital cities such as Qingdao and Jinan cities. 
   Second, in 1994, the central government implemented the fenshuizhi (division of 
the tax-collection system) to share tax revenue with the local governments. This 
system has centralized the fiscal power for macro-control for the central government 
and reduced the amount of tax revenue for local governments, which has led to the 
reduced investment in public services like education and health care by them. 
   Responding to this system, the central government has carried out chuizhi guanli 
(hierarchical control through vertical administration) to collect both central tax and 
shared tax by the central and local governments since 1998. According to this system, 
the Qingdao State Taxation Bureau is directly under the jurisdiction of the State 
Administration of Taxation since the Qingdao government has fiscal management 
authority at the provincial level. The Qingdao Local Taxation Bureau is directly under 
the jurisdiction of the municipal government. In contrast, both the Jinan and Linyi 
governments do not enjoy fiscal management authority at the provincial level. The 
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State and Local Taxation Bureaus in Jinan and Linyi municipalities are both under the 
jurisdiction of the State and Local Taxation Bureaus in Shandong province.  
Therefore, the Qingdao government enjoys more autonomy in the management of 
fiscal revenue and expenditure than the Jinan and Linyi governments. In this case, 
more financial revenue is transferred to the municipal coffers in the Qingdao 
government and in the Jinan and Linyi governments, most of local financial revenue 
is transferred to the provincial and central coffers. The shortage of financial revenue 
has further hampered both the Jinan and Linyi governments’ efforts in improving 
public services. 
Third, the central government has strengthened the leading cadre appointment in 
local governments through nomenklatura. Through the process of political control 
over the sub-provincial cities, the Qingdao and Jinan governments have acquired 
more support from the central government for their administrative reforms, and 
encouraged them to carry out innovative reform measures like the “Sunshine Aid 
Project” in the area of social security. In contrast, the Linyi government has less 
support from the central government and it only implements the reform measures 
recommended by the central government. 
Fourth, delegation of the local law-making to the Qingdao and Jinan governments 
has facilitated their administrative reforms since they can formulate new local laws to 
satisfy the needs of local economic and administrative management. In contrast, the 
absence of this authority in Linyi city has hindered the process of administrative 
reform there. 
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   Apart from the relationship of the central and local governments, the leadership is 
also a key element determining whether the reform is successful or not. In the central 
government, Deng Xiaoping is the chief architect of China’s reform. After him, Jiang 
Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji have implemented the most comprehensive 
administrative reforms until the present. Their successors, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, 
have concentrated on the simplification of government institutions, to further improve 
government functions, attitudes of government officials and the cooperative 
relationship between government and the citizens. 
In the local governments, the top leaders in Qingdao city are famous for their open 
attitudes and efforts in vigorously implementing administrative reforms in Shandong 
province. Yu Zhengsheng has concentrated on improving Qingdao city’s construction 
and actively carrying out the reform of separating government functions from that of 
enterprises, which has cultivated many famous enterprises in Qingdao city. Wang 
Jiarui, as a “doctor mayor,” has paid more attention to changing government functions 
for the purpose of establishing a modern enterprise system and a moral education 
programme in schools and universities. Another leader implementing reform measures 
in Qingdao city is Zhang Huilai, who has carried out “five projects” (wuxiang 
gongcheng) in the government management system to strengthen the service functions 
of government and change the attitudes of government officials to public service. 
The Qingdao government leaders are more open-minded in accepting and 
applying new administrative concepts and initiating more innovative reform measures 
than the Jinan and Linyi governments, and enable the Qingdao government to be the 
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most effective municipality in providing service for enterprises and the society. 
In contrast, Jinan’s top leaders such as Xie Yutang and Sun Shuyi are not as 
open-minded as the leaders in Qingdao city. Although they have also made some 
efforts in improving government functions and changing the attitudes of government 
officials, the Jinan government is not as effective as the Qingdao government in 
implementing administrative reform. The conservative characteristics of Jinan’s 
leaders have prevented them from accepting new ideas of administration and 
introducing new reform measures.  
The newer leaders, Bao Zhiqiang and Jiang Daming, have the experience of 
working in other cities and appear to be more open-mined than their predecessors. 
Bao has introduced the new idea of the service-oriented government and emphasized 
that government officials should have a truth-seeking and pioneering spirit to solve 
the living problems of urban unemployment and poverty.95 As Jiang Daming, the 
newly appointed party secretary, has a Masters degree and has worked in the central 
and provincial governments, he is expected to bring new ideas in administration to 
Jinan city.  
For Linyi city, the main leaders in the 1990s are even more conservative than their 
counterparts in Jinan city. They are not interested in reform and do not have the 
working experience of being a mayor or party secretary in other cities. All these 
factors have hindered the process of administrative reform in Linyi city.  
To accelerate the development of Linyi city, the poor area of Shandong province, 
                                                        
95 Bao Zhiqiang, “2003 Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” [Jinan Government Work Report of 2003], in Jinan Local 
Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 2003] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 2003), 
p. 11. 
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the central and provincial governments have sent Li Qun and Lian Chengmin to Linyi 
city as the secretary and mayor respectively. Unlike the previous leaders, Lian and Li 
have the experience of working in other cities. Li went to the United States for his 
MPA and was the assistant to the mayor of New Haven for three months. Influenced 
by his experience in New Haven, he has asked government officials to focus on public 
service in education, environmental protection, housing and public security. 
In sum, the relationship between the central and local governments has affected in 
different ways the local government reform in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
municipalities in terms of decentralization of economic management, taxation sharing, 
political control and delegation of law-making. Among these three municipalities, the 
Qingdao government enjoys most preferential policies or authority to carry out reform; 
the Jinan government enjoys less preferential policies or authority than the Qingdao 
government but more than the Linyi government. In addition, the central and local 
leadership plays an important role in affecting local government reform in these three 
municipalities. The leaders of Qingdao municipality are more open-minded than those 
of Jinan and Linyi municipalities and they are responsible for making the Qingdao 
government the most effective municipality in implementing administrative reform.
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section reviews the reform 
measures in government restructuring, public service delivery and civil service system 
and the effectiveness of local government reform in the three municipalities. The 
second section summarises the impact of the three factors of the local context, the 
relationship between the central and local governments and the leadership on local 
government reform in the three municipalities. The third section concludes the chapter 
by discussing the limitations and theoretical contributions of this thesis. 
 
Reform Measures and Effectiveness of Local Government Reform 
 
For the first goal of enhancing the efficiency of government, the three municipalities 
have accomplished this through curtailing the micro-economic functions of the 
government and by simplifying the procedures of granting administrative approval. 
However, they have not downsized their governments as planned since the number of 
government officials in the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi governments has increased from 
1994 to 2003. The civil service reforms in the three municipalities have enhanced the 
quality of civil servants through the recruitment of more well-educated officials and 
the introduction of open competition in promoting government officials. However, the 
performance appraisal system, the reward and punishment system and the dismissal 
system are not institutionalized. Guanxi (personal connections) and houmen 
(“backdoor” practices) culture have hindered the local governments from 
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implementing these systems effectively. The financial stress of local government has 
also impeded the implementation of incentive measures. In addition, through training 
programmes, local government officials have gradually changed their habits of 
intervening in economic affairs to providing public service. 
In comparison, the Qingdao government is the most efficient government because 
its administrative expense as a proportion of the total local government expenditure is 
the lowest as compared with that of the Jinan and Linyi governments. It has 
established a one-stop shop, recruited well-educated officials and implemented the 
performance appraisal system on the basis of public service and the motivating system 
for officials such as raising salary or increasing bonuses. The Jinan government is 
ranked second and the Linyi government is ranked third on all these aspects. 
   The second goal is to improve the quality of public service. Through the 
privatization of the education, health and social security sectors, all three 
municipalities have increased the enrolment rate in secondary and tertiary educational 
institutions and the percentage of medical and pension contributors among the total 
urban employees. However, the local governments have regarded privatization as an 
instrument of off-loading and have reduced their responsibility in areas such as 
compulsory education, public health and social security. As a result, individuals have 
to bear more financial responsibilities for their own education, health care and 
pension and unemployment insurance. This outcome indicates that reform in this area 
is not successful. 
In comparison, both the Qingdao and Jinan governments have performed better 
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than the Linyi government. The Qingdao government has performed best in investing 
in public education, reducing the infant mortality rate, enlarging the public’s access to 
improved water sources and expanding the coverage of social security. It has achieved 
a great deal in improving the service delivery in social security through the “Sunshine 
Aid Project.” The Jinan government has performed the best in enlarging the enrolment 
rate in higher education, investing in public health, increasing the number of 
physicians and hospital beds and providing public expenditure for pensions and relief 
funds for social welfare. The Linyi government has performed the best in reducing the 
unemployment rate but is ranked third on the other aspects such as education, health 
and social security. 
Third, through administrative reform, the three municipalities have made great 
efforts in enhancing transparency in their governments. To improve their service in 
providing public information, they have issued formal regulations for openness of 
government information and introduced local government websites. Nevertheless, all 
three governments should improve the level of transparency in the open recruitment 
and appointment process for officials. Furthermore, the three municipalities have 
adopted numerous forms of public participation since 1999, including subjecting 
government agencies to public scrutiny, soliciting and dealing with public complaints, 
carrying out an external evaluation system for officials conducted by the citizens and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and introducing public hearings. 
Nevertheless, the local governments should really solve the problems addressed by 
the citizens rather than specifying formal restrictions on group complaints and making 
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it difficult for them to pursue redress. They also need to invite more grassroots 
citizens to participate in public hearing meetings and to form a consensus among 
citizens. 
This thesis argues that the Qingdao government has performed the best in 
providing comprehensive and prompt government information to the public through 
its website, encouraging online public involvement, introducing public hearings on 
important issues, and utilizing the more open recruitment and appointment processes 
for government officials. The Jinan government has performed better than the Linyi 
government in providing government information through its website and public 
hearings on important issues. However, the Linyi government has performed better 
than the Jinan government in giving feedback for online public involvement but is 
ranked third on the other aspects.  
   The fourth goal is to improve bureaucratic accountability and integrity in 
government. The three municipalities have introduced administrative licensing 
regulations and implemented the performance pledges for public service. They have 
also implemented the system of accountability assurance and the system of auditing 
the economic responsibility of leading cadres. However, these systems have not been 
institutionalized. The low level of government transparency and public participation 
has also undermined the effectiveness in implementing these systems. More 
specifically, the three municipalities have not effectively curbed corruption, even 
though the number of senior officials investigated and convicted for corruption has 
increased during the past 10 years. The percentage of investigated and closed cases of 
 268 
the total citizen reports for corruption is very low and the number of officials 
disciplined among the total number of officials is also low. 
Among the three municipalities, the Qingdao government has performed the best 
in primarily establishing the external supervision system, implementing the auditing 
system of the economic responsibility of cadres, investigating corruption cases and 
disciplining government officials involved in corruption. The Jinan government has 
performed better than the other two governments in investigating senior officials 
involved in corruption. The Linyi government is ranked third on all these aspects. 
In sum, the Qingdao government is ranked first in terms of the four criteria of 
enhancing the efficiency of government, improving the quality of public service of 
government, instituting transparent government and improving the accountability and 
integrity of government. The Jinan government is ranked second on the three aspects 
of enhancing the efficiency of government, instituting transparent government and 
improving the accountability and integrity of government. It is also ranked first on 
improving the quality of public service of government, which can be attributed to 
Jinan’s status. As the political and cultural centre of Shandong province, Jinan 
municipality has the advantages of performing the best in improving the quality of 
public service since it attracts many professionals in the education and health sectors. 
The Linyi government is ranked third on all the four aspects. 
 
Factors Affecting Local Government Reform 
 
How can their different levels of effectiveness be explained? Firstly, the local context 
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of the Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi cities plays an important role in influencing the 
implementation of their administrative reforms. Among the three municipalities in 
Shandong province, the status of business centre has facilitated the economic and 
administrative reform in Qingdao city. The status of a political and cultural centre has 
also favoured Jinan city in improving public service delivery in the education and 
health sectors. In contrast, the mountainous location, large rural area and poor 
economy have hindered Linyi city’s development. 
In addition, the relationship between the central and local governments has also 
affected the effectiveness of local government reform in the three municipalities. First, 
the decentralization of economic management authority in Qingdao and Jinan cities 
allows them to promote administrative reform. In contrast, Linyi city does not enjoy 
any fiscal or economic management autonomy like Qingdao and Jinan cities, and 
therefore has no incentives to carry out administrative reform. This has also led to a 
brain-drain since human resources are attracted to coastal and capital cities such as 
Qingdao and Jinan. 
Second, through the taxation sharing system with the local government and the 
chuizhi guanli (hierarchical control through vertical administration), the Qingdao 
government enjoys more autonomy in the management of fiscal revenue and 
expenditure than the Jinan and Linyi governments. In this case, more financial 
revenue have been transferred to the municipal coffers of Qingdao city while in Jinan 
and Linyi cities, most of local financial revenue are transferred to the provincial and 
central coffers. The shortage of financial revenue has further hampered the Jinan and 
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Linyi governments’ efforts to improve public service. 
Third, through the process of political control over the sub-provincial cities, the 
Qingdao and Jinan governments have acquired more support from the central 
government for their administrative reforms. The central government’s support has 
encouraged the Qingdao government to carry out innovative reform measures like the 
“Sunshine Aid Project” in the area of social security. In comparison, the Linyi 
government has less support from the central government and has not introduced 
innovative reform measures. 
Fourth, the delegation of local law-making to the Qingdao and Jinan governments 
has facilitated their administrative reforms since they can swiftly formulate new local 
laws to satisfy the need for local economic and administrative management. In 
contrast, the lack of such authority in the Linyi government has hindered the process 
of administrative reform. 
   Apart from the relationship between the central and local governments, leadership 
is also a key element in determining whether the reform is successful or not. In the 
central government, Deng Xiaoping was the chief architect of China’s reform. After 
him, Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji implemented the most comprehensive 
administrative reforms. Their successors, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have concentrated 
on improving government functions, the attitudes of government officials and the 
cooperative relationship between the government and citizens. 
In local government, the top leaders in Qingdao city are famous for their 
open-minded attitudes in accepting and applying new administrative concepts and 
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imposing more effective reform measures than the Jinan and Linyi government 
leaders, which explains why the Qingdao government ranks first among the three 
municipalities in providing service for the enterprises and the society. The top leaders 
of the Jinan government are not as open-minded as the leaders in Qingdao city and 
their conservative nature has prevented them from accepting new ideas of 
administration and initiating effective reform measures. In Linyi city the main leaders 
in the 1990s were even more conservative than the leaders in Jinan city as they were 
not interested in reform and did not have the working experience of having been 
mayors or party secretaries in other cities. All these factors have hindered the process 
of administrative reform in Linyi city. 
 
Limitations and Theoretical Contributions 
 
This thesis acknowledges the limitations of the study. The findings of this study may 
not be generalized to all municipalities in China or other countries as it only focuses 
on three municipalities in Shandong province. In addition, the findings of Qingdao 
city may not be applicable to the other 16 cities of Shandong province as Qingdao city 
has a number of preferential policies in relation to economic and administrative 
reforms. However, this thesis could still make theoretical contributions to 
administrative reform research. 
   Firstly, this thesis combines the three important factors: local context, the 
relationship between the central and local government and leadership to analyze local 
government reform in China, which rectifies the research gap that few scholars have 
employed and combined these three factors to analyze administrative reform at the 
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local level. As mentioned in Chapter 2, some scholars such as Burns and Yang have 
analyzed the factors which affect administrative reform in China. However, their 
analyses mainly focus on administrative reform at the national level instead of the 
local level. More specifically, different from their analyses, which only utilize one or 
two factors to analyze the reform, this study combines the three important factors, that 
is, local context, the relationship between the central and local government and 
leadership, to analyze local government reform. Thus, other scholars could use these 
three factors to analyze local government reform in other municipalities in China or 
other countries. 
   Secondly, this thesis formulates an evaluation system for assessing local 
government reform which has never been done by other scholars. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, few scholars has conduced research on evaluating the effectiveness of local 
government reform in China. This study identifies the indicators provided by the 
institutions such as the World Bank, the IMD, the OECD, the ADB and the Ministry 
of Personnel in China and some scholars such as Porta et al., Price and Burns to 
formulate an evaluation system. Therefore, other scholars could use this evaluation 
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Appendix 1: Interviewees in Jinan, Qingdao and Linyi Municipalities 
 
Venue Date Position of Interviewee 
Official of Education Bureau 10 June 2005 
(Friday) Official of Education Bureau 
Official of Labour and Social Security Bureau 13 June 2005 
(Monday) 
Official of Labour and Social Security Bureau 
Director of Government Set-up Department of 
Personnel Bureau 
14 June 2005 
(Tuesday) 
Deputy Director of Government Set-up Department of 
Personnel Bureau 
15 June 2005 
(Wednesday) 
Official of Health Bureau 
16 June 2005 
(Thursday) 
Director of Civil Organizations Management 
Department of Civil Affairs Bureau 
Director of Investigation and Research Department of 
Administrative Examination and Approval Service 
Centre 
Jinan city 
17 June 2005 
(Friday) 
Deputy Dean of Public Service Centre of Urban Public 
Utility Administrative Bureau 
Director of Social Relief Department of Civil Affairs 
Bureau 
Section Chief of Social Relief Department of Civil 
Affairs Bureau 
20 June 2005 
(Monday) 
Section Chief of Special Care of Civil Affairs Bureau 
of Shinan District 
Dean of General Office of Health Bureau 21 June 2005 
(Tuesday) Dean of General Office of Urban Public Utility 
Administrative Bureau 
Official of Labour and Social Security Bureau 22 June 2005 
(Wednesday) Official of Labour and Social Security Bureau 
Official of Government Set-up Department of 
Personnel Bureau  
23 June 2005 
(Thursday) 
Official of Education Bureau 
Director of Finance Bureau of Laoshan District  
Qingdao city 
24 June 2005 (Friday) 
Director of Reform and Development Bureau of 
Laoshan District 
27 June 2005 
(Monday) 
Official of Health Bureau Linyi city 
Official of Civil Affairs Bureau 
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28 June 2005 
(Tuesday) 
Official of Civil Affairs Bureau 
Deputy Director of Personnel Bureau 29 June 2005 
(Wednesday) Official of Personnel Bureau 
Secretary of the Party Committee of Education Bureau 30 June 2005 
(Thursday) Official of Education Bureau 
Official of Labour and Social Security Bureau 
 
1 July 2005 













































Per capita GDP 
Labor productivity 
Economy 
Ratio of external investment to GDP 
Average life expectancy 
Engel’s coefficient 
Society 
Average education received 
Environment and ecology 








Natural growth rate of population 
GDP growth rate 
Urban registered unemployment rate 
Economic 
adjustment 
Fiscal revenue and expenditure 








Traffic and industrial accident fatality rate 
Infrastructure 
Information transparency  
Public service 
Public satisfaction 
Rate of value added and guaranteed in state-owned 
enterprises 











Growth rate of profits realized by state-owned 
enterprises 




Strategic human resource planning 
Ratio of corruption cases to administrative staff 
Working style of officials 
Clean government 
Citizen appraisal 
Ratio of administrative funding to fiscal expenditure 



























Level of information management 
Source: “Government Performance Yardsticks Set,” see 
http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/Show_Text?info_id=102910&p_qry=government%20and%20effectiveness%
20and%20china, accessed on 20 October 2004 and Liu Shixin, “Zhongguo zhengfu jixiaopinggu tixi mianshi” 
[The Appearance of a New System of Appraising Local Government in China], Zhongguo qingnianbao [China 
Youth Daily], 2 August 2004, p. A1. 
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Appendix 3: Map of China, Indicating the Location of Shandong Province 
 
 
Source: “Location of Shandong Province in the Map of China,” see 


























Source: “Map of Shandong Province,” see 























Appendix 5: Government Agencies of Qingdao Municipality in 1998 and 2003 
 
Name of Government Agency in 1998 (54) Name of Government Agency in 2003 (43) 
1. General Office, the People’s Government of Qingdao 
Municipality 
1. General Office, the People’s Government of Qingdao 
Municipality 
2. Qingdao Planning Commission 2. Qingdao Development and Reform Commission 
3. Qingdao Economic Commission 3. Qingdao Economic Commission (including Qingdao 
Safely Production Supervision and Administration 
Bureau) 
4. Qingdao Committee for Restructuring Economic 
System  
4. Qingdao Office for Restructuring Economic System 
5. Qingdao Committee of Foreign Trade and Economy  5. Qingdao Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Bureau (Commission of Opening to the Outside World 
Work of CCP Qingdao Municipal Committee) 
6. Qingdao Education Committee 6. Qingdao Education Bureau 
7. Qingdao Science and Technology Commission 7. Qingdao Science and Technology Bureau 
8. Qingdao Construction Commission (Office of Urban 
Administrative Commission of Qingdao Municipality; 
Construction Commission of CCP Qingdao Municipal 
Committee) 
8. Qingdao Construction Commission (Construction 
Commission of CCP Qingdao Municipal Committee) 
9. Qingdao Agriculture Bureau 
10. Qingdao Agriculture Office (Commission of Rural 
Work of CCP Qingdao Municipal Committee) 
9. Qingdao Agriculture Bureau (Commission of Rural 
Work of CCP Qingdao Municipal Committee) 
11. Qingdao Animal Husbandry Bureau   
12. Qingdao Agricultural Machinery Administration 
Bureau 
 
13. Qingdao Township Enterprise Management Bureau  
14. Qingdao Public Security Bureau 10. Qingdao Public Security Bureau 
15. Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau 11. Qingdao Civil Affairs Bureau 
16. Qingdao Justice Bureau 12. Qingdao Justice Bureau (Qingdao Prison 
Administrative Bureau) 
17. Qingdao Finance Bureau 13. Qingdao Finance Bureau 
18. Qingdao Personnel Bureau (Office of Government 
Set-up Committee of Qingdao Municipality) 
14. Qingdao Personnel Bureau (Office of Government 
Set-up Committee of Qingdao Municipality) 
19. Qingdao Labour and Social Security Bureau 15. Qingdao Labour and Social Security Bureau 
20. Qingdao Communications Bureau 16. Qingdao Communications Bureau 
21. Qingdao Water Resources Bureau 17. Qingdao Water Resources Bureau 
22. Qingdao Marine and Aquatic Product Bureau  18. Qingdao Marine and Fishery Bureau 
23. Qingdao Forestry Bureau 19. Qingdao Forestry Bureau 
24. Qingdao Culture Bureau  20. Qingdao Culture Bureau 
25. Qingdao Health Bureau 21. Qingdao Health Bureau 
26. Qingdao Audit Bureau 22. Qingdao Audit Bureau 
27. Qingdao Statistical Bureau 23. Qingdao Statistical Bureau  
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28. Qingdao Grain Administration 24. Qingdao Grain Administration 
29. Qingdao Environmental Protection Bureau  25. Qingdao Environmental Protection Bureau 
30. Qingdao Real Estate Bureau 
31. Qingdao Geology and Mineral Resources Bureau 
32. Qingdao Land Management Bureau (Qingdao 
Urban Planning Bureau) 
26. Qingdao Land Resources and Housing Management 
Bureau 
33. Qingdao Urban Planning Bureau 27. Qingdao Urban Planning Bureau 
34. Qingdao Tourism Administration 28. Qingdao Tourism Administration 
35. Qingdao Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau  29. Qingdao Ethnic Affairs and Religious Affairs 
Bureau 
36. Qingdao Foreign Affairs Office 30. Qingdao Foreign Affairs Office 
37. Qingdao Overseas Chinese Affairs Office 31. Qingdao Overseas Chinese Affairs Office 
38. Qingdao Port Office 32. Qingdao Port Office 
39. Office of Civil Air Defence Commission of 
Qingdao Municipality 
33. Office of Civil Air Defence Commission of 
Qingdao Municipality 
40. Qingdao Finance and Trade Commission ( Qingdao 
Internal Trade Bureau; Finance and Trade Commission 
of CCP Qingdao Municipal Committee) 
34. Qingdao Finance and Trade Office (Finance and 
Trade Commission of CCP Qingdao Municipal 
Committee) 
41. Qingdao Garden, Environment and Sanitation 
Administration Bureau 
42. Qingdao Public Utility Administration Bureau 
43. Qingdao Municipal Engineering Administration 
Bureau 
44. Office of Urban Management Commission of 
Qingdao Municipality 
35. Qingdao Urban Public Utility Administrative 
Bureau 
45. Qingdao State-owned Assets Administration Bureau  36. Qingdao State-owned Assets Administration Office 
46. Qingdao Legislative Affairs Bureau 37. Qingdao Legislative Affairs Office 
47. Qingdao Survey Research Office, the People’s 
Government of Qingdao Municipality (Research Centre 
for Development of Qingdao Municipality) 
38. Survey Research Office, the People’s Government 
of Qingdao Municipality 
48. Qingdao Economic and Technical Cooperation 
Office 
49. Qingdao Pairing-assistance Office (Duikou zhiyuan 
bangongshi) 
50. Qingdao Internal Business Invitation Office 
39. Qingdao Internal Economic Cooperation Office 
51. Qingdao Price Control Administration  40. Qingdao Price Control Bureau 
52. Qingdao Radio and Television Administration 41. Qingdao Radio and Television Administration 
53. Qingdao Physical Culture and Sports Commission  42. Qingdao Sports Bureau 
54. Qingdao Family Planning Commission  43. Qingdao Family Planning Commission 
Source: Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2000, 2004 [Qingdao Yearbook 
2000, 2004] (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2000) (N. B: The 2004 Yearbook was published by Qingdao 
shizhi bangongshi, 2004), pp. 20-22, pp. 16-20 and Qingdao Municipal Government, Guanyu jigougaige de shishi 
yijian [Suggestions on Organizational Reform], 2001, pp. 2-14. 
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Appendix 6: Government Agencies of Jinan Municipality in 1998 and 2003 
 
Name of Government Agency in 1998 (54) Name of Government Agency in 2003 (43) 
1. General Office, the People’s Government of 
Jinan Municipality 
1. General Office, the People’s Government of 
Jinan Municipality  
2. Jinan Planning Commission  2. Jinan Development and Planning 
Commission  
3. Jinan Economic Commission 3. Jinan Economic Commission (including 
Jinan Safely Production Supervision and 
Administration Bureau) 
4. Jinan Education Committee 
5. Jinan Adult Education Bureau 
4. Jinan Education Bureau 
6. Jinan Science and Technology Committee 5. Jinan Science and Technology Bureau 
7. Jinan Public Security Bureau 6. Jinan Public Security Bureau 
8. Jinan Civil Affairs Bureau 7. Jinan Civil Affairs Bureau 
9. Jinan Justice Bureau 8. Jinan Justice Bureau 
10. Jinan Finance Bureau 9. Jinan Finance Bureau 
11. Jinan Personnel Bureau (Office of 
Government Set-up Committee of Jinan 
Municipality) 
10. Jinan Personnel Bureau (Office of 
Government Set-up Committee of Jinan 
Municipality) 
12. Jinan Labour and Social Security Bureau  11. Jinan Labour and Social Security Bureau 
13. Jinan Geology and Mineral Resources 
Bureau  
14. Jinan Land Management Bureau 
12. Jinan Land Resources Bureau 
15. Jinan Construction Commission 
16. Jinan Urban Construction Administration 
Bureau 
17. Jinan Public Utility Administration Bureau  
18. Jinan Garden Bureau  
19. Jinan Environment and Sanitation Bureau  
20. Jinan Construction Management Bureau 
13. Jinan Construction Commission (Jinan 
Urban Public Utility Administrative Bureau) 
21. Jinan Planning Bureau 14. Jinan Planning Bureau 
22. Jinan Environmental Protection Bureau  15. Jinan Environmental Protection Bureau 
23. Jinan Communications Bureau 16. Jinan Communications Bureau 
24. Jinan Information Leading Group Office 
and Electronics Industry Council 
17. Jinan Information Industry Bureau 
25. Jinan Water Resources Bureau 18. Jinan Water Resources Bureau 
26. Jinan Agriculture Bureau 
27. Jinan Agriculture Commission 
28. Jinan Animal Husbandry Bureau 
29. Jinan Vegetables Bureau 
19. Jinan Agriculture Bureau 
30. Jinan Forestry Bureau 20. Jinan Forestry Bureau 
31. Jinan Grain Administration 21. Jinan Grain Administration 
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32. Jinan Foreign Trade and Economy 
Committee  
22. Jinan Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Bureau 
33. Jinan Culture Bureau 23. Jinan Culture Bureau 
34. Jinan Health Bureau 24. Jinan Health Bureau 
35. Jinan Radio and Television Administration  25. Jinan Radio and Television Administration 
36. Jinan Physical Culture and Sports 
Commission 
26. Jinan Sports Bureau 
37. Jinan Family Planning Commission 27. Jinan Family Planning Commission 
38. Jinan Audit Bureau 28. Jinan Audit Bureau 
39. Jinan Statistical Bureau 29. Jinan Statistical Bureau  
40. Jinan Ethnic and Religious Affairs 
Commission  
30. Jinan Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau 
41. Jinan Tourism Administration 31. Jinan Tourism Administration 
42. Jinan Township Enterprise Management 
Bureau 
32. Jinan Small Business Bureau 
43. Jinan Press and Publication Bureau  
44. Jinan Legislative Affairs Bureau 33. Jinan Legislative Affairs Office 
45. Jinan Finance and Trade Commission (Jinan 
Internal Trade Bureau) 
34. Jinan Finance and Trade Office 
46. Jinan Foreign Affairs Office 35. Jinan Foreign Affairs Office 
47. Jinan Overseas Chinese Affairs Office 36. Jinan Overseas Chinese Affairs Office 
48. Jinan Port Office 37. Jinan Port Office 
49. Research Office, the People’s Government 
of Jinan Municipality 
38. Survey Research Office, the People’s 
Government of Jinan Municipality 
50. Jinan Price Control Bureau 39. Jinan Price Control Bureau (managed by 
Development and Planning Commission) 
51. Jinan State-owned Assets Administration 
Bureau  
40. Jinan State-owned Assets Administration 
Bureau (managed by Finance Bureau) 
52. Jinan Real Estate Bureau 41. Jinan Real Estate Bureau (managed by 
Construction Commission) 
53. Committee for Restructuring Economic 
System of Jinan Municipality 
42. Office for Restructuring Economic System 
of Jinan Municipality 
54. Office of Civil Air Defence Commission of 
Jinan Municipality 
43. Office of Civil Air Defence Commission of 
Jinan Municipality 
Source: Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1999, 2004 [Jinan 
Yearbook 1999, 2004] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 1999, 2004), pp. 64-69, pp. 59-60 and Jinan 
Municipal Government, Guanyu shi xian xiang jigougaige de baogao [Report for Organizational 








Appendix 7: Government Agencies of Linyi Municipality in 1998 and 2003 
 
Name of Government Agency in 1998 (49) Name of Government Agency in 2003 (38) 
1. General Office, the People’s Government of 
Linyi Municipality 
1. General Office, the People’s Government of 
Linyi Municipality 
2. Linyi Legislative Affairs Bureau 2. Linyi Legislative Affairs Bureau (managed 
by General Office) 
3. Linyi Planning Commission  3. Linyi Development and Reform Commission  
4. Linyi Price Control Administration 4. Linyi Price Control Administration (managed 
by Development and Reform Commission) 
5. Linyi Finance Bureau  
6. Linyi State-owned Assets Administration 
Bureau 
5. Linyi Finance Bureau 
7. Linyi Foreign Trade and Economy 
Committee 
6. Linyi Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Bureau 
8. Linyi Construction Commission  
9. Linyi Construction Management Bureau 
10. Linyi City Appearance Bureau 
7. Linyi Construction Bureau 
11. Linyi Planning Management Bureau 8. Linyi Urban Planning Bureau 
12. Linyi Public Utility Bureau 9. Linyi Urban Public Utility Administrative 
Bureau 
13. Linyi Real Estate Bureau 
14. Office of Housing Committee of Linyi 
Municipality 
10. Linyi Real Estate Bureau 
15. Linyi Agriculture Bureau 
16. Linyi Agriculture Commission  
17. Linyi Agricultural Machinery 
Administration Bureau 
18. Linyi Animal Husbandry Bureau 
19. Linyi Aid-the-Poor Development Office  
11. Linyi Agriculture Bureau 
20. Linyi Economic and Trade Commission 
21. Linyi Trade Bureau 
12. Linyi Economic and Trade Commission 
(including Linyi Safely Production Supervision 
and Administration Bureau) 
22. Linyi Township Enterprise Management 
Bureau 
13. Linyi Small Business Office  (managed by 
Economic and Trade Commission) 
 14. Committee for Restructuring Economic 
System of Linyi Municipality (managed by 
Economic and Trade Commission) 
23. Linyi Communications Commission 15. Linyi Communications Bureau 
24. Linyi Water Resources Bureau 
25. Linyi Aquatic Product Bureau 
16. Linyi Water Resources Bureau (Linyi 
Fisheries Bureau) 
26. Linyi Forestry Bureau 17. Linyi Forestry Bureau 
27. Linyi Grain Administration 18. Linyi Grain Administration 
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28. Linyi Environmental Protection Bureau  19. Linyi Environmental Protection Bureau 
29. Linyi Education Committee 20. Linyi Education Bureau 
30. Linyi Science and Technology Committee  21. Linyi Science and Technology Bureau 
31. Linyi Radio and Television Administration 22. Linyi Radio and Television Administration 
32. Linyi Physical Culture and Sports 
Commission  
23. Linyi Sports Bureau 
33. Linyi Geology Bureau  
34. Linyi Land Management Bureau 
24. Linyi Land Resources and Housing 
Management Bureau 
35. Linyi Personnel Bureau (Office of 
Government Set-up Committee of Linyi 
Municipality) 
25. Linyi Personnel Bureau (Office of 
Government Set-up Committee of Linyi 
Municipality) 
36. Linyi Overseas Chinese Affairs Office 
37. Linyi Foreign Affairs Office 
26. Linyi Foreign Affairs and Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Office 
 27. Linyi Tourism Administration 
38. Linyi Public Security Bureau 28. Linyi Public Security Bureau 
39. Linyi Civil Affairs Bureau 29. Linyi Civil Affairs Bureau 
40. Linyi Justice Bureau 30. Linyi Justice Bureau 
41. Linyi Labour and Social Security Bureau  31. Linyi Labour and Social Security Bureau 
42. Linyi Culture Bureau 
43. Linyi Press and Publication Office 
32. Linyi Culture Bureau (Linyi Press and 
Publication Office) 
44. Linyi Health Bureau 33. Linyi Health Bureau 
45. Linyi Audit Bureau 34. Linyi Audit Bureau 
46. Linyi Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau  35. Linyi Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau 
47. Linyi Statistical Bureau 36. Linyi Statistical Bureau 
48. Linyi Family Planning Commission 37. Linyi Family Planning Commission 
49. Office of Civil Air Defence Commission of 
Linyi Municipality 
38. Office of Civil Air Defence Commission of 
Linyi Municipality 
Source: Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1999, 2004 [Linyi 
Yearbook 1999, 2004] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 2001) (N. B: The 2004 Yearbook was published by 
Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004), pp. 25-36, pp. 29-40 and Linyi Municipal Government, Guanyu 
shiji dangzheng jiguan jigougaige de shishi yijian [Implementing Suggestions on Organizational 














Appendix 8: Proportion of Government Officials of the Total Population in 
Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Cities 
 
Proportion of Government Officials of the Total Population (%) Year 



















































































Source: Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 1996-2004 [Qingdao Statistical 
Yearbook 1996-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1996-2004), pp. 18, 39, pp. 31, 40, 
pp. 31, 40, pp. 31, 40, pp. 31, 41, pp. 39, 49, pp. 37, 47, pp. 38, 47, pp. 61, 73; Jinan Statistical 
Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 1995-2004 [Jinan Statistical Yearbook 1995-2004] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1995-2004), p.26, 331, pp. 22, 54, pp. 26, 52, pp. 30, 67, pp. 46, 81, 
pp. 36, 88, pp. 56, 112, pp. 40, 104, pp. 34, 106, pp. 39, 106; Linyi Statistical Bureau, Linyi tongji 
nianjian 1994, 1996-2003 [Linyi Statistical Yearbook 1994, 1996-2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
tongji chubanshe, 1994, 1996-2003), pp. 17, 32, pp.37, 40, pp. 27, 32, pp. 93, 96, pp. 114, 207, pp. 
17, 19, pp. 53, 58, pp. 41, 45, pp. 41, 45; and Linyi Statistical Bureau, “2003 tongji xinxi” 
[Statistical Information in 2003], see http://www.linyi.gov.cn/tjxx/tjxx.asp?page=sjcx, accessed on 




Appendix 9: Percentage of Administrative Expense of the Total Local 
Government Expenditure in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Cities 
 
Percentage of Administrative Expense of the Total Local Government 
Expenditure (%) 
Year 
Qingdao Jinan  Linyi 


















































































Source: Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 1996-2004 [Qingdao Statistical 
Yearbook 1996-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1996-2004), p. 243, p. 247, p. 241, p. 
231, p. 89, p. 95, p. 93, p. 93, p.125; Jinan Statistical Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 1995-2004 
[Jinan Statistical Yearbook 1995-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1995-2004), p. 227, 
p. 139, p. 147, p. 168, p. 147, p. 158, p. 180, p. 172, p. 178, p. 174; Linyi Statistical Bureau, Linyi 
tongji nianjian 1994, 1996-2003 [Linyi Statistical Yearbook 1994, 1996-2003] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1994, 1996-2003), p. 60, p. 203, p. 272, p. 364, p. 435, p. 268, p. 319, 
p. 323, p. 346; and “Government Expenditure in 17 Municipalities of Shandong Province in 





Appendix 10: Number of Items of Administrative Approval in Qingdao, Jinan 
and Linyi Cities 
 
Year Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994-1998 1,263 1,113 1,088 
1999-2003 371 385 459 
Source: Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 2002 [Qingdao 
Yearbook 2002] (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2002), p. 243; Qingdao Municipal 
Government, Yifaxingzheng gongzuo baogao [The Report on Administration in Accordance with 
Law of Qingdao City], 2005; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 
2001-2004 [Jinan Yearbook 2001-2004] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 2001-2004), p. 107, p. 67, pp. 
79-80, pp. 69-70; Jinan Municipal Government, Guanyu gongbu shiji disipi quxiao de xingzheng 
shenpi shixiang de tonggao [The Advice of Dissolving Items of Administrative Approval for the 
Fourth Round in Jinan City], 2003; Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi 
nianjian 2002-2003 [Linyi Yearbook 2002-2003] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002-2003), p. 76, p. 
73; “Linyishi xingzheng shenpi zhidu gaige qude jieduanxing chengguo” [The Administrative 
Approval Reform Has Made Phase Achievements], see http://www.linyi.gov.cn/ldjh/ldjh.asp, 
accessed on 13 August 2005; and “Linyishi quxiao 158 xiang xingzheng shenpi shixiang he 67 
xiang shoufei xiangmu” [Linyi Government Dissolved 158 Items of Administrative Approval and 


























Appendix 11: Percentage of Public Expenditure on Education of the Total 
Government Expenditure in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Cities 
 
Percentage of Public Expenditure on Education of the Total Local 
Government Expenditure (%) 
Year 
Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994 13.79%(382.55/2,773.31) NA NA 
1995 11.83%(446.00/3,769.82) NA NA 
1996 12.20%(573.00/4,695.69) 17.97% (544.06/3027.54) 26.22%(585.21/2,231.85) 
1997 13.42%(758.00/5,647.87) 16.70% (638.69/3823.91) 23.97% (589.28/2457.95) 























































Source: Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 1996-2004 [Qingdao Statistical 
Yearbook 1996-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1996-2004), p. 241, p. 247, p. 239, p. 
231, p. 89, p. 95, p. 93, p. 93, p.123; “Government Expenditure in 17 Municipalities of Shandong 
Province in 2000-2003,” see 
http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000001992;http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?i
d=1000001521;http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000000335;http://www.stats-sd.gov.c
n/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000003245, accessed on 16 February 2006; Qingdao Local Chronicles 
Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1995-2000 [Qingdao Yearbook 1995] (Jinan: 
Shandong youyi chubanshe, 1995) (N. B: The 1996-1997 Yearbooks were published by Jinan: 
Qilu shushe, 1996-1997; the 1998 Yearbook was published by Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1998; the 
1999-2000 Yearbooks were published by Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 1999-2000), p. 
188, p. 291, p. 229, p. 217, p. 6, p. 233; Jinan Statistical Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 1995-2004 
[Jinan Statistical Yearbook 1995-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1995-2004), p. 227, 
p. 139, p. 147, p. 169, p. 147, p. 158, p. 180, p. 172, p. 178, p. 174; and Linyi Statistical Bureau, 
Linyi tongji nianjian 1994, 1996-2003 [Linyi Statistical Yearbook 1994, 1996-2003] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1994, 1996-2003), p. 60, p. 203, p. 272, p. 364, p. 435, p. 268, p. 319, 
p. 323, p. 347. 
 306 
Appendix 12: Number of Student Enrolment of Secondary and Tertiary 
Education in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Cities 
 
Number of Student Enrolment of 
Secondary Education per 10,000 
Persons 
Number of Student Enrolment of 
Tertiary Education per 10,000 Persons 
Year 
Qingdao Jinan  Linyi Qingdao Jinan  Linyi 
1994 619 604 528.76 36.87 102 8.49 
1995 657.6 641 515 36.38 104 8.13 
1996 678.9 668 565.5 37.8 107 9.31 
1997 666.7 682 609 39.4 113 7.58 































1999 654 661 714.8 48 130 7.7 
2000 704 703 800 65 165 10.5 
2001 763 724 802.6 85 302 15.1 
2002 804 781 787 115 669 16.1 






























Source: Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 1994, 1996-2004 [Qingdao 
Statistical Yearbook 1994, 1996-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1994, 
1996-2004), p. 17, pp. 274, 309, p. 17, p. 17, p. 17, p. 17, p. 17, p. 15, p. 15, p. 35; Jinan 
Statistical Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 1994-2004 [Jinan Statistical Yearbook 1994-2004] 
(Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1994-2004), p. 326, p. 310, p. 385, p. 357, p. 373, p. 
351, p. 395, p. 409, p. 427, p. 435, p. 431; Linyi Statistical Bureau, Linyi tongji nianjian 1994, 
1996-2003 [Linyi Statistical Yearbook 1994, 1996-2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji 
chubanshe, 1994, 1996-2003), p. 332, p. 237, p. 309, p. 403, p. 144, p. 275, p. 327, p. 333, p. 
356; and Linyi Municipal Government, “2004 tongji xinxi” [Statistical Information in 2004], 









Appendix 13: Percentage of Public Expenditure on Health of the Total 
Government Expenditure in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Cities 
 
Percentage of Public Expenditure on Health of the Total Local Government 
Expenditure (%) 
Year 
Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994 7.44% (206.43/2,773.31) NA NA 
1995 6.07% (228.94/3,769.82) NA NA 
1996 1.81% (84.77/4,695.69) 5.72% (173.22/3027.54) 6.07% (135.47/2,231.85) 
1997 0.28% (15.60/5,647.87) 6.01% (229.65/3823.91) 6.18% (152.00/2457.95) 












1999 4.70% (348.32/7,409.37) 5.01% (254.22/5,072.23) 5.03% (157.26/3,125.16) 
2000 5.83% (512.58/8,787.02) 4.86% (275.57/5,667.35) 4.78% (162.26/3,395.81) 
2001 4.75% (521.82/10,978.48) 4.60% (338.95/7,362.39) 4.52% (179.81/3,980.34) 
2002 5.48% (682.20/12,438.80) 4.14% (359.67/8,677.74) 4.78% (214.31/4,481.66) 














Source: Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 1996-2003 [Qingdao Statistical 
Yearbook 1996-2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1996-2003), p. 241, p. 247, p. 239, p. 
231, p. 89, p. 95, p. 93, p. 93; “Government Expenditure in 17 Municipalities of Shandong 
Province in 2000-2003,” see 
http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000001992;http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?i
d=1000001521;http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000000335;http://www.stats-sd.gov.c
n/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000003245, accessed on 16 February 2006; Jinan Statistical Bureau, Jinan 
tongji nianjian 1995-2003 [Jinan Statistical Yearbook 1995-2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji 
chubanshe, 1995-2003), p. 227, p. 139, p. 147, p. 169, p. 147, p. 158, p. 180, p. 172, p. 178; and 
Linyi Statistical Bureau, Linyi tongji nianjian 1994, 1996-2003 [Linyi Statistical Yearbook 1994, 
1996-2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1994, 1996-2003), p. 60, p. 203, p. 272, p. 364, 










Appendix 14: Number of Physicians and Hospital Beds per 1,000 people in 
Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Cities 
 
Physicians per 1,000 People (person) Hospital Beds per 1,000 People (bed) Year 
Qingdao Jinan Linyi Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994 1.99 2.82 0.67 3.64 3.72 1.44 
1995 2.02 2.79 0.87 3.69 3.83 1.46 
1996 2.00 2.97 0.76 3.52 3.76 1.52 
1997 2.05 2.74 0.79 3.62 3.90 1.53 




























1999 2.06 2.71 0.85 3.62 3.90 1.58 
2000 2.10 2.95 0.88 3.45 3.86 1.63 
2001 2.22 2.93 0.89 3.48 3.85 1.64 
2002 1.87 2.39 0.93 2.99 3.75 1.76 




























Source: Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 1996-2004 [Qingdao Statistical 
Yearbook 1996-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1996-2004), p. 300, p. 315, p. 17, p. 
17, p. 17, p. 17, p. 15, p. 15, p. 35; Jinan Statistical Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 1995-2004 
[Jinan Statistical Yearbook 1995-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1995-2004), p. 315, 
p. 395, p. 367, p. 385, p. 364, p. 408, p. 422, p. 440, p. 448, p. 444; Linyi Statistical Bureau, Linyi 
tongji nianjian 1994, 1996-2003 [Linyi Statistical Yearbook 1994, 1996-2003] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1994, 1996-2003), p. 333, p. 242, p. 315, p. 406, p. 446, p. 276, p. 
329, p. 335, p. 358; and Linyi Municipal Government, “2004 tongji xinxi” [Statistical Information 














Appendix 15: Infant Mortality Rate in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Municipalities 
 
Year Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994 NA NA NA 
1995 15.00‰ 12.60‰ 21.70‰ 
1996 9.91‰ 13.40‰ NA 
1997 9.29‰ 20.00‰ 22.10‰ 












1999 7.73‰ 13.43‰ 21.00‰ 
2000 7.36‰ 11.80‰ 15.60‰ 
2001 NA NA 14.84‰ 
2002 6.01‰ 11.22‰ 14.84‰ 













Source: Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1996-1997, 2001 [Qingdao 
Yearbook 1996-1997] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996-1997) (N. B: The 2001 Yearbook was published by Beijing: 
Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2001), p. 334, p. 261, p. 191; “Outline for Children Development in Qingdao City 
(2001-2010),” see http://women.qingdao.gov.cn/topic/ertong.htm, accessed on 9 March 2006; “Introduction of 
Qingdao Health Work in 1998,” see http://www.chinacity.net/zgcs/shandong/qingdao/page28/page51.htm, 
accessed on 9 March 2006; “Qingdao Government Actively Promoting Women and Children Development,” see 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/14562/3437101.html, accessed on 9 March 2006; “The Development of Qingdao 
Health Work,” see http://www.qingdaonews.com/content/2005-10/26/content_5537162.htm, accessed on 9 March 
2006; “The New Development of Women and Children Work in Qingdao City,” see 
http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjfx/sqfxdisp.asp?id=2003003081, accessed on 9 March 2006; Jinan Local 
Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1996-1997, 1999, 2001, 2003 [Jinan Yearbook 1996-1997, 
1999, 2001, 2003] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 1996-1997, 1999, 2001, 2003), p. 260, p. 249, p. 259, p. 318, p. 257; 
Jinan Municipal Government, “The Suggestions for Health Development in Jinan City,” see 
http://www.jinan.gov.cn/col639/col678/jnnj/sj/ding90.94.96.98/1998/zcfgxb/7.htm, accessed on 10 March 2006; 
“Jinan Health Management,” see http://www.jnrs.gov.cn/readrs.asp?AID=1753, accessed on 10 March 2006; 
“Outline for Children Development in Jinan City (2001-2010),” see 
http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjfx/sqfxdisp.asp?id=2004002149, accessed on 10 March 2006; Linyi Local 
Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1995, 1998, 2001-2004 [Linyi Yearbook 1995, 1998, 
2001-2004] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1997, 2000) (N. B: The 2001 Yearbook was published by Hong Kong New Times 
Press, 2001; the 2002-2004 Yearbooks were published by Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002-2004), p. 279, p. 255, p. 
270, p. 247, p. 255, p. 221;  and “Introduction of Linyi City,” see 





Appendix 16: Percentage of People with Access to an Improved Water Source in 
Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Municipalities 
 
Year Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994 99.7% 100% NA 
1995 100% 100% 91.00% 
1996 100% 100% 95.40% 
1997 100% 100% 92.00% 














1999 100% 100% 97.39% 
2000 100% 100% 94.86% 
2001 100% 98% 98.00% 
2002 100% 100% 100% 














Source: Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1995-1998, 
2000-2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 1995-1998, 2000-2002] (Jinan: Shandong youyi chubanshe, 1995) 
(N. B: The 1996-1997 Yearbooks were published by Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996-1997; the 1998 
yearbook was published by Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1998; the 2000-2002 yearbooks were 
published by Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 2000-2002), pp. 63, 207, p. 259, p. 204, p. 187, 
p. 196, p. 192, pp. 109, 323; Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 2003-2004 
[Qingdao Statistical Yearbook 2003-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2003-2004), p. 
144, p. 204; “Planning as A Whole about the Development of City and Countryside in Qingdao 
City,” see http://www.economicdaily.com.cn/no1/newsmore/200602/05/t20060205_106815.shtml, 
accessed on 5 February 2006; Jinan Statistical Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 1997-2004 [Jinan 
Statistical Yearbook 1997-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1997-2004), p. 130, p. 204, 
p. 134, p. 142, p. 162, p. 154, p. 158, p. 158; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), 
Jinan nianjian 1998-2003 [Jinan Yearbook 1998-2003] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 1998-2003), p. 
117, p. 206, p. 268, p. 319, p. 259; “Outline for Children Development in Jinan City (2001-2010),” 
see http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjfx/sqfxdisp.asp?id=2004002149, accessed on 10 March 2006; 
Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1996, 1998, 2004 [Linyi 
Yearbook 1996, 1998, 2004] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1998, 2000) (N. B: The 2004 Yearbook was 
published by Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004), p. 295, p. 256, p. 332; and Linyi Statistical Bureau, 
Linyi tongji nianjian 1996-2001, 2003 [Linyi Statistical Yearbook 1996-2001, 2003] (Beijing: 




Appendix 17: Public Expenditure for Pensions and Relief Funds for Social 
Welfare as A Percentage of Total Government Expenditure in Qingdao, Jinan 
and Linyi Cities 
 
Public Expenditure for Pensions and Relief Funds for Social Welfare as A 
Percentage of Total Local Government Expenditure (%) 
Year 
Qingdao Jinan  Linyi 
1994 2.28% (63.20//2,773.31) 3.30% (50.17/1,520.19) 4.85% (67.77/1,397.01) 
1995 2.45% (92.40/3,769.82) 2.87% (56.28/1,963.39) 3.87% (63.95/1,654.35) 
1996 2.11% (99.12/4,695.69) 1.99% (60.14/ 3027.54) 2.68% (59.73/ 2,231.85) 
1997 2.30% (129.84/5,647.87) 2.19% (83.93/ 3823.91) 3.07% (75.44/ 2457.95) 













1999 2.35% (173.85/7,409.37) 2.42% (122.98/ 5,072.23) 3.27% (102.17/ 3,125.16) 
2000 2.42% (212.72/8,787.02) 3.14% (177.72/ 5,667.35) 3.34% (113.39/ 3,395.81) 
2001 2.13% (233.47/10,978.48) 2.61% (191.93/ 7,362.39) 3.47% (138.27/3,980.34) 
2002 2.42% (301.44/12,438.80) 2.53% (219.63/ 8,677.74) 3.09% (138.27/ 4,481.66) 













Source: Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 1996-2004 [Qingdao Statistical 
Yearbook 1996-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1996-2004), p. 243, p. 247, p. 241, p. 
231, p. 89, p. 95, p. 93, p. 93, p. 125; Jinan Statistical Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 1995-2004 
[Jinan Statistical Yearbook 1995-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1995-2004), p. 227, 
p. 139, p. 147, p. 168, p. 147, p. 158, p. 180, p. 172, p. 178, p. 174; Linyi Statistical Bureau, Linyi 
tongji nianjian 1994, 1996-2003 [Linyi Statistical Yearbook 1994, 1996-2003] (Beijing: 
Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1994, 1996-2003), p. 60, p. 203, p. 272, p. 364, p. 435, p. 268, p. 319, 















Appendix 18: Percentage of Pension Contributors among Total Urban 
Employees in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Cities 
Percentage of Pension Contributors among Total Urban Employees (%) Year 
Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994 63.57% NA NA 
1995 64.17% 58.21% 65.32% 
1996 61.49% 57.55% 63.41% 
1997 59.07% 58.75% 70.53% 
1998 58.23% 68.93% 75.67% 











1999 79.90% 86.66% 77.55% 
2000 85.50% 89.70% 70.56% 
2001 91.58% 79.51% 78.24% 
2002 82.96% 82.71% 76.74% 
2003 97.37% 92.85% 74.15% 











Source: Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 1996-2004 [Qingdao Statistical 
Yearbook 1996-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1996-2004), p. 18, p. 38, p. 38, p. 38, 
p. 40, p. 48, p. 46, p. 46, p. 70; Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao 
nianjian 1995-2002 [Qingdao Yearbook 1995-2002] (Jinan: Shandong youyi chubanshe, 1995) (N. 
B: The 1996-1997 Yearbooks were published by Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996-1997; the 1998 
Yearbook was published by Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1998; the 1999-2002 Yearbooks were 
published by Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 1999-2002), pp. 48-49, p. 340, p. 44, p. 248, pp. 
252-253, pp. 9, 267, p. 197, p. 318; Jinan Statistical Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 1997-2004 
[Jinan Statistical Yearbook 1997-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1997-2004), p. 51, 
p.66, p.51, p.44, p. 56, p. 50, p. 48, p. 39; Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan 
nianjian 1995-2001 [Jinan Yearbook 1995-2001] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 1995-2001), p. 217, pp. 
46, 266, p. 256, p. 29, pp. 30, 266, pp. 273-274, p. 325; Linyi Statistical Bureau, Linyi tongji 
nianjian 1994,1996-2003 [Linyi Statistical Yearbook 1994, 1996-2003] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji 
chubanshe, 1994, 1996-2003), p. 10, p. 8, p. 31, p. 95, p. 119, p. 19, p. 57, p. 44, p. 45; Linyi 
Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1995-1999, 2001[Linyi Yearbook 
1995-1999, 2001] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1997-2001) (N. B: The 2001 Yearbook was published by 
Hong Kong New Times Press, 2001), pp. 100, 280, pp. 23, 99, 100, p. 256, pp. 24, 246; “Total 
Urban Employees in 17 Municipalities of Shandong Province in 2000-2002,” see 
http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000001859;http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?i
d=1000001450;http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000000267, accessed on 13 March 
2006; and “Total Contributors of Basic Insurances in 17 Municipalities of Shandong Province in 
2001-2003,”seehttp://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000001466;http://www.stats-sd.gov.c
n/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000000284;http://www.stats-sd.gov.cn/disp/tjsj.asp?id=1000003205,accessed 
on 15 March 2006. 
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Appendix 19: Unemployment Rate of Total Labor Force in Qingdao, Jinan and 
Linyi Municipalities 
 
Year Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994 1.90% 2.09% NA 
1995 2.18% 2.30% 4.00% 
1996 1.95% 2.80% 3.48% 
1997 2.00% 3.38% 3.04% 














1999 2.60% 3.68% 3.36% 
2000 3.05% 3.70% 3.55% 
2001 3.90% 3.80% 3.50% 
2002 3.80% 3.89% 3.20% 














Source: Qingdao Statistical Bureau, Qingdao tongji nianjian 1995-2004 [Qingdao Statistical 
Yearbook 1995-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1995-2004), p. 8, p. 8, p. 7, p. 7, p. 9, 
p. 8, p. 8, p. 8, p. 7, p. 6; Jinan Statistical Bureau, Jinan tongji nianjian 1998-2004 [Jinan 
Statistical Yearbook 1998-2004] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1998-2004), p. 41, p. 78, p. 
86, p. 110, p. 56, p. 54, p. 104; Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 
1995-1999, 2001-2004 [Linyi Yearbook 1995-1999, 2001-2004] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1997-2001) 
(N. B: The 2001 Yearbook was published by Hong Kong New Times Press, 2001; the 2002-2004 
Yearbooks were published by Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002-2004), p. 107, p. 111, p. 100, p. 96, 
p. 247, p. 276, p. 251, p. 24, p. 226; and Linyi Statistical Bureau, Linyi tongji nianjian 1998, 2001 














Appendix 20: Citizen Reports of Corruption Received by the CCP’s Commission 
for Discipline Inspection in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Municipalities 
 
Year Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994 12,385 8,460 6,011 
1995 12,472 9,972 6,951 
1996 12,104 10,482 7,725 
1997 10,005 8,753 8,890 
1998 11,383 9,460 9,520 











1999 9,448 9,057 8,670 
2000 9,356 9,114 7,695 
2001 8,306 7,628 6,882 
2002 8,789 6,088 5,947 
2003 7,989 5,984 5,400 











Source: Qingdao Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Qingdao nianjian 1995-2004 
[Qingdao Yearbook 1995-2004] (Jinan: Shandong youyi chubanshe, 1995) (N. B: The 1996-1997 
Yearbooks were published by Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1996-1997; the 1998 Yearbook was published by 
Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1998; the 1999-2002 Yearbooks were published by Beijing: Wuzhou 
chuanbo chubanshe, 1999-2002; the 2003-2004 Yearbooks were published by Qingdao: Qingdao 
shizhi bangongshi, 2003-2004), p. 106, p. 125, p. 102, p. 88, p. 85, p. 96, p. 58, p. 66, p. 86, p. 89; 
Jinan Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Jinan nianjian 1995-2004 [Jinan Yearbook 
1995-2004] (Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 1995-2004), p. 63, p. 90, p. 79, p. 75, p. 80, p. 72, p. 106, p. 
67, p. 79, p. 67; and Linyi Local Chronicles Compilation Office (ed.), Linyi nianjian 1995-1999, 
2001-2004 [Linyi Yearbook 1995-1999, 2001-2004] (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1997-2001) (N. B: The 
2001 Yearbook was published by Hong Kong New Times Press, 2001; the 2002-2004 Yearbooks 














Appendix 21: Number of Cases Investigated by the CCP’s Commission for 
Discipline and Inspection in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Municipalities 
 
Year Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994 604 656 431 
1995 626 662 502 
1996 669 671 421 
1997 713 690 405 
1998 769 672 542 











1999 788 630 514 
2000 809 631 505 
2001 820 570 497 
2002 825 541 465 
2003 828 554 503 




































Appendix 22: Number of Officials Disciplined in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi 
Municipalities 
 
Year Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994 527 339 445 
1995 582 465 411 
1996 615 532 526 
1997 665 688 491 
1998 669 657 507 











1999 727 685 548 
2000 726 652 587 
2001 736 626 651 
2002 798 608 564 
2003 828 612 651 




































Appendix 23: Officials Disciplined as Percentage of Total Number of Officials in 
Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Municipalities 
 
Year Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994 1.03% (527/51,000) 0.57% (339/58,981) 0.84% (445/53,136) 
1995 1.10% (582/53,000) 0.76% (465/61,052) 0.73% (411/56,310) 
1996 1.01% (615/61,183) 0.83% (532/63,884) 0.87% (526/60,572) 
1997 1.03% (665/64,757) 1.03% (688/66,744) 0.75% (491/65,600) 













1999 1.15% (727/63,000) 0.96% (685/71,072) 0.79% (548/69,785) 
2000 1.13% (726/64,200) 0.90% (652/72,380) 0.82% (587/71,529) 
2001 1.17% (736/63,000) 0.86% (626/72,380) 0.88% (651/73,611) 
2002 1.21% (798/66,000) 0.84% (608/71,958) 0.77% (564/73,182) 






































Appendix 24: Number of Officials Disciplined at xian-chu (county/department) 
Rank or Above in Qingdao, Jinan and Linyi Municipalities 
 
Year Qingdao Jinan Linyi 
1994 21 25 7 
1995 27 29 10 
1996 20 19 6 
1997 53 37 5 









1999 47 55 7 
2000 57 56 14 
2001 47 62 15 
2002 57 64 9 









Source: refer to the source of Appendix 20. 
 
 
